A Just Cause (23 page)

At the completion of the taped call, Ellis passed out transcripts of all four calls. The prosecutor and Chief Justice Fitzgerald discussed whether the tapes should be played again with each member of the senate having a transcript. Ellis initially said he would like to play the tapes again but then decided not to. Fitzgerald announced, in conjunction with Senate Resolution 7, that the governor or his counsel had the right to cross-examine the witness. But neither the governor nor anyone representing him was present, and the chief justice excused Cain. John Cullerton and Christine Radogno then asked that the parties be allowed to caucus to formulate questions to ask Cain. The senate recessed and each party met in caucus.

When the senate returned, Fitzgerald announced that “the body,” meaning the senate, had requested that the tapes be played again. Ellis was ready and went right to the tapes, again introducing each phone conversation. Hearing the tapes played the first time had left the senators overwhelmed; as the tapes played a second time, with the senators following the printed transcripts, the gravity of what they were hearing became even clearer.

The trial had reached the point where senate members could ask questions of the witness, and Daniel Cain resumed his place at the witness stand. According to the senate trial rules, the senators were prohibited from discussing the trial before and during the proceedings. The questioning of Cain was the first indication of each senator's individual disposition, and many seemed anxious to publicly display their inclinations. Each member of the senate who wished to ask a question was required to submit it in writing to the chief justice, who would then read the question to the witness. Cain was again accompanied to the witness stand by Assistant US Attorney Thomas Walsh. Fitzgerald explained that legal restrictions prevented the disclosure of information collected in the course of a federal crime. Cain was authorized to testify only whether the affidavit that he executed was accurate to the best of his knowledge. He was not permitted to provide additional details or any other conversations, speculate, or give his opinion. The senators had many questions, but with the restrictions in place, Cain was not able to answer the majority of them.

Nevertheless, the senators presented questions knowing that they would not receive an answer from Cain, and what they asked served to divulge their attitudes. The questions were wide-ranging but fell into four basic categories: some solicited more information than was contained in the affidavit, some addressed the procedures used to obtain the recordings, others were made as statements to disparage Rod Blagojevich, and still others seemed motivated by partisanship.

Senator Larry Bomke, a Republican from Springfield, read a section of the affidavit to reiterate a charge and asked Cain if it was correct. Cain answered that Bomke's statement was correct (304–5). Senator Michael Bond, a Democrat from Grayslake, asked if it was “fair to say” that Blagojevich did not wish to be governor (292). Senator Frank Watson, a Republican from Greenville, asked Cain if he was aware that the governor and his attorneys were given an unredacted version of the conversations referred to in the affidavit, and that neither the governor nor his attorneys would come before the senate to refute or explain the conversations. Cain would not answer
or comment on either question (301–2). A moment of comic relief broke through the intense atmosphere after Senator Gary Dahl, a Republican from Granville, asked if any members of the senate tribunal were on the wiretaps. Walsh said that was a question that could not be answered, and an unidentified voice was heard muttering, “Thank God” (292–93). The remark elicited smiles and muffled laughter.

Not all senate members, however, were keen on removing the governor. Showing a reluctance to take the consequential step of removal, Senator Mike Jacobs, a Democrat from East Moline, asked Cain, “Is the Governor's ability to appoint someone to the U.S. Senate seat a thing of value sufficient to support a criminal conspiracy?” (315). Cain would not address the question. The last two questions were from John Millner, a Republican from Carol Stream, and Heather Steans, a Democrat from Chicago. Millner brought a sense of authority with his presence. He was a former police chief of Elmhurst and was genuinely liked and respected by those on both sides of the aisle. He asked a four-part question dealing with the accuracy of the governor's statements and the oath Cain took when he signed the affidavit. He suggested that Cain took his oath “very seriously” and would not have allowed statements into the affidavit that were not true. The witness seemed ready for the question and responded affirmatively. Justice Fitzgerald, surprisingly, assisted Cain's answer and asked him to read paragraph 117, the conclusion of his affidavit. Cain read the damning conclusion (324–27).
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The final question, from Steans, was whether the affidavit “accurately reflected what was heard on the various wiretaps and microphones.” Cain answered yes (327–28). With that, the senate's questions were concluded, and Fitzgerald excused Cain.

