The Whale Has Wings Vol 1 - Rebirth (4 page)

This would displace about 12,500
tons, and carry 25 aircraft, with space allowed for reasonable maintenance work (as hunting groups in particular were often away from base support for long periods). This would fit in with the displacement limits, and some hope was entertained that small carriers in the 10,000 - 12,000 ton range might be exclude in future (as they had been until the London treaty in 1930), in which case this ship would serve as a model for a slightly smaller ship. Considerable agonising had been done of the fitting of a TDS, as it was felt that the usage of such a ship was such that a torpedo from a submarine would be one of the most likely threats. However it was extremely difficult to fit a useful TDS into such a small vessel. A solution was proposed that basically solved the problem by going around it; instead of a TDS, the ship would be well subdivided, and drums would be installed into spaces to provide buoyancy in case of underwater damage. Such a system was planned to be fitted to liners marked down as auxiliary cruisers. To aid the ships survival, the engine and boiler rooms would be split so one torpedo wouldn't take out both.

In order to keep the displacement down, as well as the cost, it was decided that the ship would only have minimal armour; sufficient for splinter protection except over the magazines where a box would be fitted. It was not expected that a CVL would be used in an area of high air threat - that was, after all, what fleet carriers were for - except in an emergency, and like cruisers performance and capability were more important than protection.

To reduce costs and manning requirements, the ship would not carry a heavy AA armament, instead it would carry 3 octuple 2pdr systems for self defence. Since the ship would have to work with cruisers and the fleet, a modified cruiser propulsion plant was proposed that would give a speed of about 28 - 29kt.

The Admiralty was still worried about the carriers existing or planned by
the USA and Japan. The USA had two very large converted carriers, one new carrier (Ranger) coming into service this year and two more new designs starting in 1934. All of these carried more planes than Ark Royal would (although the FAA were somewhat disbelieving of the number of operational planes as opposed to just planes carried). The Japanese again had two huge conversions, one smaller new carrier and another being laid down this year. To counter this the RN only really had two smaller conversions, and one new carrier being laid down shortly. They wanted more new build, and after considerable negotiations with the Treasury, they got funding for the new 'trade protection/training' ship and a repeat Ark Royal in the next years building program

This year also led to some progress in the development of the new aircraft.

First, there was a surprise when another aircraft company offered a proposal for the new dive bomber, Martin-Baker. The company had not been one of the ones 'approved' by the unofficial Air Ministry tender system, and so they had approached the Admiralty directly with a design. They also pointed out that Hawker were very busy, and even starting later they could supply a prototype for testing just as fast as Blackburn. The Admiralty was interested (they were looking at the advantages of building up a number of aircraft companies skilled in producing naval aircraft, as it was realised that only the largest companies would be in a position to build any type of aircraft), and so agreed that they would fund one
development aircraft.

Secondly the rather technically complex issue of what type of 0.5" gun should be fitted to the fighter (and to the
dive bomber, which would carry two in the wings). The USN was intending to use the Browning 0.50 M2, but the FAA was not terribly impressed with its performance. The 0.5" Vickers was another contender (and had the advantage of being a British gun), although again the performance wasn't exemplary. In the end it was decided that the initial fit would be the Vickers 0.5" (the FAA were still worried that the .303 favoured by the RAF wouldn't be enough to shoot planes down on the way in, which, as their airfields had a greater tendency to sink than those of the RAF, was rather important to them). Research did continue for a better solution, coordinating with similar RAF work.

There were worries from some of the aircraft manufacturers about the availability of the untr
ied Hercules engine (the Bristol board were still not that keen on it, although the Admiralty was determined to keep pressure on the development), particularly Gloster. They suggested, since they were contracted to produce two prototypes (one with each type of wing armament), that they could use the Bristol Perseus engine for one of the planes, in case the Hercules had problems. Of course it would produce much less power, but it was the same diameter and the plane could be weighted to allow the new engine to just be a replacement, so no time would be lost. The Admiralty agreed to this, as it would produce the first prototype in the shortest possible time, and even if the Hercules was delayed would allow testing to continue without delay.

A somewhat ironic situation arose when the RAF sent out a requirement for a radial-powered fighter for use in hot climates and from rough airfields. The RN did have a certain amount of pleasure in pointing out that a de-navalised version of their proposed fighter would in fact be ideal for this, since a plane designed for the harsh treatment of carrier landings would be very suitable for
short unprepared strips. While the irony of a naval aircraft being supplied for the RAF wasn't lost on the RAF either, in the end it actually went some way to restoring the relationship after the internecine warfare of the previous year. The RAF agreed to partially fund the Navy's plane (in the end, they RN funded the plane and the RAF paid for much of the equipment development), and it was agreed that once flight trials had completed the RAF would select one of the planes for their use. The removal of the naval-only items would them allow either higher performance, better armament of more protection, whichever was felt more important at the time. If the two services selected the same plane, the initial deliveries would be to the RN, then a joint production line could built it in the two required versions.

Chapter 4

At the start of 1935, most interest in the RN
aviation community was centred on the design of a follow-on improved fleet carrier, and the waiting for the planes in development to fly at the end of the year, hopefully with the new Hercules engine. So far, progress was very promising, although Blackburn's dive bomber was progressing more slowly that was liked, and Hawkers workload was threatening to slow down the Henly.

The good news
was that the Fairy Swordfish TBR was finished, and deliveries were starting. While it didn't have the performance the FAA was looking for from the other new aircraft, it was considerably better than their current planes, and was looking to be a good, reliable carrier plane. A specification was therefore sent out for its replacement at the beginning of the year, this time for a monoplane built around the Hercules. It was expected that a much higher performance aircraft would be available in around 3-4 years.

