A Short History of Chinese Philosophy (55 page)

The Philosopher and the Historian, of Philosophy

In so doing, I propose to confine myself to my own story, not at all because I think this is the only story worth telling, but because it is the story I know best and it can, perhaps, serve as a sort of illustration. This, I think, is better than merely giving a list of names and "isms," without any fuller exposition of any of them, a procedure which results in no kind of picture at all. By simply saying that a philosopher is a certain "ist," and nothing more, one usually creates misunderstanding instead of understanding.

My own larger History of Chinese Philosophy, the second and last volume of which was published in 1934, three years before the outbreak of the Sino— Japanese war, and the first volume of which was translated into English by Dr. Bodde and published in Peiping in 1937, three months after the war began, is an expression of that spirit of the age mentioned by me at the end of the last chapter. In that work I utilized the results of the studies of the Han

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lisiheh scholars on the texts of the ancient philosophers, and at the same time applied the analytic method to clarify the ideas of these philosophers. From the point of view of the historian, the use of this method has its limits, because the ideas of the ancient philosophers, in their original form, may not be as clear as in the presentation of their modern expositor. The function of a history of philosophy is to tell us what the words of the philosophers of the past actually meant to these men themselves, and not what we think they ought to mean. In my History I have tried my best to keep my use of the analytic method within its proper limits.

From the point of view of the pure philosopher, however, to clarify the ideas of the philosophers of the past, and push their theories to their logical conclusions in order to show their validity or absurdity, is certainly more interesting and important than merely to find out what they themselves thought about these ideas and theories. In so doing there is a process of development from the old to the new, and this development is another phase of the spirit of the age mentioned above. Such a work, however, is no longer the scholarly one of an historian, but the creative one of a philosopher. I share the feeling of Wang Kuo—wei, that is to say, I do not like to be simply an historian of philosophy.

Therefore after I had finished the writing of my History, I immediately prepared for new work. But at this juncture the war broke out in the summer of 1937-

Philosophical Production in Wartime

Before the war, the philosophy departments of the University of Peking, from which I graduated, and of Tsing Hua University, where I am now teaching, were considered to be the strongest in China. Each of them has had its own tradition and emphasis. Those of the University of Peking have been toward historical studies and scholarship, with an idealistic philosophical trend, which, in terms of Western philosophy, is Kantian and Hegelian, and, in terms of Chinese philosophy, is Lu Wang. The tradition and emphasis of Tsing Hua, on the contrary, have been toward the use of logical analysis for the study of philosophical problems, with a realistic philosophical trend, which, in terms oi Western philosophy, is Platonic in the sense that the philosophy of neo -realism is Platonic, and in terms of Chinese philosophy, is Ch eng—Chu.

These two universities are both situated in Peiping (formerly known as Peking), and on the outbreak of the war they both moved to the southwest, where they combined with a third, the Nankai University of Tientsin, to form

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the Southwest Associated University throughout the entire war period. Together, their two Philosophy Departments formed a rare and wonderful combination, comprising nine professors representing all the important schools both of Chinese and Western philosophy. At first, the Associated University as a whole was situated in Changsha in Hunan province, but our Philosophy Department, together with the other Departments of the humanities, was separately located in Hengshan, known as the South Holy Mountain.

We stayed there only about four months before moving again to Kunming, farther southwest, in the spring of 1938. These few months, however, were spiritually very stimulating. We were then in a national crisis which was the greatest in our history, and we were in the same place where Huai-jang had tried to grind a brick into a mirror, as mentioned in chapter twenty-two, and where Chu Hsi had also once lived. We were sufferers of the same fate met by the Southern Sung dynasty, that of being driven southward by a foreign army.Yet we lived in a wonderful society of philosophers, writers, and scholars, all in one building. It was this combination of the historical moment, the geographical location, and the human gathering, that made the occasion so exceptionally stimulating and inspiring.

