A History of China (77 page)

Thus, the Allies permitted Chiang, not the communists, to attend the Yalta Conference in February of 1945, which would make plans for the postwar Pacific. Franklin Roosevelt, Joseph Stalin, and Winston Churchill, the British prime minister, were the principal actors and decision makers at the conference, while Chiang was a subordinate participant with scant leverage and had to accept the conference’s consensus views. Roosevelt was eager to persuade Stalin to declare war on Japan in order to have Soviet troops participate in an invasion, a campaign that promised to generate numerous casualties because the Japanese would presumably fight to the death to protect their homeland. The US president, seeking to reduce America’s casualties, was willing to make concessions to secure USSR involvement in the invasion. China was critical as a lure for Stalin. For example, Stalin demanded that Chiang endorse a ­plebiscite in Mongolia to determine whether its people wanted independence (which was, in theory, their current status) or to “remain under China’s rule.” China and the Guomindang had continued to claim that Mongolia was part of China, despite the fact that the Mongols now had their own communist government and institutions. In the ensuing election, the Mongols naturally opted for independence. Roosevelt also infringed upon China by agreeing to let Soviet troops liberate Manchuria and to grant the USSR special privileges there, particularly in ownership and access to railroads. In a weakened position, Chiang could not object to these concessions, which mostly concerned China.

Thus, the Japanese surrender in August of 1945 did not necessarily improve Chiang’s position. The USSR had declared war on Japan a few days earlier and almost immediately sent troops to Manchuria, which seemed about to be detached from China. Tibet had been autonomous since at least 1911, if not earlier. In 1944, Turkic peoples had proclaimed an Eastern Turkistan Republic in Xinjiang, still another potentially independent entity. Warlords along China’s periphery were de facto autonomous, a further blow to Chiang. The communists were expanding the territories under their jurisdiction. Chiang appeared unable to control events.

The end of the Second World War initiated still another struggle for the control of China. The communists and the Guomindang, the two principal ­antagonists, had different strategies in this renewed civil war. The communists persisted in their policy of dominating the countryside, surrounding the cities, and then overwhelming the Guomindang. Reliance on the peasantry necessitated policies that appealed to the rural areas. Abandoning their earlier moderation, the communists now supported land reform. They targeted landlords, confiscating their land and permitting peasants to intimidate, harm, and ­sometimes kill them. This activist approach ingratiated the communists with the peasantry, though it resulted in capriciousness and violence. On the other hand, by not moving expeditiously to support land reform, the Guomindang did not identify itself with the peasants. Chiang was fixated on destroying the communist “bandits” before initiating significant changes that might attract the Chinese population. Much of Guomindang support also derived from the landlords and the bourgeoisie, groups that opposed such reforms. The communists definitely had the populist appeal, although they still had to contend with Guomindang troops trying to wrest control over territories that they had occupied. They could not compete with the Guomindang’s weapons, but they were highly motivated, honest, and disciplined, attributes that Guomindang forces generally lacked.

Ironically, the communists had their first notable postwar victories on the country’s fringes. In 1947, they occupied Inner Mongolia, ousting Mongols whom the Japanese had supported, and established the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, led by Mongols whom they considered to be reliable and loyal. Shortly thereafter, Ulanhu (1906–1988), a Mongol trained in the USSR and China, became the leader of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region. Manchuria, still another region on China’s border, also proved to be a vital venue in the communists’ ultimate success. The Yalta Conference had permitted the USSR to liberate Manchuria, and few, if any, restrictions were imposed on the Soviets in their occupation. Japan’s surrender in August of 1945 allowed the Soviets a free hand in one of China’s major industrial centers. Blessed with substantial natural and mineral resources, Manchuria had been the site of considerable investment by the Japanese in the 1930s. Factories and mines developed, and the population had increased. Good transport facilities linked the major cities, which had also benefited from Russian immigration from the early twentieth century on. Russian Jews, many with prized technical skills, had fled principally to the city of Harbin from pogroms in their homeland, and White Russians had sought sanctuary there after the Russian Revolution. Control of Manchuria thus offered significant advantages, and the Soviets capitalized on their liberation of the region. They dismantled machinery in factories and mines and shipped it to the USSR, where industries had been devastated by the Nazi invasion. They also confiscated tools, gold, and other items of value. Although they stripped a number of factories and mines, much of the industrial infrastructure remained an invaluable asset. The weapons abandoned by Japanese soldiers could also be useful. Russian troops recognized that, so they tried to ensure that the Chinese communists would obtain the abandoned arsenals. Similarly, they often turned over the lands they occupied to the communists. Chiang, unwilling to give up Manchuria without a fight, sent troops to prevent the communists from controlling this vital region, but his efforts failed. Despite massive superiority in manpower and military equipment, the Guomindang forces were riddled with corruption. Officials abused their positions for their own pecuniary gain. They managed enterprises, exploiting workers and carrying away and selling machinery from factories. The Guomindang was vulnerable, and Lin Biao, later to become the second most important figure among the communists and apparently Mao’s ­successor, led the armies that forced Chiang’s troops to withdraw from Manchuria.

