Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and the Kim Dynasty (166 page)

34.
February 15, 1994, interview with Kim Nam-joon, a former Korean People’s Army second lieutenant who said it was only after he defected to South Korea in 1989 that he learned who the real author was.

35.
Tak, Kim and Pak,
Great Leader Kim Jong Il,
vol. 1, pp. 140–159.

36.
Buzo,
Guerilla Dynasty
(see chap. 11, n. 39), p. 43.

37.
Choe In Su,
Kim Jong Il,
vol. 2, pp. 49–54. The Chinese had lapel badges with portraits of Mao earlier.

38.
Kang Myong-do testimony in
JoongAng Ilbo.

39.
Choe In Su,
Kim Jong Il,
vol. 2, pp. 55–57.

40.
Ibid., pp. 59–64.

41.
Ibid., vol. 2, p.
74.

42.
Kim Jong Il,
Some Problems Arising,
pp. 10–13. He is described as having given the talk April 6, 1968.

43.
Tak, Kim and Pak,
Great Leader Kim Jong Il,
vol. 1, pp. 172, 191–192.

44.
Choe In Su,
Kim Jong Il,
vol. 2, pp. 64–70.

45.
Tak, Kim and Pak,
Great Leader Kim Jong Il,
vol. 1, pp. 172–175.

46.
See Koh Chik-mann, “‘Theory of Cinema—’ Offers Clues to Kim Jong-il’s View on Arts, Politics,”
Korea Times,
July 13, 1994.

47.
Choe In Su,
Kim Jong Il,
vol. 2, pp. 70–74.

48.
Ibid., pp. 78–83.

49.
Ibid., pp. 84–87.

50.
Ibid., pp. 89–90.

51.
Tak, Kim and Pak,
Great Leader Kim Jong Il,
vol. 1, p. 197.

52.
Kang Myong-do,
Pyeongyangeun mangmyeoneul kumgungda
(Pyongyang Dreams of Exile) (Seoul: Joongang Daily News, 1995).

53.
See Choe In Su,
Kim Jong Il,
vol. 2, photo facing p. 88.

54.
Kim Jong Il,
Let Us Create More Revolutionary Works Which Meet the Requirements of Our Socialist Life
(Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1988).

55.
Choe In Su,
Kim Jong Il,
vol. 2, pp. 92–94.

56.
Ibid., pp. 115–120.

57.
Tak, Kim and Pak,
Great Leader Kim Jong Il,
pp. 110–111.

58.
Ibid., p. 116.

59.
Buzo,
Guerilla Dynasty,
pp. 40, 48.

60.
Ibid., p. 26.

61.
Hwang Jang-yop,
Problems of Human Rights (3).

62.
Quoted in Lee Sang-min, “The Personality Cult in the North Korean Political Process (II),”
Vantage Point
(September 1989): pp. 1–2.

63.
I interviewed the diplomat, who asked not to be further identified. Another foreign resident, an Englishman who was employed by the Foreign Languages Publishing House as a reviser in 1987–1988, noted that comedy programs were not among the entertainment offerings on North Korean television. See chap. 8, p. 7, of Andrew Holloway
A Year in Pyongyang
(published in 2002 on the Internet Web site of Aidan Foster-Carter, http://www.aidanfc.net/a_year_ in_pyongyang.html).

64.
Kim
With the Century,
vol. 3, pp. 421–422.

65.
“New Book Adds Insights into Hitler’s Personality,” Bonn-datelined article by UPI-Kyodo,
Japan Times,
December 2, 1983.

14. Eyes and Ears.

1.
Hwang Jang-yop,
Problems of Human Rights (2 and 3)
(see chap. 6, n. 104, and chap. 9, n. 25, respectively). Further details of the security organizations’ interlocking operations from Kim Jong-min, who rose to the brigadier-general level in Public Security, appear in Cho Gap-jae, “Interview of Former High-level Official” (see chap. 6, n. 88).

