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Authors: Jim Dwyer,Kevin Flynn
102 Minutes: The Unforgettable Story of the Fight to Survive Inside the Twin Towers (39 page)
BOOK: 102 Minutes: The Unforgettable Story of the Fight to Survive Inside the Twin Towers
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The elevator mechanics who worked at the trade center:
Cauchon and Moore.
Cauchon and Moore.
The mechanics planned on reentering:
Port Authority transcript, Radio Channel Z, September 11, 2001.
Port Authority transcript, Radio Channel Z, September 11, 2001.
Mike McQuaid, the electrician, heard the voices:
Mike McQuaid, interview by Ford Fessenden, May 2002.
Mike McQuaid, interview by Ford Fessenden, May 2002.
He sent a radio message to the command center:
Port Authority transcripts, Vertical Transportation Channel, September 11, 2001.
Port Authority transcripts, Vertical Transportation Channel, September 11, 2001.
Some people trapped in the cars managed to get calls:
Emergency Medical Services job log, 911 call center, September 11, 2001; call logged at 9:33 A.M.
Emergency Medical Services job log, 911 call center, September 11, 2001; call logged at 9:33 A.M.
On the 71 st floor of the north tower:
Frank DeMola, interview by Jim Dwyer, October 2003.
Frank DeMola, interview by Jim Dwyer, October 2003.
DeCosta apparently changed his mind:
Port Authority transcript, WTC Channel 29.
Port Authority transcript, WTC Channel 29.
… the Port Authority had installed alarm bells:
Alan Reiss, former director of the world trade department, e-mail correspondence, February 7, 2004.
Alan Reiss, former director of the world trade department, e-mail correspondence, February 7, 2004.
One of the Port Authority workers turned to the security guard:
Trapp, interview.
Trapp, interview.
After some consultations, the dispatcher came back to Trapp:
Port Authority transcript, Channel 27. In it, Trapp’s name is rendered erroneously as Greg Trevor, a Port Authority official who was already leaving the building.
Port Authority transcript, Channel 27. In it, Trapp’s name is rendered erroneously as Greg Trevor, a Port Authority official who was already leaving the building.
The evidence suggests that Tony Savas:
The remains of Savas and Griffin were discovered in staircases near the bottom of the building.
The remains of Savas and Griffin were discovered in staircases near the bottom of the building.
Chapter 11: “I’m staying with my friend.”
… Stephen Miller glimpsed the outside world again:
Stephen Miller, interviews by Lauren Wolfe and Kevin Flynn, December 2003.
Stephen Miller, interviews by Lauren Wolfe and Kevin Flynn, December 2003.
One Port Authority officer thought he saw thirteen people jump:
Port Authority police officer Michael Simons, written memo, March 5, 2002.
Port Authority police officer Michael Simons, written memo, March 5, 2002.
He felt like clapping his hands, and so he did, rhythmically:
Miller, interview.
Miller, interview.
The stairwells had twists and turns:
9/11 Commission study determined that the stairwell arrangement had confused many evacuees because they did not know the configuration.
9/11 Commission study determined that the stairwell arrangement had confused many evacuees because they did not know the configuration.
A windowpane covered in blood:
Recollection of window from Port Authority police officer Roger Fernandez, written memo, January 4, 2002.
Recollection of window from Port Authority police officer Roger Fernandez, written memo, January 4, 2002.
Cops at the top of the escalators:
Recollection of panic from Port Authority police officer Anthony L. Croce, written memo, January 28, 2002, and others.
Recollection of panic from Port Authority police officer Anthony L. Croce, written memo, January 28, 2002, and others.
He had pulled up in a Ford Explorer:
NYPD Deputy Inspector Timothy Pearson, interview by Kevin Flynn, March 2004.
NYPD Deputy Inspector Timothy Pearson, interview by Kevin Flynn, March 2004.
Sue Keane, a Port Authority police officer:
Port Authority police officer Sue Keane, written memo, March 4, 2002.
Port Authority police officer Sue Keane, written memo, March 4, 2002.
