A Very Private Celebrity (29 page)
Read A Very Private Celebrity Online
Authors: Hugh Purcell
In January 1969, she had given an interview to the fashion queen of the
Sunday Times
, Ernestine Carter. It was revealing:
âJohn,' says Catherine Freeman, whose husband is the ambassador-designate in Washington, âtells me that I expose too much of my surface.' She didn't mean skin. She meant herself. For candour is one of her outstanding traits. Those who think of diplomatic wives as carefully conventional, consciously gracious, hyper-discreet, will find that Mrs Freeman won't fit that mould. In fact, she fits no mould. She is careless of convention, and can afford to be, for she is equally at ease with chars and royalty and has the knack of making immediate contact.
17
This candour had annoyed the High Commissioner and would annoy the ambassador. âMy husband is very critical of what I say,' she told another reporter. âWhen I tell him I'm giving an interview, he says, “And just what is it you have to tell people? What are you trying to say?”'
18
No. 3100 Massachusetts Avenue was by a long way the largest British overseas mission in the world. The total number of diplomatic staff in the United States in 1968 was 182, compared with 214 in the whole of eastern Europe. In Washington, working under John Freeman and his deputy, were twenty-three political staff, plus thirty-four working in commerce, consular and information services. The number of personnel working for the British defence staff was 198. Freeman's administrative work was limited but he also had to cope with the endless stream of UK ministers, MPs and VIPs who visited Washington. As in India, and despite his non-professional background, his staff thought highly of him. His First Secretary was Andrew Burns:
He was a good man to work for. I asked him on one occasion how he found the job as ambassador, and he said, âReally it's very much like being an editor except that you don't have to do so much writing. As an ambassador, you have to do more.' I thought he was quite good.
19
Another junior diplomat, Andrew Wood, thought the same: âI don't remember anyone feeling that John Freeman was not one of us. He settled in very quickly.'
20
Freeman set about dispelling American fears that he was opposed to the Nixon regime. He did so successfully. In the words of Henry Brandon, who entertained the Freemans and the Kissingers at his summer home in Plymouth, Massachusetts:
Although he arrived with his âleft-wing' coat tails still casting their shadow on the red carpet, he soon rose above prejudices, whether those of others or his own.
I realised from our discussions how depoliticised Freeman's views had become, how scrupulously he adhered to the canons of the Foreign Office. In Washington, British professional diplomats tried hard to cultivate the manners of the amateur; in Freeman's case it was the amateur (as he was viewed in Washington) who cultivated the traditions of the professionals.
21
Egalitarians in Washington should have taken heart from the fact that he was the first ambassador for over fifty years without a title except âMr'. He pronounced himself âquite happy as I am', but did not say that this was of his own choosing.
Before Freeman had left the UK he had been given a âConfidential and Guard' briefing from the Foreign Office. This was just before the victory of Nixon in the presidential election of November 1968, but the relevance to Freeman's work remained valid:
The United States is our most important friend, ally and trading partner ⦠[Nevertheless] we no longer consider that our relations have a âspecial' character. In fact there has been a recent tendency in the
United States regretfully to write Britain off because we seem to them to be failing to fulfil our part in maintaining world stability in the defence and monetary fields.
The Americans deplore our withdrawals east of Suez and, while HMG's attitude over Vietnam is understood, many Americans resent our unwillingness to support the war as, for example, Australia does.
The principal objectives of the ambassador's mission will be: to promote British trade; to maintain cordial relations against the background of our application to join the common market and our lukewarm support of Vietnam; to encourage an outward looking trend in Congress and American public opinion; to keep Her Majesty's government informed of United States internal and external policies and plans.
22
Looked at from the American point of view, at least according to the influential Henry Brandon: âBritain is still the most useful, most reliable ally and the easiest to communicate with. But economic and financial stringencies have left Britain very little elbow room in the big power game.'
23
It was Freeman's great achievement during his two years as ambassador to provide a continuous flow of first-hand information from Washington to Whitehall, from the very highest level and on the most important subjects. In this respect, Britain punched above her weight. Freeman's personal âelbow room' with the two most important men in the United States government, President Richard Nixon and his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, was unique. No British ambassador before or since can have been more confided in, more privy to presidential thinking on foreign affairs than he. As Kissinger put it:
I thought so highly of Freeman's judgement that I frequently consulted him on matters outside his official purview. On one or two
occasions, I let him read early drafts of presidential speeches, tapping his talents as an editor. He had every right to report all his conversations to his Prime Minister; he almost certainly did so. But the intimacy and trust of the âspecial relationship' were meant precisely for such cordial collaboration.
For his part Nixon came first to trust, then to like Freeman. Freeman was the only ambassador invited to the White House for a social occasion during his first term. He also became one of my closest friends; that friendship has survived both our terms of office. I consider it one of the greatest rewards of my public service.
24
When Freeman wrote his annual review for 1969, he said it had been âa pretty good year of Anglo-American relations':
President Nixon has repeatedly made clear to me in terms I can no longer doubt that he regards his administration as having more intimate relations with Britain than with any other foreign country. In terms of close and candid consultation ⦠we have been treated exceptionally â probably uniquely â well.
25
According to Lord Renwick, who was ambassador to the United States in the 1990s and had visited Washington frequently while Freeman was in post: âAt first, Henry didn't know what to make of this left-wing journalist, who'd previously criticised Nixon, but after only two meetings with John he realised that here is someone on the same intellectual level as himself, and Henry hardly regards anybody else on this planet as his intellectual equal.'