Of the sixty-three questions asked by the senators, most had not been answered by Cain, but there was a sense in the senate chamber that the verdict was already in. Outside of Jacobs's question, which seemed motivated more by reluctance to remove the governor than a desire to defend him, none of the senators had offered support for Blagojevich or questioned the accuracy of the criminal complaint.

The trial was progressing as a dynamic event with the calling of the next witness. Ellis had carefully chosen this witness, having rethought his strategy after he was given access to a portion of the tapes. The governor's decision not to participate had made the use of house members as witnesses problematic. Still, to address the pay-to-play impeachment charges that resulted from the testimonies by Ata and Cari at the Rezko trial, Ellis felt
that he needed a real person before the senate to make the testimony come alive. He needed someone to ensure that the written statements of Ata and Cari had maximum effect on the senate. To address the testimony as a witness for the prosecution, it was best to have an attorney, someone who could not only address the testimony as it was presented during the trial but also interpret the events that had led up to the cooperation of Ata and Cari and explain the consequential factors that ensured the accuracy of their remarks. Chapin Rose, a member of the house investigative committee, a former assistant state's attorney from Champaign County, and most important, a Republican, seemed the logical choice. It was important that the senate trial be conducted in a nonpartisan manner, but controlling individual members was always on the minds of party leaders Cullerton and Radogno. Some of the house members introduced by Ellis the day before could have prompted some Republicans to drift into partisan posturing. The Republican Rose negated that scenario.

Rose was questioned by Michael Kasper, a former counsel to the Speaker. Competent and trusted by the Speaker, Kasper had been asked to assist in the trial on a pro bono basis.
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Copies of Ata's and Cari's Rezko trial testimony were passed out. Before beginning to ask specific questions about the testimony, Kasper wanted to establish that the two men, both of whom had admitted to committing crimes, had been telling the truth when they testified in the Rezko trial. He asked Rose a series of questions regarding the incentives of both men to be truthful. Rose explained that the two had not been sentenced but agreed to cooperate with the federal authorities. Presumably, in exchange for their truthful testimony, they would receive reduced sentences.

Kasper took Rose through the testimony in some detail. He began with Ata's and recalled, once again, Ata's encounters with Rezko and Rezko's requests for contributions. Ata had testified that the governor, speaking of a future position for Ata, had said, “He hoped that whatever the position might be, it was one that he could make some money at.” Kasper asked Rose what had taken place after the governor's remarks, and Rose said that Rezko had informed Ata that he would be offered a position with the newly created Illinois Finance Authority and that someone from the administration would contact him. Ata was contacted and met with the governor's chief budget director. After the meeting, he accepted the IFA position. Ata testified that Tony Rezko later informed him that he should report to Rezko, and Ata agreed to have regular meetings with Rezko (341–43).

The senate had heard the tale before, and it remained the weakest of all the charges. Rewarding loyal supporters was an intricate part of American politics and has been widely practiced since the country's founding. There was no evidence of a direct quid pro quo. The governor never said, “You are getting this job because of the money you donated,” and Rezko never said, “If you donate the amount I have requested, you will get a job.” The governor's comment about Ata making money could have been in reference to Ata's financial well-being. The exchange with the governor and the discussions with Rezko certainly cast suspicions concerning the methods of governance within the Blagojevich administration, but it would be difficult to prove that a crime was committed.

