A Trust Betrayed (38 page)

After active duty ends, however, it is not clear how strong these bonds remain, even for those who had stellar and lengthy careers. Following World War II, returning troops were rewarded in part with a fully paid education under the GI Bill, and the health care and pensions that veterans receive seem to be the least the country can do for those who have served. But for many, much more is needed, and lately, in times of fiscal stress, the government has been failing to respond.

The most dramatic signs of disregard for struggling veterans came in 2007 when the
Washington Post
revealed shoddy and inadequate care for wounded warriors from Iraq and Afghanistan at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center. Years later, despite promises by the Obama administration to do better, out of a backlog of 900,000 pending claims, more than half a million filed with the Department of Veterans Affairs had seen no action for four months or more. In August 2013, a petition signed by 26,000 veterans was sent to President Obama asking him to fire
VA
Secretary Eric Shinseki for failing to eliminate the backlog.
¹

In the case of Camp Lejeune, the government hasn't just been slow to respond to the victims of pollution at the base; it has stifled and bullied and outright ignored them. Initially it was a story of negligence: the Navy violating its own standards for drinking water, ignoring evidence of toxic contamination all over the Marine base, and waiting for years before shutting down tainted wells after lab tests showed there were problems. Then the Navy and Marine Corps turned to dissembling, stonewalling, and obfuscation: failing to cooperate with
ATSDR
studies, refusing to notify people who had been exposed to contaminants at Lejeune, coaching its people
on how to answer questions by investigators, and fighting hard against claims from victims seeking compensation.

Many of the victims of Lejeune's pollution have been as heroic in these instances as any warriors wounded in battle. In some cases, they have given up far more for their country than battle-scarred fighters—they have lost loved ones or seen them stricken with debilitating illnesses, or have had their own quality of life destroyed by cancer and other diseases. All they have asked in return is fair compensation for their losses or disabilities—suffering they would never have undergone had they not had the misfortune of being stationed at Lejeune when the water was contaminated. Yet they have had to fight for years to force their government to acknowledge that the military's mismanagement sickened or killed many people, and they have waited two decades for studies to be completed that would help determine the full extent of the damages.

In exposing the harm caused by the pollution at Camp Lejeune, the victims also helped thwart the military's reckless effort to obtain exemptions from environmental laws. Had that scheme succeeded, there is no telling how many more in the service would have been sickened by toxic wastes. There are hundreds of sites contaminated by the US military around the nation and the world, and much more investigation and cleanup—not less—are needed to ensure that people living and working on or near those installations are safe.

The Camp Lejeune contamination constitutes the largest and worst incidence of a poisoned water supply in history. Had a corporation been responsible, there would almost certainly have been a massive criminal complaint filed by the federal government, as the Justice Department did against Occidental Chemical Corporation after the Love Canal disaster in New York in the late 1970s, and as it did again against BP and its partners in the Gulf of Mexico after the 2010 explosion on the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig
caused the biggest offshore oil spill in US history. In contrast, there have been only a few inconclusive investigations of the Marine Corps' misconduct at Camp Lejeune, and a push by Congress to require that some surviving victims of the pollution at least be provided with health insurance.

As this book was being completed in late 2013, a report was circulating through the ranks of Lejeune victims that the Marine Corps was seeking an “endgame” for the long-running saga of the base pollution and its effects. Presumably the military was hoping for something less than the conclusions already in sight—completion of all
ATSDR
studies and full implementation of the 2012 law guaranteeing health care for veterans and family members with illnesses linked to the base water. But twenty years after it began its studies at Lejeune, the
ATSDR
still had not released three promised studies on health problems caused by the pollution, and the
VA
still had not issued rules for providing health coverage to all Lejeune victims. If the “endgame” to the Camp Lejeune story falls short of complete health assessments and full compensation for victims, the result may become one of the most egregious betrayals of its citizens in American history.

NOTES

All quoted material not cited in the endnotes is from personal interviews conducted by the author.

