Japan's Comfort Women (35 page)

In his memorandum on December 6, 1945, Lieutenant-Colonel Hugh McDonald, Chief of the Legal Subsection of PHW briefly analyzed the “practice of procuring girls” for brothels in Japan and wrote: The girl is impressed into contracting by the desperate financial straits of her parents and their urging, occasionally supplemented by her own willing-ness to make such a sacrifice to help her family.

. . .

It is the belief of our informants, however, that in urban districts the practice of enslaving girls, while much less prevalent than in the past, still exists . . .79

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Yet, for most of the staff of the PHW Section, whatever their thoughts on the plight of the women, their most important task was quickly to reduce a high VD rate among their own men by administering effective medical VD control methods among the Japanese sex workers.

The contemporary Japanese situation, which was one of the major contributing factors to the boom in prostitution during the occupation, did not really concern the medical specialists. For them, the main concern was the health of their own men and not the health and welfare of the Japanese “service women.” GIs saw the Japanese women in the sex industry as a mere “outlet” for their carnal desire and the lust for male domination. Many called Japanese sex workers a “yellow stool.” The attitude of medical officers of the PHW Section towards these women was fundamentally little different from that of the GIs. To medical officers of the PHW section, the Japanese women infected with VD were also seen as mere “defective sexual commodities” that had to be fixed in order to satisfy the customers. Throughout the vast number of documents prepared by the PHW Section, any consideration for the women’s humanity is totally lacking. In this sense, there is a striking similarity between the medical officers of the US occupation forces in Japan and their counterparts in the Japanese Imperial forces who had been in charge of the VD problems of Asian comfort women during the war.

The provision of “free medical treatment” did not alleviate the difficulty of the women’s lives. This is clear from the following memorandum of Major Philip Bourland, one of the staff of the PHW Section. It relates what two of his VD

control officers in the Tokyo area reported to him after visiting some hospitals: These officers were particularly concerned with the problems and difficulties in maintaining segregation and quarantine in hospitals, of civilian female disease cases under treatment, in the face of present food shortages and the inability to obtain adequate rations for hospital patients.

. . .

Col. Ridgely was consulted in regard to the above problems but was unable to offer any encouragement or any suggestion as to how any additional food might be procured for subject patients.80

This report reveals that the women were admitted to the hospital free of charge but were provided inadequate food while there. The natural consequence was that they ran away from the hospital before the disease was completely cured and slipped back into the same old business that provided their only source of income.

The US military clergymen of the occupation forces were also concerned about widespread, military-controlled prostitution and with the VD problems of their troops. In December 1945 the Tokyo–Yokohama Chapter of the Army and Navy Chaplains Association had a conference at which they discussed this matter. On January 11, 1946, this Association submitted its recommendation to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, General MacArthur. In it the chaplains severely condemned the widespread practice of military-controlled prostitution in Japan. They pointed out that it was against the War Department 160

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policy. However, for them too, the overriding concern was the “moral degradation,”

which was “exceptionally widespread and unusually ruinous to the character of American troops.”81 Here too, any thoughtful concern about the Japanese women, who were in their eyes the source of “these evils,” was totally absent.

The PHW Section reacted negatively to the chaplains’ recommendation that they suppress military-controlled prostitution. The section’s opinion was that VD was controllable only by tight regulation of the prostitution system, not by the suppression of prostitution. The staff of the PHW Section felt that this had been repeatedly demonstrated in the “experience of the Army.”82 Thus, the PHW Section basically ignored the chaplains’ recommendation. Instead, it continued to apply more rigorous VD examinations and treatment of the Japanese women working in the sex industry. On February 18, 1946, the PHW Section introduced yet another VD control plan. This involved the military police track-ing down women who had been in contact with diagnosed patients,
i.e.
members of the occupation troops, and then forcing them to undergo examination and hospitalization, if required. If a sex worker refused to cooperate, the plan was to make the police invoke their legal authority to isolate her.83

Despite their knowledge of the factors related to the spread of the disease, both the staff of the PHW Section and the military chaplains shared the same belief that the source of “evil VD” was the Japanese women. Their own men were seen as clean, innocent and vulnerable to having their high morals cor-rupted and their health destroyed. The Australian military officers entertained the same ideas. This is clear from the following examples of some comments made by these officers in their own reports:

•

Japan offers abnormal temptation.