Ken Greene, the Port Authority’s assistant director of aviation:
Some details of Greene’s account were gleaned from an interview he did with CBS News that was broadcast on
48 Hours,
October 19, 2001.
Some details of Greene’s account were gleaned from an interview he did with CBS News that was broadcast on
48 Hours,
October 19, 2001.
Nelson Chanfrau, a risk manager for the agency:
Sources for the account of Chanfrau’s activities that day include written memo of Port Authority inspector Timothy Norris, interview with Jim Dwyer, October 2001.
Sources for the account of Chanfrau’s activities that day include written memo of Port Authority inspector Timothy Norris, interview with Jim Dwyer, October 2001.
Perry was an activist and an actor:
Sources for aspects of this account include Pearson interview, an interview with Officer Perry’s mother, Patricia, on March 4, 2004, and John Tierney in “A Policeman for Starters, and at the End,”
New York Times,
November 16, 2001.
Sources for aspects of this account include Pearson interview, an interview with Officer Perry’s mother, Patricia, on March 4, 2004, and John Tierney in “A Policeman for Starters, and at the End,”
New York Times,
November 16, 2001.
Perry and a few others picked her up:
Details are taken from the Fernandez memo and interview with Pearson.
Details are taken from the Fernandez memo and interview with Pearson.
Instead, many people were directed south:
Details are based on interviews of Rich Fetter, resident manager of the Marriott Hotel, by Jim Dwyer, May 2002.
Details are based on interviews of Rich Fetter, resident manager of the Marriott Hotel, by Jim Dwyer, May 2002.
Most of the seventy-five stores had closed:
The closing of the stores is recounted by Port Authority police officer A. Greenstein, written memo, December 9, 2001. Water recounted by Steven Charest of May Davis Group, interview by Kevin Flynn, March 2004.
The closing of the stores is recounted by Port Authority police officer A. Greenstein, written memo, December 9, 2001. Water recounted by Steven Charest of May Davis Group, interview by Kevin Flynn, March 2004.
These were demolished and turned into corridors:
Alan Reiss, e-mail, May 25, 2004; Reiss testimony before the 9/11 Commission, May 18, 2004.
Alan Reiss, e-mail, May 25, 2004; Reiss testimony before the 9/11 Commission, May 18, 2004.
… five Port Authority police officers, wheeling a canvas laundry cart:
The account of Sergeant McLoughlin’s team was taken from
New York Times
interviews of Port Authority police officer Will Jimeno, Port Authority police chief Joseph Morris, and various written memos of police officers, including those of Lt. John Murphy and Sgt. William Ross. Although both Murphy and Ross recall that a Port Authority officer, J. D. Levi, was part of the original group that went with McLoughlin to find the equipment, he somehow was assigned to other duties and Amoroso joined the group instead.
The account of Sergeant McLoughlin’s team was taken from
New York Times
interviews of Port Authority police officer Will Jimeno, Port Authority police chief Joseph Morris, and various written memos of police officers, including those of Lt. John Murphy and Sgt. William Ross. Although both Murphy and Ross recall that a Port Authority officer, J. D. Levi, was part of the original group that went with McLoughlin to find the equipment, he somehow was assigned to other duties and Amoroso joined the group instead.
… crowd scurrying in all directions:
Alan Reiss, interview by Jim Dwyer, April 30, 2002.
Alan Reiss, interview by Jim Dwyer, April 30, 2002.
… Leclaire had to pull them off pay phones:
Port Authority police officer David Leclaire, January 29, 2002.
Port Authority police officer David Leclaire, January 29, 2002.
Sgt. Robert Vargas of the Port Authority police:
Port Authority police Sgt. Robert Vargas, written memo, January 31, 2002.
Port Authority police Sgt. Robert Vargas, written memo, January 31, 2002.
Firefighter Michael Otten of Ladder 35:
Michael Otten, interview by Lauren Wolfe, December 12, 2003.
Michael Otten, interview by Lauren Wolfe, December 12, 2003.
