Negroes and the Gun (62 page)

One might still respond that
at least stringent supply controls can't hurt
. But this assumes that guns produce no benefits that would be lost under restrictive policies. And that is a difficult assumption to sustain. Several measures show various benefits of firearms ownership. A national study of gun use against burglaries conducted by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) estimated 1,900,000 annual episodes where someone in the home retrieved a firearm in response to a suspected illegal entry. There were roughly half a million instances where the armed householder confronted and chased off the intruder.
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A study of active burglars found that one of the greatest risks faced by residential burglars is being injured or killed by occupants of a targeted dwelling. Many reported that this was their greatest fear and a far greater worry than being caught by police.
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The data bear out the instinct. Home invaders in the United States are more at risk of being shot in the act than of going to prison.
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Because burglars do not know which homes have a gun, people who do not own guns enjoy free-rider benefits because of the deterrent effect of others owning guns.
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In a survey of convicted felons conducted for the National Institute of Justice, 34 percent of them reported being “scared off, shot at, wounded or captured by an armed victim.” Nearly 40 percent had refrained from attempting a crime because they worried the target was armed. Fifty-six percent said that they would not attack someone they knew was armed and 74 percent agreed that “one reason burglars avoid houses where people are at home is that they fear being shot.”

The National Institute of Justice study concluded, “The highest concern about confronting an armed victim was registered by felons from states with the greatest relative number of privately owned firearms. . . . The major effects of partial or total
handgun bans would fall more on the shoulders of the ordinary gun-owning public than on the felonious gun abuser of the sort studied here. . . . It is therefore also possible that one side consequence of such measures would be some loss of the crime-thwarting effects of civilian firearms ownership.”
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Comparative assessments are instructive. Only around 13 percent of US residential burglaries are “hot” burglaries, meaning the attempt is made on an occupied residence.
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This relatively low incidence of hot burglaries is generally attributed to criminals' fear of confronting an armed resident.
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Home invaders in the United Kingdom seem to operate under different incentives. Compared to the United States, the United Kingdom has far more hot burglaries, nearly half of the total in one counting period. The chances of encountering an armed homeowner are far lower in the United Kingdom. This actually seems to fuel a preference for striking when occupants are home and alarms and locks are disengaged. Because hot burglaries pose higher risks of assault, one estimate says that UK-style gun restrictions in the United States would increase assaults by more than half a million per year, raising the overall American violent crime rate by almost 10 percent.
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There is intriguing
anecdotal evidence of firearms benefits in the consequences of targeted firearms policies
. In the period before Florida adopted its “shall issue” concealed-carry laws, the Orlando Police Department conducted a widely advertised program of firearms training for women. The program was started in response to reports that women in the city were buying guns at an increased rate after an uptick in sexual assaults.

The program aimed to help women gun owners become safe and proficient. Over the next year, rape declined by 88 percent. Burglary fell by 25 percent. Nationally these rates were increasing and no other city with a population over 100,000 experienced similar decreases during the period.
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Rape increased by 7 percent nationally and by 5 percent elsewhere in Florida.
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There is a related lesson in the policies surrounding the concealed carry of firearms. The shift here has been revolutionary. Over the past thirty years, state after state has adopted nondiscretionary (“shall issue”) licensing, which allows people who pass objective filters of trustworthiness to carry concealed firearms in public. This movement started as a reaction against the old discretionary systems that often were afflicted by cronyism, and, historically, by overt racism. Shall issue licensing is now the national norm.

At the start, many claimed that vetting people for trustworthiness and then allowing them to carry guns would lead to blood in the street. The gun, it was argued, was a powerful catalyst that would turn ordinary people into murderers. By any estimate, that fear did not turn out. With millions of concealed-carry permit holders nationally, the objections that concealed-carry laws would lead to carnage as ordinary people transformed into murderers have been tested and refuted.

The dispute now centers on studies concluding that concealed-carry laws cause reductions in crime and yield billions of dollars of benefits in avoided costs. This assessment matches the intuition that making criminal activity more risky also makes it less likely. These claims have drawn criticisms and rebuttals. In 2005, a National Research Council panel evaluated the literature on both sides. The majority of the panel concluded that the data were inadequate to say whether right-to-carry laws increased or decreased crime. One panel member, political scientist James Q. Wilson, filed a dissent. Wilson had supported gun-control measures in the past and gained fame as the originator of the “Broken Windows” theory of crime control. Wilson concluded that “the best evidence we have is that [right-to-carry laws] impose no costs but may confer benefits.” While the debate continues, the striking thing is that the more-guns-equals-more-crime/blood-in-the-streets thesis is not seriously on the table.
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Much of the social science on the costs and benefits of private firearms proceeds on broad measures that do not specify distinct racial trends. But some studies have focused specifically on blacks. One study started with data sets about black homicides and then tracked the stories of victims and offenders. Researchers interviewed people familiar with the episode, the parties involved, and people who knew them.

