A Sense of the Enemy: The High Stakes History of Reading Your Rival's Mind (39 page)

12
.   Nguyen,
Hanoi’s War
.

13
.   Hanoi’s official commemorative biography of the Party First Secretary states that Le Duan was granted an exemption from the rule limiting Politburo members to one wife. In the arduous resistance war, Le Duan had close relationships with southern compatriots and comrades. In 1950 he was allowed by the Party organization to obtain a second marriage to Ms. Nguyen Thuy Nga. Tong Bi Thu,
Le Duan: Party General Secretary Le Duan
(VNA Hanoi Publishing House, 2007), p. 5.

14
.   “The Southern Wife of the Late Party General Secretary Le Duan,” Installment 3,
Tien Phong
, July 9, 2006., Accessed July 10, 2006, at
http://www.tienphongonline.com.vn/Tianyon/Index.aspx?ArticleID=52871&ChannelID=13
.

15
.   Carlyle Thayer,
War by Other Means: National Liberation and Revolution in Vietnam, 1954–1960
(Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1989). See chapter titled “The 8th Plenum, August 1955.”

16
.   As translated by Robert Brigham and Le Phuong Anh, the relevant text reads: “Recently, in the U.S Presidential election, the present Republican administration, in order to buy the people’s esteem, put forward the slogan ‘Peace and Prosperity,’ which showed that even the people of an imperialist warlike country like the U.S. want peace.” Le Duan, “The Path of Revolution in the South,” 1956. Available at
http://vi.uh.edu/pages/buzzmat/southrevo.htm
.

17
.   See
Nhan Dan
, no. 975 (November 5, 1956); “Some Observations Regarding the Recent General Election in the U.S.” no. 981 (November 11, 1956); “Is That Actually Democratic?” no. 993 (November 25, 1956); “Democracy and Dictatorship,” no. 1000 (November 30, 1956).

18
.  
Historical Chronicle of the Cochin China Party Committee and the Central Office for South Vietnam, 1954–1975
(Hanoi, Vietnam: National Political Publishing House, 2002), pp. 119–20. This history discusses the significance of Le Duan’s thesis, placing it in the context of COSVN activities at the time.

19
.  
History of the COSVN Military Command, 1961–1976
, ed. Colonel Ho Son Dai (Hanoi, Vietnam: National Political Publishing House, 2004), p. 44.

20
.   Alec Holcombe, “The Complete Collection of Party Documents: Listening to the Party’s Official Internal Voice,”
Journal of Vietnamese Studies
vol. 5, no. 2 (2010), pp. 225–42.

21
.   Thayer,
War by Other Means
. See chapter titled “The Fatherland Front and Renewed Political Struggle, September 1955–April 1956.” For more on Moscow’s influence over Hanoi, see Ilya Gaiduk,
The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

22
.  
History of the COSVN Military Command
, p. 42. “Faced with the duplicity and the brutal terrorist actions of the U.S. and their puppets, starting with 200 officers and men we had left behind to support the political struggle movement, the self–defense and armed propaganda forces of the B2 Front had expanded to form 37 armed propaganda platoons. However, these units only conducted limited operations because of the fear that they might be violating the Party’s policy at that time, which was to conduct political struggle only.”

23
.  
Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of the People’s Army of Vietnam, 1954–1975
, trans. Merle L. Pribbenow (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002), p. 43.

24
.   For more on armed propaganda, see Greg Lockhart,
Nation in Arms: The Origins of the People’s Army of Vietnam
(Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1989).

25
.   For more on the construction of Le Duan’s police state, see Nguyen,
Hanoi’s War
, ch. 2.

26
.   See William J. Duiker in the Foreword to
Victory in Vietnam
, p. xiii.

27
.   The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency had closely followed General Thanh’s rise and analyzed his influence. It was well-aware of his closeness to Le Duan within the Politburo. Following the General’s death, the Agency assumed that his replacement would indicate whether Pham Van Dong and the moderates or Le Duan and the militants had greater power within the Party. See CIA Directorate of Intelligence,
Intelligence Memorandum
(July 11, 1967), No. 1365/67, “Problems Posed for North Vietnam by Death of Politburo Member Nguyen Chi Thanh.”