During these few months, myself and my colleagues, Professors T ang Yung-t ung and Y. L. Chin, finished books on which we had been working. T ang s book is the first part of his History of Chinese Buddhism. Chin s book is titled On the Too, and mine the Hsin Li-hsUeh or New Li—hsileh. Chin and myself have many ideas in common, but my work is a development of the Ch eng—Chu school, as the title indicates, while his is the result of an independent study of metaphysical problems. Later in Kunming I wrote a series of other books: the Hsin Shih-lun, also titled China's Road to Freedom; the Hsin Yuan-jen or New Treatise on the Nature of Man; the Hsin Yilan-tao, also titled The Spirit of Chinese Philosophy, which has been translated from the manuscript by Mr. E. R. Hughes of Oxford University and is published in London; and the Hsin Chih-yen or New Treatise on the Methodology of Metaphysics. (All these, in their original Chinese editions, have been published by the Commercial Press, Shanghai.) In the following, I shall try to summarize some of their results, as an illustration of one trend in contemporary Chinese philosophy, and in so doing we may perhaps get a partial glimpse of what Chinese philosophy can contribute to future philosophy.

Philosophical, or rather metaphysical, reasoning starts with the experience that something exists. This something may be a sensation, an emotion, or anything else. From the statement: "Something exists," I have in my Hsin Li-hsUeh deduced all the metaphysical ideas or concepts not only of the Ch'

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eng-Chu school but also of the Taoists. They are all considered in such a way that they are simply the logical implications of the statement that something exists. It is not difficult to see how the ideas of Li and Ch'i arc deducible from this statement, and olher ideas are also treated in the same way. For instance, the idea of Movement is treated by me not as a cosmological idea for some actual initial movement of the world, but as a metaphysical idea implied in the idea of existence itself. To exist is an activity, a movement. If we think about the world in its static aspect, we will say with the Taoists that before anything comes into being there must first be the being of Being. And if we think about the world in its dynamic aspect, we will say with the Confucianists that before anything comes to exist, there must first be Movement, which is simply another way of speaking of the activity of existing.Tn what I call men' s pictorial form of thinking, which is really imagination, men imagine Being or Movement as God, the Father of all things. In imaginative thought of this kind, one has religion or cosmology, but not philosophy or metaphysics.

Following the same line of argument, I have been able in my Hsin Li-hsiieh to deduce all the metaphysical ideas of Chinese philosophy and to integrate them into a clear and systematic whole. The book was favorably received because in it critics seemed to feel that the structure of Chinese philosophy was more clearly stated than hitherto. It was considered as representing a revival of Chinese philosophy, which was taken as the symbol of a revival of the Chinese nation.

In the Ch'eng-Chu school, as we have seen in the last chapter, there is a certain element of authoritarianism and conservatism, but this is avoided in my Hsin Li-hsueh. In my opinion, metaphysics can know only that there are the Li, but not the content of each Li. It is the business of science to find out the content of the individual Li, using the scientific and pragmatic method. The Li in themselves are absolute and eternal, but as they are known to us, that is, in the laws and theories of science, they are relative and changeable.

The realization of the Li requires a material basis. The various types of society are ihe realization of the various Li of social structure, and the material basis each Li requires for its realization is the economic foundation of a given type of society. In the sphere of history, therefore, I believe in an economic interpretation, and in my book, China's Road to Freedom, I apply this interpretation to Chinese civilization and history, as I also have in chapter two of the present book.

I think Wang Kuo-wei s trouble in philosophy has been due to his failure 552 CHINESE PHILOSOPHY IN THE MODERN WORLD

to realize that each branch of knowledge has its own sphere of application. One does not need to believe in any theory of metaphysics, if that theory does not make much assertion about matters of fact. If it does make such assertions, however, it is bad metaphysics, which is the same as bad science. This does not mean that a good metaphysical theory is unbelievable, but only that it is so evident that one does not need to say that he believes in it, just as one need not say that one believes in mathematics. The difference between metaphysics and mathematics and logic is that in the latter two one does not need to start with the statement that something exists, which is an assertion about matters of fact, and is the only one that metaphysics need make.

