A World at Arms (193 page)

163
ADAP
,
D, 10, No. 164.

164
On the journey and activities of the
Komet,
code-named “Schiff 45,” see Weinberg,
Germany and the Soviet Union,
pp. 83–84; “Lagebesprechung beim Chef der Seekriegsleitung,” 26 June 1940, KTB Ski A 10, BA/MA, RM 7/13, f. 271; KTB Ski “A 12, 1 Aug. and 12 Aug. 1940, RM 7/15, f. 7 and 264; German Naval Attache Moscow report of 9 Sept. 1940, RM 7/92, f. 588–93; KTB Ski A 13, 12 Sept. 1940, RM 7/16, f. 160–61; Jürgen Rohwer and Gerhard Hummelchen,
Chronik des Seekrieges
1939–45 (Oldenburg: Stalling, 1968), pp. 58,88,89,93, 156, 158, 187, 194.

165
“Vortrag Marineattache Moskau, Kapitan z.S. Baumbach, bei Chef I/Skl,” 12 Sept. 1940, KTB Skl A 13, BA/MA, RM 7/16, f. 156;
ADAP
,
D, 10, No. 206. Given the limited cargo space available, the Soviet Union was willing to carry such critical raw materials as tin, rubber, molybdenum and wolfram from East Asia to Germany but preferred to transport other items only if really essential for war industry. See Ian D. Mac Donald, “Diplomacy, Trade and War: The British Naval Blockade and the German Search for Raw Materials in the Far East, 1939–1941,” MA thesis, Univ. of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1987.

166
ADAP
,
D, 10, No. 162; Schulenburg (Moscow) tels. 1398 of 13 July 1940 and 1502 of 29 July 1940, AA, St.S., “Litauen,” fr. 193334 and 193351.

167
ADAP
,
D, 10, Nos. 77, 84, 141, 182, 214, 217, 223, 242.

168
There is an excellent account in Toscano,
Designs in Diplomacy,
chap. 3. See also Schulenburg (Moscow) tel. 1497 of 29 July 1940, AA, St.S., “Russland,” Bd. 2, fr. 112342, and Tippelskich (Moscow) tel. 1046 of 30 Apr. 1941, St.S., “Russland,” Bd. 4, fr. 113383.

169
It should be noted that Soviet relations with the U.S. remained very cool at this time, a fact known to the Germans
ADAP
,
D, 10, No. 59).

170
See People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to the Soviet embassy in Tokyo, 1 July 1940, in Morley,
Fateful Choice
, pp. 311–12.

171
On Soviet–Japanese relations, see the project for a partition of China between Japan and the Soviet Union put forward by the Soviet ambassador to Japan on June 28, 1940 (ibid., p. 31 I) which extraordinarily resembles a plan set forth by Shiratori Toshio on July 19, 1939. Cf. ibid., pp. 41–44.

172
David Dilks (ed.),
The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, O.M. 1938–1945
(New York: G. P. Putnam’s, 1972), p. 331.

173
A summary with documents in Brügel,
Stalin und Hitler
.

174
Summary in Woodward,
British Foreign Policy
, 1: 473–74. The full text, which was sent to Churchill, is in N 6029/283/38, PRO, FO 371/24852.

175
Ch’i,
Nationalist China
, pp. 56–60, 89–92, 128–30.

176
ADAP
, D, 9, Nos. 29, 233, 327, 414, 491; Joachim Peck (ed.),
Kolonialismus ohne Kolonien: Der deutsche Imperialismus und China 1937
(Berlin East: Akademie Verlag, 1961), No. 134; Gordon M. Berger,
Parties out of Power in Japan
, 1931–1941 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1977), pp. 241–42, 254, 258–59.

177
See Ott (Tokyo) tels. 355 of 17 Apr. 1940 and 367 of 20 Apr. 1940, AA, 5t.S., “Japan,” Bd. 2, fr. 136289–90 and 136291; documents in AA, Ha Pol, Clodius, “Japan,” Bd. 3; the diary of the German naval attache in Tokyo edited by Chapman,
Price of Admiralty
, passim; and the thesis by Mac Donald cited in n 165, above.

178
Morley,
Fateful Choice
, p. 157.

179
Ibid., p. 243.

180
Boyle,
China and Japan at War
, pp. 274–75.

181
Morley,
Fateful Choice
, pp. 243–44;
ADAP
, D, 9, No. 123.

182
ADAP
, D, 9, Nos. 234, 261, 262, 273, 280, 302, 502; Morley,
Fateful Choice
, p. 244; Arita (Tokyo), to Washington No. 968, to the Hague No. 149 of I I May 1940, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 4196; Arita (Tokyo) to Washington No. 230 of 15 May 1940, SRDJ 4282; Tokyo to Batavia No. 209, to Berlin No. 280 of 16 May 1940, SRDJ 4714. On Japan’s insignificant production of shale and synthetic oil, see Barnhart,
Japan Prepares
, pp. 29, 146–47.