Steve Charest, a broker from May Davis:
Charest, interview.
Charest, interview.
Maffeo always carried tuna to a fire:
Linda Maffeo, interview by Elissa Gootman,
New York Times,
December 2001.
Linda Maffeo, interview by Elissa Gootman,
New York Times,
December 2001.
Capt. William Burke Jr. of Engine 21:
Jean Traina, interview by Lauren Wolfe, January 2004.
Jean Traina, interview by Lauren Wolfe, January 2004.
Sharon Premoli, the financial executive:
Sharon Premoli, interview by Kevin Flynn, March 2004.
Sharon Premoli, interview by Kevin Flynn, March 2004.
… reports of firemen having chest pains:
Lt. Gregg Hansson, interview by Ford Fessenden, July 2002.
Lt. Gregg Hansson, interview by Ford Fessenden, July 2002.
Engine 9. Squad 18:
Specific citations of the other units that suffered chest pains is listed in an oral history by Capt. Jay Jonas of the Fire Department of New York that was published in the
Times Herald-Record,
September 8, 2003.
Specific citations of the other units that suffered chest pains is listed in an oral history by Capt. Jay Jonas of the Fire Department of New York that was published in the
Times Herald-Record,
September 8, 2003.
At the 19th floor, dozens of exhausted firefighters:
Interview with Capt. Joseph Baccellieri of the Court Officers by Kevin Flynn, July 2002 and 2003. An alternative explanation for the large collection of firefighters on the 19th floor is offered by Dennis Smith, the author and retired firefighter, who notes that a battalion chief had been sent to the 23rd floor to set up a command post, and the firefighters may have used the 19th floor as a mustering point.
Interview with Capt. Joseph Baccellieri of the Court Officers by Kevin Flynn, July 2002 and 2003. An alternative explanation for the large collection of firefighters on the 19th floor is offered by Dennis Smith, the author and retired firefighter, who notes that a battalion chief had been sent to the 23rd floor to set up a command post, and the firefighters may have used the 19th floor as a mustering point.
On the 31st floor, a dozen firefighters slumped in the hallway:
This account is based on radio transmissions and an interview with David Norman, June 2004.
This account is based on radio transmissions and an interview with David Norman, June 2004.
… a firefighter told them to stuff wet rags underneath the doors:
Capt. Joseph Baccellieri, interview.
Capt. Joseph Baccellieri, interview.
“No, I’m staying with my friend”:
Anthony Giardina, who witnessed the conversation, interview by Kevin Flynn, April 2004.
Anthony Giardina, who witnessed the conversation, interview by Kevin Flynn, April 2004.
Now, as he approached 27:
Keith Meerholz, interview by Jim Dwyer, January 2004.
Keith Meerholz, interview by Jim Dwyer, January 2004.
Martin and her fellow passengers had tried pushing the alarm buttons:
Ian Robb, Judith Martin, Mike Jacobs, Chris Young, interviews by Joseph Plambeck, May 2004.
Ian Robb, Judith Martin, Mike Jacobs, Chris Young, interviews by Joseph Plambeck, May 2004.
Just before 9:30, a new note of alarm:
The scene in the lobby was reconstructed based on footage shot by Jules and Gedeon Naudet, accounts in the McKinsey Report, and oral history recollections of firefighters and others present, including Chiefs Pfeifer, Hayden, and Callan.
The scene in the lobby was reconstructed based on footage shot by Jules and Gedeon Naudet, accounts in the McKinsey Report, and oral history recollections of firefighters and others present, including Chiefs Pfeifer, Hayden, and Callan.
In the skies above the trade center, Greg Semendinger:
Semendinger’s words and those of other helicopter radio transmissions are taken from a Police Department transcript of traffic on the channel used by its Special Operations Division.
Semendinger’s words and those of other helicopter radio transmissions are taken from a Police Department transcript of traffic on the channel used by its Special Operations Division.
… thousands of planes were still in the air across the country:
Information about the number of flights in the air at the time and the
timing of the shutdown of New York airspace is from an interview with Laura J. Brown, a spokesperson for the FAA.
