Ten Degrees of Reckoning (20 page)

While the Investigations Branch of the United States Coast Guard in Washington, D.C., and Lieutenant Commander Acker in Honolulu, had the bulk of the administrative burden, Matthews was willing to monitor any activities related to the
Pan Grace.
It was very challenging to get any cooperation, but he was determined to stand by to ensure that the hull was not repainted.

Finally, the
Pan Grace
proceeded to port to unload its cargo of logs. Matthews was allowed to be in attendance, accompanied by the Maritime Police. He observed several areas of distinct blue markings on the hull and recent, sweeping scratches from the sea surface up to the center and over to the starboard side. When the cargo was offloaded and the bow rose higher, more scratches appeared. With the evidence apparent, Matthews asked the Maritime Police to request a meeting with the master, second mate, and quartermaster. The Maritime Police declined. Matthews then asked for samples of the blue paint on the hull of the
Pan Grace.
They declined. He asked to board the ship and examine the equipment. They declined, but allowed Matthews to observe their removal of paint scrapings.

Matthews contacted the United States Embassy. He asked them to intercede with written requests to both the CMAIA and the Maritime Police. It was reasonable to ask for paint samples as well as interviews. The U.S. Embassy was told the U.S. Coast Guard and the New Zealand MSA would be sent the results of the South Korean chemical analysis of the paint, but not the paint samples themselves.

More communications were sent—by the New Zealand chief investigator, by the U.S. Coast Guard, and by the U.S. Embassy—requesting interviews with the crew and samples for independent analysis. These requests also were denied. But the South Korean Maritime Police did accept the original samples of Ameron blue antifouling paint, sent from the United States Coast Guard to the South Korean Embassy in Washington, D.C.

On January 16, Lieutenant Commander Acker, Honolulu’s senior investigating officer, sent a letter to the South Korean Embassy in Washington, D.C., asking for crew responses and the results of the analysis. He sent another letter on February 27, with the same requests. He asked the maritime attaché at the South Korean Embassy in Washington, D.C., to hasten the proceedings. The attaché apologized and told him he had not heard from the investigating authorities in South Korea. The South Korean investigators refused to turn over the results of the chemical analysis of the paint samples. Later, when a South Korean Maritime Police investigator was interviewed, he said they rejected the request by the United States Coast Guard for the paint sample because, they said, “we are the ones investigating the suspects.”

Instead, the South Korean chief investigator sent a long list of questions to Acker, to be forwarded to Judy. The U.S. Coast Guard was told the South Korean authorities would refuse further communication until they received all her responses. Many of the questions had already been answered in a packet sent to them by the New Zealand MSA. The additional information they asked for, such as charts and logs, was perverse. They obviously knew everything was at the bottom of the sea.

The break came on March 14, when the Korean National Institute for Scientific Investigation announced their laboratory findings. Three means of testing were conducted: microscopic examination, acid-solvent testing, and infrared spectrophotometer testing. All three confirmed that the transferred paint on the
Pan Grace
’s hull matched the antifouling paint used on the
Melinda Lee.

A copy of the results was released to the United States Coast Guard in Honolulu on April 10, but most likely only because a South Korean reporter for the Associated Press had written an article on April 2 describing the findings. Ultimately, paint samples from the hull were independently tested in both New Zealand and Japan, with the same conclusive results. The
Pan Grace
was undeniably the vessel involved in the collision with the
Melinda Lee.

Despite the irrefutable scientific evidence, as soon as the results of the chemical analysis were released, the Pan Ocean company spokesman issued a statement saying they were confident the
Pan Grace
was not involved.

Pan Ocean is the second-largest shipping line in South Korea, and has offices and shipping agents in the United States. The United States and South Korea do billions of dollars in trade each year; economics, diplomatic pressure, the presence and persistence of a United States Coast Guard officer, and the international media spotlight on a family tragedy undoubtedly helped pressure the South Korean officials into conducting an investigation.