183
Morley,
Fateful Choice
, pp. 38–41.

184
Ibid., pp. 245–46.

185
Gordon W. Prange,
At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981), p. 14, which places this in March or April.

186
Morley,
Deterrent Diplomacy
, pp. 206–7. For German recognition of this shift and the immediate desire of the German navy to take advantage of it to obtain assistance for its
operations in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, see KTB Skl A 10, 1 June 1940, BA/MA, RM 7/13, f. 2.

187
The Japanese army as well as the navy now wanted to move south; see Barnhart,
Japan Prepares,
pp. 158–59. On the French giving in, see Morley,
Fateful Choice,
pp. 158–60, 162–88, 254–55, 301–2. The Germans watched this process with care: they wanted the Japanese to commit themselves by occupying French Indo-China but saw no reason to assist the Yonai government’s shaky domestic position by pressuring Vichy in their behalf;
ADAP
,
D, 9, Nos. 484, 511, 514; D, 10, No.6. The original agreement had been signed by Georges Catroux as governor but he was replaced (and joined de Gaulle) by Vichy with Jean Decoux who agreed to the Japanese occupation.

188
On the British answer to Japanese demands, see the War Cabinet meetings 172 of 19 and 173 of 20 June 1940 in PRO, CAB 65/7, and 194 of 5 and 199 of 10 July 1940 in CAB 65/8; Arita (Tokyo) to Washington No. 313, to London No. 513 of 29 June 1940, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 5007–8.

189
Morley,
Deterrent Diplomacy
, pp. 208–14; Morley,
Fateful Choice
, pp. 247–49, 249–53; Butow, Tojo, pp. 139–41; Yamaji (Vienna) to Tokyo No. 121 of 26 June 1940, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 4994–98 and No. 140 of 24 July 1940, SRDJ 5470–73, Inoue (Budapest) to Washington and Tokyo No. 122 of 6 July 1940, SRDJ 5142–50;
ADAP
, D, 10, No. 147.

190
Note Yamamoto’s sensing of this timetable for Japan as noted in the diary of the German naval attache on Sept 13. 1940, Chapman, Price of Admiralty, 1: 264.

191
Morley,
Fateful Choice
, pp. 140–41,254.

192
Kido Koichi,
The Diary of Marquis Kido, 1931–45: Selected Translations into English
(Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America, 1984), pp. 244ff (esp. the entry for July 1I, 1940). (Henceforth cited as
Kido Diary
).

193
See Berger,
Parties out of Power
, pp. 268–69.

194
The best account in English remains James B. Crowley,
Japan’s Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy, 1930–1938
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1964), pp. 358–75. See also the account in Barnhart, Japan Prepares, chaps. 4 and 5.

195
Berger,
Parties out of Power
, pp. 254–70;
ADAP
, D, 10, No. 241.

196
On these debates and their conclusion, see Krebs,
Japans Deutschlandpolitik
1: 438–40; Berger, pp. 269–70; Butow,
Tojo
, pp. 140–53; Morley,
Deterrent Diplomacy
, pp. 216–21; Morley,
Fateful Choice
, pp. 44–45, 264–65; Boyle,
China and Japan
, p. 300. On the domestic aspect of the new policy, see esp. Berger, pp. 272–92.

197
Borg and Okamoto,
Pearl Harbor
, p. 251; Morley,
Fateful Choice
, p. 266.

198
The quotation is from Matsuoka’s draft of a Tripartite Pact policy; the full text is in Morley,
Deterrent Diplomacy
, pp. 283–88; discussion of it in ibid., p. 221and Morley,
Fateful Choice
, pp. 47–49, 265–66.

199
Borg and Okamoto, pp. 99–101; documents in F 3634/677/23, PRO, FO 371/24741.

200
ADAP
, D, 10, No. 273; Morley,
Deterrent Diplomacy
, pp. 223–28.

201
Ian Kershaw,
The ‘Hitler Myth’: Image and Reality in the Third Reich
(New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1987), pp. 154–60.

202
Note
ADAP
, D, 9, No. 397.

203
See the comments by Goebbels on June 16, 1940, that France must be crushed absolutely and not allowed to recover as Germany had after 1918. Britain would be made into an enlarged Holland (Boelcke,
Kriegspropaganda
, p. 392).

204
This is also the interpretation in the books of Paxton and Jackel (see Bibliographic Essay, p. 928).

205
On the invasion plans and preparations, see the works of Lampe, Ansel, Fleming, Wheatley, Klee, and the detailed notes by General Reinhardt in BA/MA, N 245/7. There is a facsimile reprint of the German occupation handbook in
Gennan Occupied Great Britain: The Official Secret Documents, Ordinances of the Military Authorities
(Scutt: Foord,
1971); the German arrest list with over 2800 names has been reprinted,
The Black Book (Sonderfahndungsliste G.B.)
(London: Imperial War Museum, 1989).