•

It is to be appreciated that among Japanese women no shame attaches to the prostitute whose trade is recognised as honourable and legitimate.

•

In consideration of the whole problem there exists a divergence of opinion as to whether prostitutes, part-time streetwalkers or “amateurs” were mainly responsible for the incidence of disease among the troops. There was general opinion, however, that action is necessary relative to all three categories . . .84

As many as 200,000 VD cases, mainly women in the sex industry, were recorded in Japan in 1946.85 Yet, it must not be forgotten that the majority of their clients were occupation troops and that the systems of prostitution they patronized were established and sanctioned by both the Japanese and Allied occupation authorities. Therefore, responsibility lay with the occupation troops rather than “shame-less Japanese women.” There is no doubt that many Japanese women contracted VD from members of the occupation forces. One BCOF report admits that “some (soldiers) had 2 or 3 attacks but still continue having intercourse.”86

Other Japanese women also contracted VD from GIs. One of the Japanese Central Liaison Office’s reports submitted to the GHQ complains that many of the low-paid Japanese employees of the occupation forces, in jobs like telephone operators, contracted VD from GIs.87

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There is no doubt that MacArthur was embarrassed by the chaplains’ report, and he must have felt that some action was necessary. Indeed, by the time that the chaplains met on the issue, GHQ staff were already preparing to take measures to head off any criticism. GHQ came up with the idea of abolishing Japan’s “licensed prostitution system,” and recommended the Metropolitan Police Headquarters in Tokyo advise licensed brothel owners and their prostitutes to voluntarily give up their business. GHQ also recommended the annulment and abrogation of all the existing contracts in which women had been indentured to serve a certain period as prostitutes as a form of repayment of loans made to themselves or to their parents. Almost all the licensed brothel proprietors and their prostitutes accepted these recommendations in advance of an official order by GHQ on January 21, 1946 (SCAPIN 642), which forced them to do so.

However, the order only outlawed “enslaved prostitution” – the practice of “voluntary prostitution” was still permitted under SACPIN 642.88 Therefore, in reality, nothing changed and the brothel proprietors continued to operate their businesses by “lending out rooms” to “newly liberated voluntary prostitutes.”

Moreover, unlicensed prostitution organizations, such as the RAA and other newly established comfort stations like “restaurants” and “bars,” were never affected by this order because a license had never been issued to them anyway.

Likewise, the women working at these places had never been licensed either and were thus unaffected by the new law.

However, the news of the “abolition of Japan’s feudalistic licensed brothels”

and the “emancipation of women from the enslaved prostitution business” was widely reported back in the US. It gave a false impression to US citizens that all forms of prostitution in Japan had been outlawed. This ruling together with the negation of the Emperor’s divinity, announced on January 1, 1946, and the order to purge Japanese militarists from public positions, issued on January 4, were exploited by GHQ as examples of the great success its policies were having in the “democratization of Japan.” Yet, in reality, a vast number of comfort women and unlicensed prostitutes continued to be enslaved by loan arrange-ments. The Japanese police authorities were also aware of the real consequence of this hypocritical “emancipation order.” In his report on May 28, 1946, the Director of the Police Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs, wrote: As regards similar contracts with service women in restaurants, eating-and-drinking-houses, houses of private prostitution, to whom the system of licensed prostitution was not applicable, efforts will be made to persuade and guide the proprietors of the business to voluntarily abandon all such contracts as are likely to be binding the freedom of the service women or their free will.89

Regardless of the PHW Section’s introduction of VD control regulations in the months following the start of the occupation, the problem continued to worsen.