2.
An official biographer quoted Kim Il-sung as saying, “The consistent principle our Party adheres to in its work with people who have complicated social and political backgrounds, is that we should appraise them case by case, always attaching utmost importance to their present behavior, isolate hostile elements to the maximum and win even one by one over to the side of the revolution.” The biographer continued, “Introducing such a principle, he was able to educate and remold all the people except a handful of purposefully hostile elements of exploiting class origin, and brought all into the bosom of socialism. He … went deep among the people, embraced all warmly, trusted them and actively helped them to give full scope to their talents and exercise a passion for socialist construction, himself setting a practical example, and teaching this to Party organizations.”

For example, Kim supposedly forgave the chief engineer of a steelworks who had come up under the Japanese and who, during the Korean War, had started to move south but thought better of it. “Noting that he had returned again to follow the Party after realizing that the U.S. scoundrels were bad, even though he had hesitated for a while during the war, the Leader held that it was possible to educate and remold him.”

Visiting the wives left behind by some men who had fled south during the war, Kim noted that the men were from backgrounds of poverty. Thus, they must have been deceived by enemy propaganda. “Some of your husbands who have gone to South Korea are probably begging for some food with a tin [can] in hand,” he told the abandoned wives, who were described as repenting of their “inadvertent” failure to dissuade their husbands from fleeing. “Some are likely to be fighting against the Syngman Rhee clique. Achieving something in their fight, they may come back. Generally speaking, those who went there from the northern half are mostly saying frequently that the politics of the Republic is better. We know this well. Therefore, we cannot say that all the families are bad
simply because their members went to the South.” He told the women, “When your infant children ask questions about their fathers, you must clearly answer. If their fathers went there after doing something wrong, tell them that their fathers are a class enemy. Educate them, telling them that they must become revolutionaries, taking the right road though their fathers took the wrong road. If their fathers went there unwittingly, please tell them that their fathers are guiltless and went there unwittingly. Inform them that it is because of U.S. imperialism and the Syngman Rhee clique that they cannot see their fathers. Teach them that U.S. imperialism and the Syngman Rhee clique are our sworn enemies. Educate them that ‘You receive equal treatment as citizens of the Republic. There is no discrimination against you simply because your family members went to the South. Don’t worry! You must study well, work well and become labor innovators.’ ” The women “shed copious tears” at his words, and after he had gone “they all gave more energy to the country’s service and came to enjoy a lively life. It was because of such personal education by Comrade Kim Il-sung that the people with complicated backgrounds took the road to hope, in countless cases. People who had a shameful past drew boundless inspiration from the wise policy and warm love of Comrade Kim Il-sung and learned to give all their energies to proud socialist construction, embraced to his broad bosom” (Baik II [see chap. 4, n. 24], pp. 530–543).

3.
June 1994 interview in Seoul.

15. From Generation to Generation.

1.
Hwang Jang-yop,
Problems of Human Rights (2)
(see chap. 6, n. 104).

2.
“Can Kim Jong-il .Maintain His Father’s ‘Inviolable’ Authority?”
Vantage Point
(July 1981): pp. 11–15.

3.
Tak, Kim and Park,
Great Leader Kim Jong Il,
vol. 1 (see chap. 5, n. 15), pp. 222–223. Another report, by a North Korean spokesman in Tokyo, says it was in 1974 that Kim Jong-il formed a crisis-management task force to try to salvage the foundering six-year plan (1971–1976), which sought to complete the country’s “socialist industrialization” and—the “technical revolution” again—to mechanize or automate difficult, dangerous and dirty tasks in the factory, on the farm and in the home. At an extraordinary Politburo meeting called to discuss economic problems, “no one responded to the exhortations of Kim Il-sung. Then Kim Jong-il volunteered to take over the job. He organized young volunteers into shock brigades and led the six-year plan to fulfillment of its goals ahead of schedule. For this work he was awarded the title Hero of the Nation in 1975” (Kim Myong Chol, “Biography of an Infant Prodigy” [see chap. 13, n. 4]). Here we have either two different events or, perhaps, two conflicting dates for the same event.