26
Kissinger told Wes Pruden, a journalist then on the
National Observer
who became friends with the Freemans, âI get along well with John. John doesn't make friends easily and I don't make friends at all, so we get along very well!' He also said of Freeman:
He was one of the most effective ambassadors I ever dealt with. The reason for this was not so simple. His style was unpropitious. Freeman eschewed all flattery; he met socially only those he respected; he made little effort to turn his embassy into a fashionable salon. When he had a message to deliver, he prefaced it with a very formal statement that he was speaking under instructions. But he was prepared to go beyond his instructions to express personal views. Since he was a man of superb intelligence and utter integrity, this soon proved invaluable. He had a shrewd geopolitical mind and, as it turned out, rather shared our philosophy of foreign relations.
27
Whatever John Freeman thought of Henry Kissinger, it did not prevent him making a detached judgement of his work as National Security Advisor, as in this account of a meeting about the Middle East he sent to Sir Denis Greenhill, the head of the diplomatic service, on 5 June 1970. Headed âSecret, Personal and Guard' Freeman writes: âI consider some of the views he [Kissinger] expounded, though not completely irrational, both naive and romantic. In fairness to Kissinger I must record my view that he is a man of outstanding intellectual honesty who could be easily influenced by the arguments of others.'
He ended, not for the first time: âI need hardly point out that the strict protection of Kissinger's confidence concerning a private and obviously indiscreet conversation of this kind is of the paramount importance to our relations with the White House.'
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The same day Freeman sent a second letter to Greenhill that reveals the extent of Kissinger's indiscretions and the degree to which he trusted Freeman. It also reveals an odd triangular relationship between the two and President Nixon. It is so extraordinary it deserves to be quoted at length. Freeman begins by recalling a conversation with Kissinger the previous day:
The President, said Kissinger, was not an easy man to read even by those who knew him pretty well. For years he had represented in Kissinger's eyes all that was most objectionable in political life. But working with him had changed his view. Mr Nixon was a âgood' man, generous in his responses and basically warm-hearted.
Kissinger's main criticism of the President was directed against those who surrounded him. He said: âI have never met such a gang of self-seeking bastards in my life.' When I observed that the same criticism had been levelled at other national leaders and that perhaps this sort of thing was always said, he replied: âNo, I used to find the Kennedy group unattractively narcissistic, but they were idealists. These people are real heels.' I find this convincing testimony.
Finally, I hope you will not misunderstand my motives in reporting, as I think I should, a very bizarre incident that took place later the same evening and is clearly related â though I'm not sure how â to the conversation with Kissinger. At about 11.30 p.m. my telephone rang, and the President was on the line. He said he was relaxing with Kissinger. Kissinger had been telling him that we had had a long and intimate talk earlier in the day. He was glad to hear this and hoped we would do so whenever the opportunity offered. He wanted me to know that Kissinger much valued my friendship and was stimulated by our conversations. After some further amiable remarks, the President rang off.
I am completely unable to interpret this incident.
Freeman added in his handwriting:
I think Mr Nixon spoke seriously and appeared completely rational. Thus, while the telephone call was probably made on impulse, I don't doubt that he was trying to convey
something
he considered of importance.
29
Freeman hated gossip, but this correspondence was political gilt-edge. It rises up the security hierarchy to SECRET, PERSONAL AND GUARD, ADDRESSEES EYES ONLY. Sir Denis adds in his handwriting to his private secretary âkeep among our private pps'. In 2015 I asked Dr Kissinger if he recalled this incident and, if so, could he tell me what the âsomething of importance' was that Freeman referred to? He said it was obvious: âThe President wanted Freeman to know that he knew all about our conversation the previous day.' I asked how he knew; was Dr Kissinger âbugged'? âHow would I know if I was?' he replied.
In the same conversation, I asked Dr Kissinger what President Nixon had thought of Ambassador Freeman:
He liked him. He thought he had made an impossible job work because of his intelligence and straightforward manner. He liked his analytical mind. John imposed no strain. He did not flatter the President, he did not want to become close to him. He was reticent; did his business and left.
30
What did Freeman think of Nixon? He certainly grew to admire him over the first two years of his first administration, before Watergate. At his farewell audience in January 1971 he thought the time had come for him to apologise for his 1962 article. Nixon brushed him aside but he persisted: âI'm apologising not for my manners but for my judgement. I got you so wrong.'
Nixon replied: âAh, I understand. Well, you couldn't have said that before without browning your nose' â the language of âa ruffian' is probably how Freeman would have described that, as he did the talk of much of Washington society. Wes Pruden remembers him speaking highly of Nixon and Lord Renwick has no doubts that Freeman got Nixon right:
I honestly think before he went to Washington, JF didn't understand how intelligent Nixon was. He found, much to his surprise that before Watergate Nixon actually was a good President. He and Kissinger started winding down the war in Vietnam, preparing for the opening up of China and the détente with Russia. Henry deserves 80 per cent of the credit for this but Nixon instinctively took the right position on these issues; he had a feel for foreign policy. He was quite a brilliant person with a severe character flaw. I know John thought that Watergate was a completely unnecessary tragedy that showed he was right about this flaw [i.e. Nixon's totally self-serving character].
31
Freeman's admiration for Nixon went further than foreign affairs. He once said that, âNixon remains America's greatest undiscovered US President.' This was true in more ways than one, because as the historian Alistair Horne put it:
Nixon wanted to remain undiscovered: he was a paid-up misanthrope [meaning that he disliked the human species and abhorred more contact than necessary]. He shunned Washington society, talked in abstractions about the working class without having any desire to âpress the flesh' in public, and preferred the written memo to any kind of discussion.