The Nature of Philosophy

The method I use in the Hsin Li-hsileh is wholly analytic. After writing that book, however, I began to realize the importance of the negative method which has been mentioned in chapter twenty —one. At present, if someone were to ask me for a definition of philosophy, I would reply paradoxically that philosophy, especially metaphysics, is that branch of knowledge which, in its development, will ultimately become "the knowledge that is not knowledge." If this be so, then the negative method needs to be used. Philosophy, especially metaphysics, is useless for the increase of our knowledge regarding matters of fact, but is indispensable for the elevation of our mind. These few points are not merely my own opinion, but, as we have previously seen, represent certain aspects of the Chinese philosophical tradition. It is these aspects that I think can contribute something to future world philosophy. In the following I shall try to develop them a little further.

Philosophy, as well as other branches of knowledge, must start with experience. But philosophy, especially metaphysics, differs from these other branches in that its development will lead it ultimately to that "something" which transcends experience. In this something there is that which cannot logically be sensed, but can only be thought. For instance, one can sense a square table, but cannot sense squareness.

This is not because one s sense organ is insufficiently developed, but because squareness is a Li, which logically can only be thought but not sensed.

In the something there is also that which not only cannot be sensed, but strictly speaking, cannot even be thought. In chapter one I said that philosophy is systematic reflective thinking on life. Because of its reflective nature, it ultimately has to think on "something that logically cannot be the object 554 CHINESE PHILOSOPHY IN THE MODERN WORLD

of thought. For instance, the universe, because it is the totality of all that is, cannot logically be the object of thought. As we have seen in chapter nineteen, the Chinese word T'ien or Heaven is sometimes used in ihis sense of totality, as when Kuo Hsiang says: "Heaven is the name of all things." Since the universe is the totality of all that is, therefore when one thinks about it, one is thinking reflectively, because the thinking and the thinker must also be included in the totality. But when one thinks about that totality, the totality that lies in one's thought does not include the thought itself. For it is the object of the thought and so stands in contrast to it. Hence the totality that one is thinking about is not actually the totality of all that is. Yet one must first think about totality in order to realize that it is unthinkable. One needs thought in order to be conscious of the unthinkable, just as sometimes one needs a sound in order to be conscious of silence. One must think about the unthinkable, yet as soon as one tries to do so, it immediately slips away. This is the most fascinating and also most troublesome aspect of philosophy.

What logically cannot be sensed transcends experience; what can neither be sensed nor thought of transcends intellect. Concerning what transcends experience and intellect, one cannot say very much.

Hence philosophy, or at least metaphysics, must be simple in its nature. Otherwise it again becomes simply bad science. And with its simple ideas, it suffices for its function.

The Spheres of Living

What is the function of philosophy? In chapter one I suggested that, according to Chinese philosophical tradition, its function is not the increase of positive knowledge of matters of fact, but the elevation of the mind. Here it would seem well to explain more clearly what I mean by this statement.

In my book, The New Treatise on the Nature of Man, I have observed that man differs from other animals in that when he docs something, he understands what he is doing, and is conscious that he is doing it. It is this understanding and self—consciousness that give significance for him to what he is doing. The various significances that thus attach to his various acts, in their totality, constitute what I call his sphere of living. Different men may do the same things, but according to their different degrees of understanding and self—consciousness, these things may have varying significance to them. Every individual has his own sphere of living, which is not quite the same as that of any other individual. Yet in spite of these individual differences, we can classify the various spheres of living into four general grades. Beginning with the lowest, they are: the innocent sphere, the utilitarian sphere, the 556 CHINESE PHILOSOPHY IN THE MODERN WORLD