206
ADAP
, D, 10, Nos. 73, 129; Douglas A. Farnie,
East and West of Suez: The Suez Canal in History,
1854–1956 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), p. 621.

207
Knox,
Mussolini Unleashed,
pp. 146–48.

208
The best recent account in ibid., pp. 15off. Knox is correct in stressing Mussolini’s concern about an early peace between Germany and England in which Italian aspirations would be disregarded by the Germans and the role this concern played in his futile efforts to get his generals and admirals moving. A rather different view is presented in James J. Sadkovich, “Understanding Defeat: Reappraising Italy’s Role in World War II,”
JCH 24,
No.1 (Jan. 1989), 27–61. More balanced, Brian R. Sullivan, “The Italian Armed Forces 1918–1940,” in Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray (eds.),
Military Effectiveness,
Vol.
2,
The Interwar Period
(Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1988), pp. 169–217.

209
Weinberg,
World in the Balance,
pp. 96–136; Klaus Hildebrand,
Vom Reich zum Weltreich: Hitler, NSDAP und koloniale Frage 1919–1945
(Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1969). For a perspective from the former German Democratic Republic (where the major German colonial records were located), see Helmuth Stoecker (ed.),
German Imperialism in Africa
(London: C. Hurst, 1986), chap. 12. See also Lammers to Schwerin von Krosigk, “RM Nr. 4992/39,” of 20 Nov. 1939, BA, R 2/4509, and the references to Hitler’s meeting with Ritter von Epp on 7, 8, and 19 July 1940 for a total of 9.5 hours, in BA, Nachlass Epp 2013.

210
Hitler’s views were set forth by him to the chief of the high command of the armed forces (OKW), Wilhelm Keitel, the prospective Minister for the Colonies, Ritter von Epp, and the OKW representative on colonial matters, Colonel Werner von Geldern-Crispendorf, in conferences on July 13, 1940; see the account of the last named in BA/MA, N 185/4, f. 1191–97; cf. Weinberg,
World in the Balance,
p. 114, and Hildebrand, pp. 666–67. By July 19 the Italians knew the dimensions of the planned German colonial empire, see
ADAP
,
D, 10, No. 193.

211
On German negotiations with the nationalist opposition in the Union of South Africa, see
ADAP
,
D, 8, Nos. 577, 629; 9, No. 25. Both Hertzog and Malan were at this time urging an immediate peace with Germany; see Kenneth Ingham,
Jan Christian Smuts, The Conscience of a South African
(New York: St. Martin’s, 1986), p. 210. German plans for the recovery of German Southwest Africa assumed the exclusion of Walfishbay; see “Verwaltungsorganisation Deutsch Südwestafrika,” 18 Jan 1940, BA, R 2/4985a.

212
Proof coins are in BA, R 2/30737.

213
Interesting clues to Hitler’s thinking on this point are in his comments to Abetz, the new Foreign Ministry representative in France, on 3 Aug. 1940
ADAP
,
D, 10, No. 345).

214
Recent accounts of the Madagascar plan are in Breitman,
Architect of Genocide
, passim, and Hans-Jürgen Döscher,
Das Auswärtige Amt im Dritten Reich: Diplomatie im Schatten der “Endlösung"
(Berlin: Siedler, 1987), pp. 215–20. See also Christopher R. Browning, The
Final Solution and the German Foreign Office: A Study of Amt D III of Abteilung Deutschland 1940–43
(New York: Holmes & Meier, 1978), pp. 35–43; Boe1cke,
Kriegspropaganda
, PP’ 510–1I; Fröhlich,
Goebbels Tagebücher
, 26 July 1940, 4: 253.

215
A summary in Eberhard Jackel,
Hitlers Herrschaft: Vollzug einer Weltanschauung
(Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1986), pp. 89–99.

216
Note Hillgruber’s summary in Jürgen Rohwer and Eberhard Jackel (eds.),
Der Mord an den Juden im Zweiten Weltkrieg: Entschlussbildung and Verwirklichung
(Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1985), PP’ 218–20.

217
See also the Goebbels conference of July 9, 1940, Boe1cke,
Kriegspropaganda
, p. 421.

218
For suggestions that Germany annex a portion of Hungary that the latter had acquired in the 1919 peace settlement, see the material on “Der Anschluss Odenburgs an das Reich, zu 40/41 geh.Reichssache,” in AA, Pol XII.

219
The editor of von Leeb’s papers, Georg Meyer,
Generalfeldmarschall Ritter von Leeb: Tagebuchauft;eichnungen und Lagebeurteilungen aus zwei Weltkriegen
(Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1976), p. 58, claims that this was merely routine staff work, but the entries in von Leeb’s diary for 28 June, I July, 10 July and 1 Oct. 1940, as well as other evidence, contradict Meyer’s apologia. (Publication henceforth cited as
Leeb KTB.)