Questioning the crew, the South Korean investigating authorities determined that the second mate had seen a red light off the starboard bow of the
Pan Grace
at approximately “a one o’clock position.” He recognized that the red light meant he was observing the port side of a crossing vessel, and that the
Pan Grace
was the “give-way” vessel, under the IMO’s International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (known as COLREGS). Under Rule 15 of these regulations, he was to take action to avoid the
Melinda Lee,
the “stand-on” or privileged vessel. He said that at first he needed binoculars to see the red light, but soon he could see it with the naked eye. He said that upon seeing it he did not alter course to keep clear. Or tell the engine room to slow down or stand by. Or call for a lookout to go out on the bridge wing. Or go out himself for a closer look. Or locate the vessel on radar. Or call the other vessel on the VHF radio. Or sound the ship’s horn. Or call the master for advice. He finally decided to take the bearing of the red light, but was unable to do so. He did realize that the
Melinda Lee
remained at the same relative bearing to the
Pan Grace,
and he understood that this indicated they were on a collision course. He did not turn on the automatic radar plotting aid, which, in conjunction with the radar, could have automatically calculated an alteration in course to avoid collision. In fact, he made no calculations before he finally decided it was time to avoid the other vessel. He simply ordered the helmsman to turn 10 degrees to starboard.

Later, under deposition, the second mate would say that because he could not detect the
Melinda Lee
on radar, he “could not think of the distance” of the
Melinda Lee
from the
Pan Grace.
He would add that he determined the 10-degree rudder change to starboard was sufficient to avoid a collision based “purely up to the watchkeeping officer’s own judgment.” His order to the helmsman resulted in the
Pan Grace
’s turning right into the
Melinda Lee.

Official findings by the South Korean authorities held the
Pan Grace
accountable for the collision. According to the Korean CMAIA, the
Melinda Lee
was sighted by the
Pan Grace
far enough away, giving the second officer sufficient time to avoid the
Melinda Lee.
Among other issues, the report cited the
Pan Grace
’s apparent failure to properly detect the contact on radar, and failure to immediately decrease speed and execute a turn after visually detecting the red light ahead.

The United States Coast Guard did a comprehensive study and drew on all of the investigative reports to cite the
Pan Grace
as the “proximate cause of collision.” Their report cited the
Pan Grace
’s failure, as the give-way vessel, to follow COLREGS. Adherence to a number of the rules, the report said, would have prevented the incident:

• They should have posted a lookout forward of the bridge to make a full appraisal of the situation.

• They should have posted a lookout with training in the proper use of radars.

• They should have established communication, by radio and sound signals, when they sighted the red light, in order to relay their intentions.

• They should have contacted the engine room to reduce speed and to prepare to come to “all stop.”

• They should have checked that all navigation equipment, such as lights, were in proper operation at each watch.

The United States Coast Guard’s report also cited a “contributing cause”:

Failure to maintain a proper lookout on both the give-way and stand-on vessels.

Rule 5 of COLREGS emphasizes the need for vessels to keep a lookout at all times and states, in part, that the lookout should be kept “by sight, and hearing, and by all available means.”

Mike and Judy had strict rules: one of them was always in the cockpit keeping watch, day and night. Farther out at sea, course-plotting was done every three hours, at the watch change. Closer to land, the watch keeper charted their course on an hourly basis. International regulations state that “the watch keeper shall have no other duties.”

This regulation was of relevance in a fairly recent event, when a cruise ship and a container ship collided in the English Channel. After an investigation, the primary blame was placed on the officer standing watch on the cruise ship’s bridge. He was overburdened and distracted by duties other than watchkeeping, including routine clerical tasks. At the time of the collision he was signing off on the garbage log.