Similar scenarios occurred throughout China. The Guomindang repeatedly harmed itself by its inefficiency, mismanagement, and toleration of corruption. Unemployment and inflation were rampant. Factory workers were exploited and paid poorly. In 1947, women workers in a cotton mill initiated a successful strike, adopting an aggressive response to employer elimination of New Year bonuses, child-care facilities, and maternity leave; other such incidents may have occurred. However, such victories were few and far between. In addition, morale among Guomindang troops was low. Many soldiers were either unwilling to fight or deserted. By contrast, the communist forces were disciplined and had high morale and a low rate of desertion. Foreigners residing in or visiting China noticed and wrote about the differences between the two sides. As early as the 1930s, the American journalist Edgar Snow and other visitors had praised and perhaps idealized the communists. Similarly, foreign observers provided withering criticisms of the Guomindang in its last days of control over China.

Under these circumstances, the communists were now ready to challenge the Guomindang in the cities. Although they still relied on the peasantry, the industrial workers began to provide support as well. In any event, their troops moved from the west and began to attack the eastern or central core of Chinese civilization. From Manchuria they headed south, and by late 1948 they had occupied much of north China, including the ancient capitals of Kaifeng and Luoyang. Communist forces had made a great leap forward: they could lay siege to sizable cities and actually seize them. After their campaigns in the north, they drove forward to the Yangzi-area cities, including Hangzhou and Shanghai. Probably as early as late 1947 or early 1948, Chiang and his associates must have known that they were losing the civil war. They began, at that time, to dispatch valuables, including precious artworks and manuscripts, to Taiwan. The three hundred thousand or so objects in the National Palace Museum in Taibei could not have been transported from China just in the last days of Guomindang domination of the mainland. Elaborate preparations must have been made much earlier, which confirms Chiang’s recognition of the Guomindang’s failure.

On October 1, 1949, Beijing provided the venue for Mao’s proclamation of the People’s Republic of China.

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1919–1949
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1930–1945
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1912–1949
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T
HE
period since October of 1949 has witnessed remarkable ­fluctuations in Chinese government and Communist Party policies. Changes have, on occasion, been rapid and sometimes capricious. Often they have been predictable, but at other times the transformations have been sudden and so drastic that they have been difficult to understand. Motivations for these changes have ranged from perceived foreign threats to retention of ideological purity to ­personal struggles at the top of the hierarchy to decline in productivity to ­communist leaders’ disenchantment with intellectuals or other segments of the population. Causes of these dramatic shifts have varied from realistic assessments of political and economic conditions to commitment to a rigid Marxist–Leninist-Maoist doctrine of development. The changes have caught many unawares and generated considerable instability and even chaos. Many Chinese have been confused by six decades of wavering and, at times, contradictory policies, which have occasionally prompted demonstrations and violence by police, army, and unruly crowds. Greater stability developed, in general, after Mao Zedong’s death in 1976, but there were still periods of harsh and sudden fluctuations in government policies.

Map 12.1
China, 2013