In March, 1946, the average VD rate for the entire US occupation troops was 274 per 1,000; in other words, more than one in every four GIs was suffering 162

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from some form of VD.90 The cost of medical treatment to the US occupation forces must have been high. The facts behind the failure of the “abolition of licensed prostitution” were mounting. Unless VD rates were reduced, the problem would become publicly known and taken up by the media, to the great embarrassment of occupation authorities. This dilemma can be clearly seen in the letter that James Gordon wrote to General MacArthur on January 22, 1946, a day after the above-mentioned order, SCAPIN 642, was issued. In it, he wrote: It is reasonable to assume that back-home news accounts of increasing VD

rates, licensed prostitution (or perhaps, its abolition), “temporary wives”, fraternization and related subjects will create considerable demand from official and domestic sources for special consideration and action on the problem. The probable result will be an increase of critical visitors unless their demands for information are anticipated and forestalled.91

As a last resort, on March 25, 1946, GHQ adopted a drastic, nationwide measure. It placed “off-limits” all brothels, comfort stations, houses of private prostitution, and “restaurants and bars” that operated prostitution.92 Comfort stations which were operated by the RAA were not exempt. Yet this order too failed to result in the total abolition of prostitution. The question remains: Why did the GHQ not suppress prostitution in Japan completely? If they had wished, General MacArthur and his staff of the GHQ could have issued a “Potsdam Ordinance,”

whereby GHQ could have issued a law directly to the Japanese people which would have bypassed the Diet, the Japanese parliament. Indeed, the above-mentioned “Complementary Regulation for the Venereal Disease Prevention Law” was a Potsdam Ordinance. It is difficult to find a definitive answer to this question, as the available PHW Section’s documents do not refer to this particular issue.93

However, it can be speculated that GHQ was clearly aware that a total ban of prostitution would not stop their men from associating with clandestine prostitutes.

Probably the nationwide “off-limits” measure was implemented more as a stern warning to take health precautions to those who chose to indulge.

The nationwide “off limits” policy suddenly put more than 150,000 Japanese women out of a job. Desperate to survive the extreme poverty, many women left red-light districts to become “streetwalkers,” loitering around US bases and city centers frequented by GIs. In Tokyo, for example, the main shopping quarters of Ueno, Shinjuku, Y
e
rakuch
d
, Shinbashi, and Ikebukuro were flooded with the so-called “Y
d
pan” – “hookers specializing in Westerners.”94 As “voluntary prostitution” was not illegal, neither the Japanese police nor the MPs could make arrests to control the sudden rise of “open market prostitution.” As one Australian soldier later claimed, in the eyes of the men of the occupation troops Japan became “one big brothel.”95 This put GHQ in a position in which it could not control the GIs’ sexual activities, which hitherto had been confined to limited quarters. Prostitutes suddenly became conspicuous to many ordinary Japanese citizens and visitors from the US and other Allied nations. Thus, both GHQ and the Japanese authorities faced a far more difficult situation in controlling VD.

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In response, GHQ firstly tried to repress the situation by adopting the “non-fraternization policy.” Finding almost immediately that this policy had no effect at all, GHQ instructed the Japanese police to “round up” streetwalkers under the auspices of the law by which suspected VD patients could be forced to undergo VD examinations and medical treatment. Thus, on August 20, the first nationwide “round up” was implemented using the pretext of “VD check-ups.” This involved a large number of Japanese police and MPs of the occupation forces. It is reported that 15,000 Japanese women were “rounded up” on this day alone.96

These “round up” operations were carried out a number of times each month until September 1949. One of the results, however, was that many girls and young women who were just passers-by were caught up in “round up” operations, forcibly taken to the hospital, and detained at the hospital for three days until the result was known. For them it was an extremely humiliating experience. This “violation of civil rights” became a serious controversy and enraged some women politicians and members of various women’s organizations.97 Yet the Japanese government and GHQ ignored the criticism and continued the operation.