28
.   See Asselin, “Le Duan.”

29
.   Sophie Quinn-Judge, “The Ideological Debate in the DRV and the Significance of the Anti–Party Affair, 1967–1968,”
Cold War History
, vol. 5, no. 4 (2005), pp. 479–500.

30
.   Asselin, “Le Duan.” One of Le Duan’s close supporters has published a memoir, attempting to defend his former boss’s reputation. Tran Quynh served as Deputy Prime Minister of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam from 1981 to 1987. See Tran Quynh, “Reminiscences of Le Duan.” Self-published recollections were available at
http://d.violet.vn//uploads/resources/492/369514/preview.swf
at the time of this manuscript’s submission.

31
.   See Tran Quynh, “Reminiscences of Le Duan.” The author served as Deputy Prime Minister of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam from 1981 to February 16, 1987, and worked closely with Le Duan. Self-published recollections were
available at
http://d.violet.vn//uploads/resources/492/369514/preview.swf
at the time of this manuscript’s submission.

32
.   For a helpful summary of communist states and the primacy of the Party, see Archie Brown,
The Rise and Fall of Communism
(New York: Ecco, 2009).

33
.   Liên-Hang T. Nguyen argues that in 1963 Le Duan abandoned a protracted war strategy in favor of “big war” involving conventional forces aimed at a rapid victory. My own view is slightly different. I note that Le Duan preferred “big war” but recognized the need for protracted war against America for a variety of both military and political reasons. Nguyen’s view is detailed in both
Hanoi’s War
, ch. 2, and “The War Politburo: North Vietnam’s Diplomatic and Political Road to the Têt Offensive,”
Journal of Vietnamese Studies
, vol. 1, nos. 1–2 (2006), pp. 4–58.

34
.  
Letters to the South
[Tho Vao Nam] (Hanoi, Vietnam : Su That Publishing House, 1985). Letter to Muoi Cuc (Nguyen Van Linh) and the Cochin China Party Committee [Xu Uy Nam Bo], April 20, 1961, p. 48. Because the English translation of
Letters to the South
does not contain all of the letters in the Vietnamese version, I have drawn on both editions. The letter referenced here, for example, is not found in the English edition.

35
.  
Letters to the South
. Letter to Muoi Cuc (Nguyen Van Linh) and the Cochin China Party Committee [Xu Uy Nam Bo], July 1962, p. 50. “Currently, even though there are some cities where the enemy is vulnerable, it is not yet the time to attack and occupy them. From an over-all strategic standpoint, such a victory would not yield positive results at this time, because it could incite the American imperialists to increase their intervention and to expand the war.”

36
.  
Letters to the South
, July 18, 1962, p. 65. A slightly different version of this letter is reprinted in
Van Kien Dang
.

37
.  
Letters to the South
, July 18, 1962. Le Duan wrote: “If we present limited demands that allow the enemy to see that, even though they must lose, they can lose at a level which they can accept, a level that the enemy can see does not present a major threat to them, then they will be forced to accept defeat. We have put forward goals and requirements for the National Liberation Front for South Vietnam that we have calculated are at the level necessary for us to be able to win and for the enemy to be able to lose.”

38
.   For a thoughtful revision of Diem’s reputation, see Philip E. Catton,
Diem’s Final Failure: Prelude to America’s War in Vietnam
(Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2002).

39
.  
Van Kien Dang
, 1963, p. 818.

40
.  
Van Kien Dang
, 1963, p. 815.

41
.   Le Duan,
Letters to the South
, May 1965. English edition.

42
.   For an interesting assessment of the hollowness of America’s “flexible response” approach see Marc Trachtenberg,
The Cold War and After: History, Theory, and the Logic of International Politics
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), ch. 6, “The Structure of Great Power Politics.”

43
.  
Van Kien Dang
, 1963, p. 813.

44
.   Wayne Morse, a Republican turned Independent turned Democrat, represented Oregon in the Senate from 1945 to 1969. He was one of only two Senators to vote against the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. The other was Ernest Gruening, a Democrat from Alaska.