Information about the number of flights in the air at the time and the
timing of the shutdown of New York airspace is from an interview with Laura J. Brown, a spokesperson for the FAA.
Air controllers did not realize that at that moment:
Port Authority transcripts, La Guardia Airport channels; Jim Dwyer, “Takeoffs Continued until Second Jet Hit the Trade Center, Transcripts Show,”
New York Times,
December 30, 2003.
Port Authority transcripts, La Guardia Airport channels; Jim Dwyer, “Takeoffs Continued until Second Jet Hit the Trade Center, Transcripts Show,”
New York Times,
December 30, 2003.
A strike by a third plane:
Hayden’s recollections are contained in his oral history obtained by the
New York Times
and an interview with
Firehouse
magazine, April 2002.
Hayden’s recollections are contained in his oral history obtained by the
New York Times
and an interview with
Firehouse
magazine, April 2002.
Some police officers who had been preparing to go inside paused:
Ross memo as above, March 6, 2002.
Ross memo as above, March 6, 2002.
… just looked at one another and kept working:
Port Authority police officer A. Greenstein, written memo, December 9, 2001.
Port Authority police officer A. Greenstein, written memo, December 9, 2001.
… cleared out of the lobby, relocating to West Street:
McKinsey Report.
McKinsey Report.
Later, he would cite the order as a mark:
Sheirer’s account is based on footage by the Naudet brothers and an interview with Jim Dwyer, March 2002.
Sheirer’s account is based on footage by the Naudet brothers and an interview with Jim Dwyer, March 2002.
No one answered his call:
McKinsey Report states that no one responded to Callan.
McKinsey Report states that no one responded to Callan.
Chapter 12: “Tell the chief what you just told me.”
Andreacchio had even started downstairs:
Jessica Carucci, niece of Andreacchio, interview by Lauren Wolfe, January 28, 2004. She learned this information at his memorial service.
Jessica Carucci, niece of Andreacchio, interview by Lauren Wolfe, January 28, 2004. She learned this information at his memorial service.
Now, he was stuck with Manny Gomez:
Carucci, interview. He told her that he was with five people. She spoke with him several minutes before Bramante.
Carucci, interview. He told her that he was with five people. She spoke with him several minutes before Bramante.
Bramante talked him through the options:
Anthony Bramante, interview by Lauren Wolfe, January 28, 2004.
Anthony Bramante, interview by Lauren Wolfe, January 28, 2004.
… the city’s emergency response program had no mechanism:
Bernard B. Kerik, former police commissioner, testimony before 9/11 Commission, May 18, 2004.
Bernard B. Kerik, former police commissioner, testimony before 9/11 Commission, May 18, 2004.
At 9:19, Vadas left a message:
Kris McFerren, interviewed by Ford Fessenden, May 2002.
Kris McFerren, interviewed by Ford Fessenden, May 2002.
Mulderry, the former college basketball star:
Peter Mulderry, interview by Jim Dwyer, May 2002.
Peter Mulderry, interview by Jim Dwyer, May 2002.
Five floors above them, Greg Milanowycz:
Joseph Milanowycz, interview by Eric Lipton, April 2002.
Joseph Milanowycz, interview by Eric Lipton, April 2002.
At the main post, across West Street:
Thomas Fitzpatrick, FDNY, oral history, October 1, 2001.
Thomas Fitzpatrick, FDNY, oral history, October 1, 2001.
At the same post, Lt. Joseph Chiafari:
Joseph Chiafari, FDNY, oral history, December 3, 2001.
Joseph Chiafari, FDNY, oral history, December 3, 2001.
His boss, Deputy Assistant Chief Al Turi, began to think:
Al Turi, oral history, FDNY, October 23, 2001.
Al Turi, oral history, FDNY, October 23, 2001.