On yachts the size of the
Melinda Lee,
the crew most often is comprised of two adults, which makes it necessary for the person on watch to also perform the navigation duties. Judy went below; that is a fact. After seeing and hearing nothing, at about 0205 she went below to obtain and chart the
Melinda Lee
’s position. Sometime between 0205 and 0212, when Judy was preparing to return to the cockpit, the
Pan Grace
rammed the
Melinda Lee.

Had Judy seen any navigation lights, she would not have gone below for her hourly charting. Had there been any navigation lights on the
Pan Grace,
Judy would have seen the ship at least five miles away, the required distance for the lights of a ship that size to be visible. Taking into account the speed and bearing of both vessels, and using the law of cosines, Judy should have been able to see the
Pan Grace
for 25.47 minutes before the collision—at least fifteen minutes before she went below. Under deposition later, the second mate was asked if he checked that the navigation lights were on before coming on duty, and he replied, “I think I didn’t.”

Had Judy heard any sounds, she would not have gone below. On the
Melinda Lee,
the Sleavins kept two VHF radios on, one in the cockpit and one in the cabin at the navigation table, both tuned to channel 16, the all-purpose emergency channel. Both had a range up to twenty-five miles. No one hailed the sailboat by radio. The
Melinda Lee
also had a radar detector. Had the radar aboard the
Pan Grace
been in operation, its microwave transmission would have activated the
Melinda Lee
’s collision avoidance radar detector (CARD), causing the resounding of a loud alarm, from a distance of twelve miles.

The Sleavins knew their CARD was operable. They had heard its alarm many times. Apparently the radar on the
Pan Grace
was not on. Make no mistake: it was a modern ship with all the required equipment, and South Korea is a progressive country with established maritime academies. They did admit that the automatic radar plotting aid was not in operation. The two crew members on duty either didn’t know how to use radar or did not even bother to monitor it. In testimony later, the quartermaster, who was at the helm of the ship, was unable to name or describe the function of many of the basic instruments on the bridge.

Now, more than ten years later, it might be difficult for sailors to remember the cumbersome, stationary, power-hungry cathode-ray tube radar units that were the only option for sailboats. In 1995, in addition to the usual bank of gel cell batteries, the
Melinda Lee
had solar panels, a wind generator, an engine, and a portable generator; and still, they had to be judicious in their use of radar.

The evolution of laptop computers has enhanced the liquid crystal display technology of the radar units. These days, sailors can leave radar units on in standby mode, without worrying about power consumption. The units are resistant to moisture, and they have glare-free screens. They have gimballed mounts to keep them level, whatever the sea conditions. There is electronic charting available. These days, it is not necessary to leave the cockpit for navigation purposes.

The Sleavins knew that their radar reflector, mounted high on the mast, was effective in increasing the
Melinda Lee
’s visibility on a ship’s radar. It was proven as they sailed through the navy embargo off the Haitian coast, and later, most ships they spoke to on VHF radio reported seeing their boat on radar at least five miles away, even in poor conditions. Still, they knew it was more important to sight a ship before it sighted them.

The
Melinda Lee
’s established course of action in the case of another ship being in the area went something like this: they would sight the ship or its navigation lights, or in many cases first know that a ship was some twelve miles away when the alarm of their CARD sounded. This would alert them to go to a double-handed watch system—one below at the radar unit, one in the cockpit. They would call the ship on channel 16 and give their position relative to the ship’s position. Even in crossing situations where the
Melinda Lee
was the “stand-on, privileged” vessel, they would offer to make a course alteration to avoid any risks, once they had made their intentions clear in a radio discussion. The
Pan Grace
did not give them any opportunity to take evasive action.

Sophisticated technology has been introduced for all kinds of systems on both commercial vessels and recreational craft. On many commercial vessels this has meant a steady reduction in the number of officers and crew manning a ship, with an over-reliance on technology. What’s more, a critical tangent to the increase in shipping worldwide and the expansion of the cruise industry is the number of crew necessary to run all these ships. Often cheap labor from developing countries is hired, with no substantial training and little or no proficiency. Technology without understanding is useless.