1: T
HE
M
ARINE
C
ORPS
F
AMILY

1
. This chapter is based on author interviews with Tom Townsend, 2013, and a written statement by Anne Townsend (in author's files).

2: L
EJEUNE

1
. Chapter 4, “Encroachment: MCB Camp Lejeune,” in
Conserving Biodiversity on Military Lands: A Guide for Natural Resources Managers
, Conserving Biodiversity on Military Lands website, NatureServe, funded by the US Department of Defense Legacy Resource Management Program, 2008,
www.dodbiodiversity.org/index.html
; “North Carolina Natural Resources Inventory,” North Carolina Heritage Program, North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources, April 2013.

2
. “Post of the Corps: Camp Lejeune, N.C.,”
The Leatherneck
, October 1981.

3
. J. Robert Moskin,
The U.S. Marine Corps Story
(New York: McGraw Hill, 1977), 682.

4
. Allan R. Millett,
Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps
(New York: Macmillan, 1980), 276–285; Moskin,
U.S. Marine Corps Story
, 26–27.

5
. Moskin,
U.S. Marine Corps Story
, 36–37.

6
. Ibid., 54.

7
. Ibid., 61–67.

8
. Ibid., 89–90.

9
. Millett,
Semper Fidelis
, 267–272.

10
. Ibid., 271–277.

11
. Major General John A. Lejeune,
The Reminiscences of a Marine
(Philadelphia: Dorrance and Company, 1930), 68–80.

12
. Millett,
Semper Fidelis
, 322–324.

13
. Chuck Lawliss,
The Marine Book: A Portrait of America's Military Elite
(New York: Thames and Hudson, 1988), 23.

14
. Lejeune,
Reminiscences
, 321.

15
. Moskin,
U.S. Marine Corps Story
, 207; Millett,
Semper Fidelis
, 322.

16
. Millett,
Semper Fidelis
, 322–324.

17
. Lawliss,
Marine Book
, 23; Millett,
Semper Fidelis
, 326–327.

18
. Millett,
Semper Fidelis
, 328.

19
. “Origins of Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune,” Cultural Resources Management: Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, Marines: The Official Website of the United States Marine Corps,
www.lejeune.marines.mil/OfficesStaff/EnvironmentalMgmt/CulturalResources/HistoryLive/HistoryofCampLejeune.aspx
.

20
. Millett,
Semper Fidelis
, 348; Moskin,
U.S. Marine Corps Story
, 224–225.

21
. “Origins of Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune,” US Marine Corps website.

22
. “History,” Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, Marines: The Official Website of the United States Marine Corps,
www.lejeune.usmc.mil/visitors/history/
.

23
. David G. Thompson, “Memorandum in Regard to Ground-Water Supplies in the Vicinity of Jacksonville, North Carolina,” United States Geological Survey, May 20, 1941; Harry E. LeGrand, consulting geologist, “Interim Report of Groundwater Conditions at Tarawa Terrace, Camp Lejeune, N.C.,” April 2, 1959.

24
. “Facts About Camp Lejeune,” brochure, Public Affairs Office, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, January 2000.

25
. “Report to the Department of Justice on Disposal Practices at Camp Lejeune,” Davis L. Ford and Associates, Austin, Texas, September 2009.

26
. Interview with Danny Sharpe, Camp Lejeune Environmental Fact-Finding Group, June 2, 2004. All interviews cited as “Camp Lejeune Environmental Fact-Finding Group” interviews were conducted in 2003 and 2004 by a contractor for the United States Marine Corps for the Marine Corps Fact-Finding Panel, which released a report entitled “Drinking Water Fact-Finding Panel for Camp Lejeune: Report to the Commandant, U.S.M.C.,” dated October 6, 2004.

27
. Interview with Julian Wooten, Camp Lejeune Environmental Fact-Finding Group, May 30, 2004.

28
. Sharpe interview.

29
. Wooten interview.

3: “B
ABY
H
EAVEN
”

1
. Some of the quotations from the McLaughlins and other details of their story in this chapter are from Jo-Ann Moriarty, “N.C. Base Left Deadly Legacy,”
Springfield (Mass.) Republican
, July 22, 2007.