In a sample from selected American cities, the study found that “robbery homicide” was the most frequent type of stranger homicide. But the next finding is surprising. “Young adult black men who are robbery-homicide victims are more often persons described as the robber than the robbed. This pattern appears to prevail in each of the primary sample cities.”

In thinking about what is best for the Parker/McDonald class, the next assessment is vital. “Given the higher percentage of robber homicide victimizations in the early years of the interval, one might assume that
targets posing a higher homicide risk for the offender were abandoned in favor of safer targets
.” Note that the idea of hardening targets against the aggressive microculture is the core theme of arguments that armed citizens are a disincentive to crime. Researchers concluded that over a six-year period, robbery homicide was nearly as likely to result in the death of the robber as the robbed and that “
the deterrent efficiency of those who are successful in thwarting a robbery attempt probably exceeds that of the criminal justice system
.”

This is difficult territory. It is easy to see why policy makers might not embrace these data or design rules exploiting this trend. But from the perspective of the Parker/McDonald class—people living in the midst of clear threats and state
failure—these data are a welcome affirmation of the benefits of private firearms in the hands of good people. One study underscores that message with this summary.

The previous evidence illustrating the riskiness of becoming a victim if choosing to engage in robbery is a point seldom made. One must exhibit caution not to overstate the case, considering the low clearance rate for this offense. Yet it appears that robbers are indeed sensitive to the risks associated with the choice of robber targets. . . . Young black males who are insensitive to the risks associated with the choice of a robbery target clearly increase the probability that they will become homicide victims.
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The idea that firearms policy in the black community should privilege the Parker/McDonald class of innocents is open to at least two additional objections. Besides the Parker/McDonald class, there is another important class of innocents who are put at risk by firearms externalities— that is, crossfire, stray shots, and accidents for which self-defense is no clear answer. This group actually overlaps with the Parker/McDonald class. But treating it separately gives maximum credit to this interest as a counterweight.

Balancing these interests prompts comparisons between defensive gun uses and accidents and a variety of other balances. The DGU numbers range perhaps into the millions. The accidental death numbers are in the hundreds. People will contest exactly how these inputs should be weighted. And some will suggest other types of comparisons. It is also relevant that these data are drawn from the general population. It may turn out that particular black communities are exceptional in ways that are not reflected in the general data.

Also, one of the negative externalities of even a virtuous armed citizenry is that some percentage of guns owned by good people leak into the black market. Some of these guns are stolen. Others are shared-access guns, legally owned but taken and used by some untrustworthy member of the household. These risks are not fully quantified and are open for debate. They raise arguments for a sharper focus on safe storage, theft reporting, and innovations like frangible ammunition. The government interest in those things might be stronger in some places than in others.

Overall, the social science fairly suggests three important things
. First, the problem of intraracial gun violence among blacks is attributable mainly to a distinct criminal microculture. Second, that criminal microclass responds to disincentives that make
violent crime more risky. Third, guns in the hands of the Parker/McDonald class are among those disincentives.

Caution is certainly warranted here. The social science on these questions is vast, diverse, and incomplete. And a healthy cycle of criticism, rebuttal, and response is ongoing. It would be a mistake to anoint any particular empirical claim as the last word. Indeed, it is best to think about social-science claims as simply working theories. Still, there is a strong case that arms in the hands of the Parker/McDonald class generate results that compete easily with the modern orthodoxy's combination of promising symbolism and practical failure.

This brings us full circle, back to choice
. Empirically it is far from obvious that the Parker/McDonald class is better off disarmed. So it seems fair to give them the option. But choice also resonates beyond cold empirical assessment. As a matter of long practice and policy, the black tradition of arms respected, indeed, exalted, the self-defense interest of individual black people. Though the stakes were tremendous, individuals were never asked to surrender their self-defense interest to advance group goals. The danger that self-defense would spill over into political violence was substantial, putting the entire movement, the freedom of an entire people, at risk. On that measure, the historic risks of the black tradition of arms were just as great or greater than the risks of firearms today. Despite that historic risk, black folk from the leadership to the grassroots upheld individual choice on the question of armed self-defense.