A Short History of Chinese Philosophy (25 page)

In Confucianism, li is a very comprehensive idea. It can be translated as ceremonies, rituals, or rules of social conduct. It is all these, but in the above arguments, it is taken more or less in the third sense. In this sense, the function of the li is to regulate. The li provide regulation for the satisfaction of man' s desires. But in the sense of ceremonies and rituals, the li have another function, that of refining. In this sense, the li give refinement and purification to man's emotions. In this latter interpretation, Hsiin Tzu also made a great contribution.

THE REALISTIC WING OF CONFUCIANISM: HSUN TZU

Theory of Riles and Music

For the Confucianists, the most important of the ceremonies are those of mourning and sacrifice (especially to the ancestors). These ceremonies were universal at that time, and as popularly practiced they contained not a little of superstition and mythology. In justifying them, however, the Confucianists gave them new interpretations and read into them new ideas. These we find in the Hsiin—tzu and the Li Chi or Book of Rites.

Among the Confucian classics, there are two devoted to the rites. One is the Yi Li or Book of Etiquette and Ceremonial, which is a factual record of the procedures of ceremonies as practiced at that time. The other is the Li Chi, which consists of the interpretations on the ceremonies given by the Confucianists. I believe that most of the chapters of the Li Chi were written by the followers of Hsiin Tzu.

Our mind has two aspects, the intellectual and the emotional. When our loved ones die, we know, through our intellect, that the dead are dead and that there is no rational ground for believing in the immortality of the soul. If we were to act solely under the direction of our intellect, therefore, we would need no mourning rites. But since our mind also has its emotional aspect, this causes us, when our loved ones die, to hope that the dead may live again and that there may be a soul that will continue existing in the other world. When we thus give way to our fancy, we take superstition as truth, and deny the judgment of our intellect.

Thus there is a difference between what we know and what we hope. Knowledge is important, but we cannot live with knowledge only. We need emotional satisfaction as well. In determining our attitude towards the dead, we have to take both aspects into consideration. As interpreted by the Confu— cianists, the mourning and sacrificial rites did precisely this. I have said that these rites were originally not without superstition and mythology. But with the interpretations of the Confucianists, these aspects were purged. The religious elements in them were transformed into poetry, so that they were no longer religious, but simply poetic.

Religion and poetry are both expressions of the fancy of man. They both mingle imagination with reality. The difference between them is that religion takes what it itself says as true, while poetry takes what it itself says as false. What poetry presents is not reality, and it knows that it is not. Therefore it deceives itself, yet it is a conscious self—deception. It is very unscientific, yet it does not contradict science. In poetry we obtain emotional satisfaction without obstructing the progress of the intellect.

According to the Confucianist, when we perform the mourning and sacrificial rites, we are deceiving ourselves without being really deceived. In the Li Chi, Confucius is reported to have said: In dealing with the dead, if we treat them as if they were really dead, that would mean a want of affection, 2-4° THE REALISTIC WING OF CONFUCIANISM: HSUN TZU

and should not be done. If we treat them as if they were really alive, that would mean a want of wisdom, and should not be done." (Ch. 2.) That is to say, we cannot Ireat the dead simply as we know, or hope, them to be. The middle way is to treat them both as we know and as we hope them to be. This way consists in treating the dead as if they were living.

In Ins Treatise on Rites, Hsiin Tzu says: The rites are careful about the treatment of man's life and death. Life is the beginning of man, death is his end. If the beginning and end of man are both well treated, the Way of Humanity is complete....If we render adequate service to our parents when they are living hul not when they are dead, that means that we respect our parents when they have knowledge, but neglect them when they do not. One's death means that one is gone forever. That is the last chance for a subject to serve his sovereign, and a son his parents....The mourning rites serve to decorate the dead by the living, to send off the dead as if they were still living, and to render the same service to the dead as that to the living, a service uniform from the beginning to the end....Therefore the function of the mourning riles is to make clear the meaning of life and death, to send off the dead with sorrow and respect, and thus to complete the end of man." (Ch. 19.) In the same chapter, Hsiin Tzu says: The sacrificial rites are the expression of man s affectionate longing. They represent the height of piety and faithfulness, of love and respect. They represent also the completion of propriety and refinement. Their meaning cannot be fully understood except by the sages.

The sages understand their meaning. Superior men enjoy their practice. They become the routine of the officer. They become the custom of the people. Superior men consider them to be the activity of man, while ordinary people consider them as something that has to do with spirits and ghosts....They exist to render the same service to the dead as to the living, to render the same service to the lost as to the existing. What they serve has neither shape nor even a shadow, yet they are the completion of culture and refinement. With this interpretation, the meaning of the mourning and sacrificial rites becomes completely poetic, not religious.

There are other kinds of sacrifice besides those offered to ancestors. These Hsiin Tzu interprets from the same point of view. Tn his chapter titled "Treatise on Nature," one passage reads: "Why is it that it rains after people have offered sacrifice for rain? Hsiin Tzu said:'There is no reason for that. It is the same as if there had been rain without praying for it. When there is an eclipse of the sun and the moon, we make demonstrations to save them. When rain is deficient, we pray for it. And when there are important affairs, we divine before we reach any decision. We do these things not because we can thereby get what we want. They are simply a sort of decorum. The superior man considers them as a sort of decorum, while ordinary people consider them as having supernatural force. One will be happy if one considers them as a sort of decorum; one will not, if one considers them as having su-2.42 THE REALISTIC WING OF CONFUCIANISM: HSUN TZU

pernatural force."' (Ch. 17.)