2
. The Stasiaks are quoted in Jo-Ann Moriarty, “Senators Seek to Alert Marines,”
Springfield (Mass.) Republican
, August 12, 2007.

3
. Maggie Gagnoni, letter to President George W. Bush, June 15, 2001, obtained through Freedom of Information Act request by Tom Townsend.

4
. Quotations from Mary Freshwater in this chapter are from Cynthia McFadden, “Sick Families of N.C. Military Base Water Contamination May Finally Get Help, 30 Years Later,” ABC News Nightline, June 28, 2012,
http://abcnews.go.com/US/sick-families-nc-military-base-water-contamination-finally/story?id=16670758&singlePage=true
.

5
. Joan Lewis is quoted in Amanda Greene, “Family Attributed Health Problems to Bad Luck, But Now Think Lejeune's Water the Source,”
Wilmington (N.C.) Star-News
, August 27, 2007,
www.starnewsonline.com/article/20070827/NEWS/708270314
.

6
. “Statement of Sandra Carbone,” Camp Lejeune Toxic Water: The Few, the Proud, the Forgotten,
http://tftptf.com/CLW_Docs/Carbone_Story.pdf
. For other statements, see
www.tftptf.com/9401.html
.

7
. Terry Dyer, daughter of John Fristoe, is quoted in Richard Currey, “Troubled Waters: The Toxic Legacy of Camp Lejeune's Contaminated Water Supply,”
The Veteran
, August/September 2004,
www.vva.org/archive/TheVeteran/2004_08/feature_TroubledWaters.htm
.

4: S
OLVENTS
!

1
. Letter from Donald J. Guinyard, chief of water supply branch, Environmental Protection Agency, Region IV, to Commanding General, September 8, 1980.

2
. Trihalomethane (
THM
) surveillance reports, William C. Neal, chief of laboratory services, Army Environmental Hygiene Lab, October 1980 to February 1981.

3
. Interview with William C. Neal, Camp Lejeune Environmental Fact-Finding Group, July 7, 2004.

4
. Results of water samples at Camp Lejeune, Jennings Laboratories, Virginia Beach, Virginia, October 31, 1980; interview with Wallace Carter, Camp Lejeune Environmental Fact-Finding Group, July 12, 2004.

5
. Interview with Steve Azar, Camp Lejeune Environmental Fact-Finding Group, July 8 and 21, 2004; Government Accountability Office (
GAO
), “Activities Related to Past Drinking Water Contamination at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune,” May 11, 2007, 23.

6
. Interview with Elizabeth Betz, Camp Lejeune Environmental Fact-Finding Group, June 18 and 29, 2004.

7
. Ibid.

8
. Interview with Julian Wooten, Camp Lejeune Environmental Fact-Finding Group, May 30, 2004.

9
. Interview with Danny Sharpe, Camp Lejeune Environmental Fact-Finding Group, June 2, 2004.

10
. Memorandum by J. R. Bailey, Naval Facilities Engineering Command, “Suspected Chemical Dump, Rifle Range Area,” May 8, 1981.

11
. Memorandum by Elizabeth Betz, supervisory chemist, Camp Lejeune Quality Control Lab, Environmental Section, “Suspected Chemical Dump, Rifle Range Area,” May 12, 1981.

12
. GAO, “Activities Related to Past Drinking Water Contamination,” 21.

13
. US Department of the Navy, “A Primer on the Navy Installation Restoration Program,” June 6, 1982.

14
. Memorandum for the Record by Elizabeth Betz, supervisory chemist, Camp Lejeune Quality Control Lab, Environmental Section, “Phone Conversation with Mike Hargett on 6 May 1982,” May 25, 1982, online at US Senate, Committee on the Judiciary,
www.judiciary.senate.gov/judiciarydocs/CLHDW%20CDR%20Docs/Docs%20(PDFs)/2–1197/CLW/CLW%205176.pdf
.