In one potentially critical area:
Years after September 11, the precise reason why the firefighters had such trouble communicating by radio that morning remains a matter of significant debate. Much of the debate centers on the performance of the repeater, or amplifier, that was designed to boost the radio signals of the small handheld radios so that firefighters could communicate through the multiple floors of a high-rise. The repeater was operated through a console that looked like a phone set and sat at the fire-command desks in each of the towers. The 9/11 Commission staff reported in May 2004 that the repeater had worked properly but that, in the stress of the morning, fire chiefs mistakenly thought otherwise. The investigators said the chiefs had not noticed that the button that activated the phone handset on the repeater console had not been depressed. The investigators concluded that when the chiefs could not hear through the handset, they mistakenly believed that the equipment itself was not working and prematurely abandoned it. Actually, it was just the handset that had not been turned on, they said. Fire chiefs in the north tower then relied simply on the unaided signal of their small handheld radios to communicate. The chiefs have insisted that the handset button was correctly pushed and that testing in the lobby showed the repeater was not working properly. Lloyd Thompson, one of the fire-safety directors in the north tower lobby that morning, told the commission that he saw that the handset button had been correctly depressed. As of June 2004, investigators had yet to determine who actually activated the repeater that morning or who might have touched any of the buttons. Chief Palmer subsequently decided to use the repeater channel, Channel 7, when he responded to the south tower. It is not clear how he came to realize that the repeater was working, at least partly. He had been one of the chiefs who had initially tested the repeater in the north tower lobby that morning and concluded it was not working. It is clear that at some point when he arrived at the south tower he tuned his radio to Channel 7, the channel amplified by the repeater. A tape recording of his radio transmissions and those of other firefighters over Channel 7 that morning was later recovered from the rubble. None of the transmissions gives a sense of how Palmer came to realize the repeater was working. The recording also does not contain transmissions from many of the other firefighters who were operating in the south tower. Fire officials have said the low
number of transmissions is evidence that the repeater did not work properly. Investigators have said the low number is more likely explained by the fact that so few firefighters were told to operate on that channel.
Years after September 11, the precise reason why the firefighters had such trouble communicating by radio that morning remains a matter of significant debate. Much of the debate centers on the performance of the repeater, or amplifier, that was designed to boost the radio signals of the small handheld radios so that firefighters could communicate through the multiple floors of a high-rise. The repeater was operated through a console that looked like a phone set and sat at the fire-command desks in each of the towers. The 9/11 Commission staff reported in May 2004 that the repeater had worked properly but that, in the stress of the morning, fire chiefs mistakenly thought otherwise. The investigators said the chiefs had not noticed that the button that activated the phone handset on the repeater console had not been depressed. The investigators concluded that when the chiefs could not hear through the handset, they mistakenly believed that the equipment itself was not working and prematurely abandoned it. Actually, it was just the handset that had not been turned on, they said. Fire chiefs in the north tower then relied simply on the unaided signal of their small handheld radios to communicate. The chiefs have insisted that the handset button was correctly pushed and that testing in the lobby showed the repeater was not working properly. Lloyd Thompson, one of the fire-safety directors in the north tower lobby that morning, told the commission that he saw that the handset button had been correctly depressed. As of June 2004, investigators had yet to determine who actually activated the repeater that morning or who might have touched any of the buttons. Chief Palmer subsequently decided to use the repeater channel, Channel 7, when he responded to the south tower. It is not clear how he came to realize that the repeater was working, at least partly. He had been one of the chiefs who had initially tested the repeater in the north tower lobby that morning and concluded it was not working. It is clear that at some point when he arrived at the south tower he tuned his radio to Channel 7, the channel amplified by the repeater. A tape recording of his radio transmissions and those of other firefighters over Channel 7 that morning was later recovered from the rubble. None of the transmissions gives a sense of how Palmer came to realize the repeater was working. The recording also does not contain transmissions from many of the other firefighters who were operating in the south tower. Fire officials have said the low
number of transmissions is evidence that the repeater did not work properly. Investigators have said the low number is more likely explained by the fact that so few firefighters were told to operate on that channel.
BOOK: 102 Minutes: The Unforgettable Story of the Fight to Survive Inside the Twin Towers
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