4.
Tak, Kim and Pak,
Great Leader Kim Jong Il,
vol. 1, p. 226.

5.
Ibid., pp. 204–205.

6.
Choe In Su,
Kim Jong Il,
vol. 2 (see chap. 10, n. 43), p. 129.

7.
Tak, Kim and Pak,
Great Leader Kim Jong Il,
vol. 1, pp. 228–229.

8.
Ibid., pp. 248–250.

9.
“The north Korean government is well aware of the negative feeling of the people against the mobilization system and it, therefore, keeps the people always
under strain North Korea has admitted that small-scale resistance activities of the people occur in a wide sphere of life. … According to a speech by Kim Il-sung, there are ‘workers and clerks who do not work hard and observe labor regulations’ as well as those ‘who waste the valuable social and national properties’ [including] those who lavishly use chemical fertilizer, leave foodgrains piled up on moist ground and those who do not keep their farm tools in good shape or plan to harvest chestnuts. In the case of factory workers, there are those who think only of the quantity, not the quality, of industrial products and who pack commodities without care. Kim Il-sung believes that these phenomena are related to individualism. In other words, he thinks such phenomena occur as workers do not believe in the coincidence between the national interest and personal interest” (Choe Hong-gi, “Mobilization System and Labor Efficiency”
Vantage Point
[January 1979]: pp. 12, 13; no source, date, or place given for Kim Il-sung’s speech).

10.
Peoples Korea
said in its February 13, 1982, edition that Kim Jong-il “proposed a Three-Revolution-Team .Movement and dispatched teams composed of party activists and young intellectuals to various branches of the national economy.” Other North Korean sources, however, say that Kim Il-sung initiated the movement early in 1973 and Kim Jong-il only took charge of the effort later that year when he was promoted to party secretary for organization and guidance.

11.
Among the many analysts taking this view was Pusan National University Professor Lee Sang-min, in “The Personality in the North Korean Political Process (I),”
Vantage Point
(August 1989): p. 7.

12.
Interview February 17, 1994.

13.
Yang Ho-min, “The Three Revolutions in North Korea,”
Vantage Point
(June 1978): p. 8.

14.
Interview March 15, 1995.

15.
“Pyongyang’s harshest attack on the Chinese appeared in an editorial of Nodong Shinmun on September 15, 1966. … Ostensibly attacking ‘Trotskyism,’ the KWP organ pointed out that the major departure and basis of the position of Trotsky’s left-wing’ opportunism was the theory of ‘permanent revolution.’ … The Trotskyites categorically opposed any combination of violent and nonviolent methods in the revolutionary struggle, and favored only ‘offensive and reckless rebellion.’ The North Korean leaders were apparently alarmed by the violence of China’s Cultural Revolution, which they did not want to follow. However, Pyongyang refrained from commenting on the Cultural Revolution in explicit terms” (Chin O. Chung,
P’yongyang Between Peking and Moscow: North Korea’s Involvement in the Sino-Soviet Dispute, 1958–1975
[Tuscaloosa, Ala.: The University of Alabama Press, 1978], p. 128).

16.
Kulloja
(Worker), no. 3, 1975, p. 16, cited in Yang Ho-min, “Three Revolutions in North Korea,” p. 11.

17.
This former official insisted on anonymity.

18.
Choe In Su,
Kim Jong Il,
vol. 2, pp. 28–30.

19.
Kang Myong-do in
JoongAng Ilbo.

20.
Ibid.

21.
“True Picture of North Korea” (see chap. 13, n. 21).

22.
The country’s Central Broadcasting Station announced that Kim Yong-ju had attended a ceremony and a concert on July 26, 1993. His name was listed then
between the previously tenth- and eleventh-ranking officials, suggesting he had been rehabilitated
(Korea Times,
July 28, 1994).

23.
Kim Myong Chol, “Biography of an Infant Prodigy” (see chap. 13, n. 4). Hahn Ho-suk, “American Nuclear Threats and North Korea’s Counter Strategy,” in
The US-DPRK Relations at the Close of the 20th Century and the Prospect for United Korea at the Dawn of the 21st Century,
described as an English abstract of an original paper posted in Korean on the Web site onekorea.org by the author, who directs the “Center for Korean Affairs” in Flushing, N.Y.
(Korea Web Weekly,
http://www kimsoft.com/2000/hanho.htm).

24.
Eric Cornell,
North Korea Under Communism: Report of an Envoy to Paradise
(see chap. 9, n. 3), p. 124.