Kasper moved on to Cari's testimony, which was much more clear-cut than Ata's, with its nebulous statements. Cari's acts had involved intimidation, extortion, and a clear pattern of pay to play. Most of all, his testimony included remarks, allegedly made by the governor, about schemes to exchange contracts for contributions. Cari's trial testimony was reviewed in greater detail than it had previously been during the house investigative committee hearings, with more of it being made public. Kasper asked how Joseph Cari first became involved with the governor's “political committee.” Rose answered that Cari testified that he was asked by David Wilhelm, a former head of the national Democratic Party, to meet “some of the key players around Governor Blagojevich,” mainly Chris Kelly and Tony Rezko. Blagojevich was considering running for president, and Cari, who had been a former Democratic National Committee finance chairman, would be a good person with whom to discuss “what it takes to run a national campaign.” Cari subsequently met with Kelly and then Stuart Levine. Later, Wilhelm called Cari and asked him to arrange a fund-raiser in New York, and Cari, whose “law firm did a lot of business with the State of Illinois,” agreed. Kasper asked Rose about the plane Levine had procured to fly the governor and a small entourage to New York. Cari said he was asked to join the group on the plane. During the flight, the governor told Cari that it was better to run for president as governor than as a sitting US senator because governors “could award contracts to people who helped to raise funds.” Kasper seized on the contract awards—this was definitely pay to play. With a quickened voice, he asked Rose a series of questions intended to provide the senate with a clear understanding of the type of contracts: “State contracts for legal work?” “And advisory work?” “And consulting work?” And finally, “And investment banking work?” Rose answered yes to each (344–52).

Kasper then asked Rose to read from the Rezko trial transcript. Rose read a question posed by an assistant US attorney, referring to the governor: “And what, if anything, did he say in relation to how they might help his friends?” He then read Cari's answer: “That there were contracts, that there was legal work, that there was investment banking work, consulting work to give to people who helped them.” Kasper asked if Cari had explained “who he was referring to when he said ‘them,'” and Rose answered, “Principally Mr. Rezko and Mr. Kelly.” Rose related that in a later conversation, Stuart Levine told Cari “that there was a plan in place . . . in terms of fundraising,” and the people around the governor would pick the consultants, lawyers, and investment bankers, and “those people then would be in return solicited for political contributions.” Kasper asked if Cari ever said who picked the lawyers, bankers, and contractors, and Rose replied that Cari had indicated that Kelly and Rezko did. When asked if Cari's testimony addressed statements by the governor about Kelly and Rezko, Rose answered yes, the governor had told Cari “that they were trusted advisors” and “that he expected them to be with him throughout his public service career.” After a short exchange designed to reinforce Cari's guilt and the involvement of Stuart Levine in the extortion of JER, Kasper had no further questions (353–58). The senate again took a short recess to formulate questions.

The appearance and testimony of Rose, a Republican house member, did not sit well with the Democratic members of the senate. The senate and the house are considered by their members as autonomous chambers, and the independence of each is a guarded principle. The senate Democrats opposed a member of the house serving as the prosecutor, and now many felt that the appearance of house members as witnesses was inappropriate. During the dialogue between Kasper and Rose, Eric Madiar informed Ellis that Rose's appearance “was not going well” and was not welcomed by the Democratic members. He suggested that the record of the house investigation spoke for itself and that the remaining house witnesses, Lou Lang and Connie Howard, not be called.
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The official reason for the prosecutor not to call more house witnesses could be that they would simply rehash what was in the trial transcripts, and the senate members could read the transcripts. The witnesses were unnecessary.

An element of political tension was also at play. The Democratic members did not want to extrapolate on the testimony regarding Ata and Cari. Blagojevich was the sitting Democratic governor, though few felt any party or ideological kinship to his style of governance. The majority of senate
Democrats agreed that they had to act decisively, that the governor had to be removed quickly, but the whole affair proved an embarrassment. They did not wish to extend the process or draw unnecessary attention to the misdeeds of a member of the Democratic Party. Removal was obvious. They wanted to do it quickly. They wanted it to be over.