In order to utilise the hi
gher performance of the proposed new plane, it was decided to look into the possibility of improving the current airborne torpedo. Currently the Swordfish couldn't carry a much heavier weapon, or drop it an faster than the current design allowed, but there were obvious advantages for survivability in a faster and higher drop speed, and at the same time the overall performance would be looked at.

However world affairs soon turned the attention of the planning staff to a number of different topics that would prove to be eventually very significant.

The first of these occurred at the beginning of March, when a letter was received from Air Marshal Dowding concerning a recent trial to detect an aircraft by means of radio beams. As a result of this, some urgent conversations were held first with Dowding, then with the boffin concerned, Watson-Watt. The results, and the possibilities, astounded the FAA and the navy - this was what they had been looking for as a way of implementing a successful fleet defence. The FAA in particular felt that if this system could be successfully developed, it would solve many of the still-intractable problems they had been wrestling with. They hadn't really managed a good solution to the problem of enemy raid interception, Basically the enemy arrived too close too soon, especially in bad weather. One of the reasons they had specified a new fighter with a high speed was to help with a faster interception, but exercises had already shown that this wasn't going to solve the problem. RDF would both solve the problem of weather, and give sufficient range to allow the bombers to be intercepted before they could get in range. As a bonus, the still tricky problem of getting single-seat fighters back would be fixed by tracking and controlling them back, allowing them to intercept even further out. On escort missions, the pilot would only have to get back to the general area of the carrier, making the task much easier. The FAA recommended that RDF should be given the highest priority for technical development (rather unnecessarily as the RAF was looking equally hard at the possibilities). A section was set up at the navy's signal school to evaluate the results of the RAF development, to proceed in parallel with a system for the navy, and to design new operational tactics offered by the new system.

In retrospect, this discovery was well-timed.

On the 16th March Adolf Hitler denounced the disarmament clause of the Versailles treaty, and that the German army would be expanded to 36 divisions. While the announcement of a bigger army didn't worry the navy directly, the announcement of the Luftwaffe certainly did. The air threat to the RN in the North Sea and eastern coastal waters had just gone from a minor nuisance to a potentially major threat.

As a result a major review was undertaken with some urgency as to the state of the fleets air defences, both with and without ai
r support. This was split into three areas - fighter cover, HA air defence gunfire, and close in gunfire.

Fighter support was considered inadequate at present, due to the very limited number and performance of the planes. Given the steps already taken, it was felt little more could be done on improving this until the new aircraft were in service, although there were big issues as to numbers and control of them . N
umber of aircraft would be a function of the numbers and availability of carriers, and a number of exercises were planned to work on the most efficient number to use. As to control, it was already know that it was inadequate and subject to the weather, although it was pointed out that poor weather would help ships hide as well as make it difficult to spot an air raid. Even more hope was placed in the RDF experiments.

The position of HA gunfire was felt to be in a better state. A steady and significant improvement in capability was already in progress, and when completed was felt adequate to break up the mass high level formations that were the only real threat to ships. While it was recognised that only limited numbers would actually be shot down, the main effect would be to stop them actually hitting anything.

The biggest issue was with the close range defences. While the multiple pompom was considered a good weapon, it had been a long while in development, and supply was still inadequate. The problems had been brought into greater clarity by the exercises over the last couple of years, with the increases emphasis on dive bombing. Before these it had been felt that the system was adequate, but a number of issues had been shown up in the additional exercises. Due to the existing shortage, and the problems associated with speeding up production that were already being encountered, a decision was made to look at a program of improvements that would have the minimal impact on production while improving the capability of the system, with particular attention to the four and eight barrel versions. A report was requested, with recommendations and input from the firms involved, within six months

In order to try and keep the German naval build
-up under some sort of limitation, the Anglo-German naval agreement was signed on the 18th June. This limited Germany to 35% of Britain's surface tonnage, 45% of submarine tonnage. While seeming to give Germany the opportunities to build a considerable fleet, The Admiralty were quite happy with it for two main reasons; first, they thought that allowing Germany to build up prestigious capital units would stop them building the 'freak fleet' of fast cruisers and submarines that was their biggest worry, and second that while Germany could in theory build up a carrier force, it had taken them, the USA and Japan well over 10 years to work out many of the problems, so any early German carriers would have to go through a similar time-wasting learning curve.

While this was going on, the arguments over next years
' carrier construction program went on. The government understood that Germany could easily build up into a major threat, and that this meant that they could no longer ignore the need for increased defence spending. While they didn't see the German army as a threat at the moment, the Luftwaffe was clearly able to attack Britain, if not immediately then in the near future. British air defences had to be improved, and work on strengthening the RAF was speeded up. The land-based air defences were also planned for major improvements, although delays in the 3.7" AA gun meant this would take time before it could become implemented.

The Navy argued that the air threat extended to them as well, and since it was not certain that the R
AF would be available except in cases like the coastal waters off the UK, the obvious way of increasing the defences of the fleet was to build more carriers. In addition, the carriers based at Scapa could also help defend the base (and if necessary Scotland), thus freeing up RAF fighters for other use. While the government agreed that this was logical in principle, there were issues over the cost and the tonnage availability under the London treaty. The navy did point out that at the moment there were ample large building slips available (while they were reserving five for the battleships they hoped to start in 1937, they still had ample capability to build carriers).