We pray for rain, and divine before we make any important decision, because we want to express our anxiety. That is all. If we were to take prayer as really being able to move the gods, or divination as really being able to make predictions about the future, this would result in superstition with all its consequences.

Hsiin Tzu is also the author of a Treatise on Music, in which he writes: Man cannot be without joy, and wheii there is joy, it must have a physical embodiment. When this embodiment does not conform to the right principle, there will be disorder. The early kings hated this disorder, and so they established the music of the Ya and ung Ltwo of the divisions of the Book of Odes ] to guide it. They caused its music to be joyful and not degenerate, and its beauty to be distinct and not limited. They caused it in its indirect and direct appeals, its complexity and simplicity, its frugality and richness, its rests and notes, to stir up the goodness in men s minds and to prevent evil feelings from gaining any foothold. This is the manner in which the early kings established music. " (Ch. 2.0.) Thus music, for Hsiin Tzu, functions as an instrument for moral education. This has been the prevailing Confucianist view of music.

Logical Theories

In the Hsiln-tzu there is a chapter titled "On the Rectification of Names." This subject is an old one in Confucianism. The term itself was originated by Confucius, as we have seen in chapter four. He said: "Let the ruler be ruler, the subject be subject; let the father be father and the son be son."

(Analects, XII, 11.) Likewise Mencius said: "To be without the relationship of ruler and of father is to be like the beasts. (Mencius, IVb, 90 Because the interests of these two thinkers were purely ethical, their application of the rectification of names was likewise confined primarily to the sphere of ethics.

Hsiin Tzu, however, lived in an age when the School of Names was flourishing. Hence his theory of the rectification of names possesses logical as well as ethical interest.

In his chapter, "On the Rectification of Names," Hsiin Tzu first describes his epistemological theory, which is similar to that of the later Mohists. He writes: "That in man by which he knows is L called the faculty ofj knowing. That in [the faculty of] knowing which corresponds [to external things] is called knowledge." (Ch. 2X) The faculty of knowing consists of two parts. One is what he calls the natural senses, such as those of the ears and eyes. The other is the mind itself. The natural senses receive impressions, and the mind interprets and gives meaning to them. Hsiin Tzu writes: "The mind gives meaning to impressions. It gives meaning to impressions, and only then, by means of the ear, can sound be known; by means of the eye, can forms be known....When the five senses note something but cannot classify it,

2-44 . THE REALISTIC WING OF CONFUCIANISM: HSUN TZU

and the mind tries to identify it but fails to give it meaning, then one can only say that there is no knowledge.' (Ibid.)

As to the origin and use of names, Hsiln Tzu says: "Names were made in order to denote actualities, on the one hand so as to make evident the distinctions between superior and inferior [in society], and on the other hand to distinguish similarities and differences. (Ibid.) That is to say, names were originated partly for ethical and partly for logical reasons.

As to the logical use of names, he says: 'Names are given to things. When things are alike, they are named alike; when different, they are named differently....The one who knows that different actualities have different names, and who therefore never refers to different actualities otherwise than by different names, will not experience any confusion. Likewise he who refers to the same actualities should never use any other but the same names. (Ibid.)

Regarding the logical classification of names, he writes further: Although things are innumerable, there are times when we wish to speak of them all in general, so we call them 'things.' 'Things' is the most general term. We press on and generalize; we generalize arid generalize still more, until there is nothing more general. Then only we stop. There are times when we wish lo speak of one aspect, so we say birds and beasts. Birds and beasts is the great classifying term. We press on and classify. We classify and classify still more, until there is no more classification to be made, and then we stop." (Ibid.) Thus Hsiin Tzu distinguishes two kinds of names, the general and the classifying. The general name is the product of the synthetic process of our reasoning, while the classifying name is that of its analytic process.

All names are man-made. When they were in the process of invention, there was no reason why an actuality should be designated by one particular name rather than another. The animal that came to be known as ' dog, for example, might equally well have been called "cat" instead. Once, however, certain names came through convention to be applied to certain actualities, they could be attached to these and none other. As Hsiin Tzu explains: "There are no names necessarily appropriate themselves. Names were named by convention. But when the convention having been established, it has become customary, this is called an appropriate name." (Ibid)

He also writes: "Should a true King arise, he must certainly follow the ancient terms and make the new ones. (Ibid) Thus the invention of new names and determination of their meanings is a function of the ruler and his government. Hsiin Tzu says: "When the kings had regulated names, the names were fixed and actualities distinguished. Their principles were thus able to be carried out, and their will could be known. They thus carefully led the people to unity. Therefore, the making of unauthorized distinctions between words, and the making of new words, so as thus to confuse the correct nomenclature, cause the people to be in doubt, and bring much litigation, was called great wickedness.

It was a crime like that of using false credentials or false measures. (Ibid.) 2-46 THE REALISTIC. WING OF CONFUCIANISM: HSUN TZU

Fallacies of Other Schools

Hsiin Tzu considered most of the arguments of the School of Names and the later Mohists to be based upon logical sophistries and so fallacious. He grouped them into three classes of fallacies.

The first is what he calls 'the fallacy of corrupting names with names." (Ibid.) In this class, he includes the Mohist argument that "to kill a robber is not to kill a man. Tins is because, according to Hsiin Tzu, the very fact of being a robber implies being a man, since by extension the category which bears the name "man includes the category which has the name "robber." When one speaks of a robber, therefore, one means by this a being who is at the same time a man.

The second class Hsiin Tzu calls "the fallacy of corrupting names with actualities." (Ibid.) In this group he includes the argument that "mountains and abysses are on the same level, which is a rephrasing by Hsiin Tzu of Hui Shih's argument that "mountains and marshes are on the same level."