45
.   Carlyle Thayer,
War By Other Means: National Liberation and Revolution in Vietnam, 1954–1960
(Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1989).

46
.   Bui Anh Tuan ed.,
Ministry of Public Security
(Hanoi, Vietnam: People’s Public Security Publishing House, 2004), pp. 156–71. This official history describes some of the radio communications counterespionage against the Americans and acknowledges the Soviet Union’s assistance in establishing those operations in the 1950s.

47
.   Two sources offering a glimpse into Hanoi’s intelligence apparati are Larry Berman,
Perfect Spy: The Incredible Double Life of Pham Xuan An, Time Magazine Reporter and Vietnamese Communist Agent
(New York: Smithsonian Books, 2007), and a declassified CIA report on prisoners of war, which offers an outline of intelligence services, Central Intelligence Agency, “The Responsibilities of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam Intelligence and Security Services in the Exploitation of American Prisoners of War,” November 17, 1975, available at
http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=11270323004
. See also Christopher Goscha, “The Early Development of Vietnamese Intelligence Services,” in R. G. Hughes, P. Jackson and L. Scott, eds.,
Exploring Intelligence Archives
(Londen: Routledge, 2008), pp. 103–15. For a compelling oral history of a Soviet spy in Vietnam, see Xiaobing Li,
Voices from the Vietnam War: Stories from American, Asian, and Russian Veterans
(Louisville: University of Kentucky Press, 2010). See ch. 10, “Russian Spies in Hanoi.”

48
.   Le Duan cited an American as the originator of this terminology, i.e. “special,” “limited,” and “general war.”
Van Kien Dang
, 1965, p. 581.

49
.  
Van Kien Dang
, 1963, p. 821.

50
.  
Victory in Vietnam
, pp. 126–27.

51
.   Pham Hong Thuy, Pham Hong Doi, and Phan Trong Dam,
History of the People’s Navy of Vietnam
(Hanoi, Vietnam: People’s Army Publishing House, 1985), p. 89.

52
.  
Victory in Vietnam
, Part II,
chapters 4
–
6
detail the many attacks against American forces leading up to the U.S. deployment of ground troops.

53
.   Fredrik Logevall,
Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), p. 189.

Chapter 7

1
.   One of the best works on the Tonkin incident is Edwin Moise,
Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996).

2
.   Lieutenant General Hoang Nghia Khanh,
The Road to the General Headquarters Staff
(Hanoi, Vietnam: People’s Army Publishing House, 2008), pp. 112–13.

3
.   Combat Operations Department, General Staff of the People’s Army of Vietnam,
History of the Combat Operations Department 1945–2000
(Hanoi, Vietnam: People’s Army Publishing House, 2005), p. 210.

4
.   Victory in Vietnam, p. 133.

5
.   Moise,
Tonkin Gulf
, ch. 3, “The Desoto Patrols,” p. 60.

6
.   Logevall,
Choosing War
, p. 200.

7
.  
Van Kien Dang
, Toan Tap, 25, Politburo Directive No. 81-CT/TW, August 7, 1964, ed. Vu Huu Ngoan (Hanoi, Vietnam: National Political Publishing House [Nha Xuat Ban Chinh Tri Quoc Gia], 2003), p. 185.

8
.  
Van Kien Dang
, 1964, p. 186.

9
.   Ed Moise,
Tonkin Gulf
, ch. 2, “Thoughts of Escalation.”

10
.   Logevall,
Choosing War
, p. 147.

11
.   Dubbing McNamara the “high priest of rational management,” the historian Barbara Tuchman critiqued the Defense Secretary’s strategy of incremental escalation for its cool calculation. “One thing was left out of account: the other side. What if the other side failed to respond rationally to the coercive message?” she asked. “Appreciation of the human factor was not McNamara’s strong point, and the possibility that human kind is not rational was too eccentric and disruptive to be programmed into his analysis.” Barbara Tuchman,
The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam
(New York: Knopf, 1984), p. 288. In contrast, Fredrik Logevall notes that McNamara was already exhibiting signs of concern in 1964 that the war was unwise, yet Logevall sees McNamara’s “slavish” loyalty to the President as the reason for his continued support of the policy. Logevall,
Choosing War
, p. 127.