Hannibal (11 page)

The revolt of the Boii against the Romans which, no doubt, Hannibal had hoped would more or less coincide with his own arrival in northern Italy had been premature. (Possibly it provides further evidence that Hannibal was some two months late in his campaign?) What it meant in effect, even though it had seriously damaged Roman morale, was that there were Roman legions in the north at a time of the year when, under normal circumstances, the only troops would have been limited garrisons in places such as Cremona, Placentia (Piacenza) and Ariminum (Rimini). Scipio was thus able to find an army ready in the field which, though it needed his presence and exhortation, was already disposed not far from the chosen battleground.

Hannibal’s first task, when his army and the animals were sufficiently recuperated to be fit for action, was to ensure that the Gauls of northern Italy recognised the Carthaginians as their deliverers from the Roman oppressor. Unfortunately, the very tribe in whose area he had arrived, the Taurini, were unwilling to accept his offer of friendship and were at war with the Insubres, another Gallic tribe—but one which was prepared to accept the Carthaginian as their leader. Hannibal had learned long ago from his experiences in dealing with the tribes in Spain that nothing succeeded with them so well as swift and determined action. He moved rapidly against the Taurini and attacked their main town-later to be known as Augusta Taurinorum (Turin). In three days he had taken it and put to the sword all who still opposed him, while welcoming those who joined his standard. This simple success had the desired effect, and from now on all the Gauls in the surrounding area hastened to join his ranks against the common enemy. Scipio, however, had moved equally fast and had crossed the Po—at this time of the year a cold, fast-flowing torrent—and had brought his troops up to the river Ticinus (Ticino). By doing so, he had isolated many of the Gauls in the area of the Po and though their sympathies were with Hannibal, the Roman presence prevented them from joining him.

The ensuing actions of the two leaders—at this crucial moment before the clash of arms resounded throughout Italy—may seem strange to the modern reader, but must be viewed in the light of a time when individual communication between a general and his troops assumed an immense importance. When there were no printed ‘Daily Orders’ there was no other form of exhortation possible than for the commander to stand up and address as many of his men as could be gathered in one place to hear him. The formal speech before battle (so often heavily embroidered by ancient historians, but true to the spirit of the time) could have an immense effect upon the morale of soldiers, most of whom were illiterate, and many of whom were ignorant even of the events that had led to their being called upon to give battle. Publius Cornelius Scipio, for instance, seems to have been concerned to stress that it was a just war that they were fighting, because the Carthaginians had treacherously attacked Saguntum—thus breaking the peace that had been agreed between Rome and Carthage after the First Punic War. He pointed out that, as they had shown in this previous war, the Romans were superior on the field to the Carthaginians in their prime, while all that they now had to face were the half-starved remnants of Hannibal’s army, not yet recovered from their crossing of the Alps. Furthermore, he reminded them, there were no more Alps to protect their land or Rome itself—and no other army save their own.

Hannibal’s approach to his men was slightly different, and it is easy to see why. He had to communicate to an army composed of several races and, no doubt, speaking many dialects. He chose, therefore, to keep words to the minimum, but to provide his audience with a visual and easily comprehensible image of their present situation and of how, if they fought well, they might yet turn it to good account. The army was formed into a large circle into which were introduced a number of prisoners taken from the Gauls who had attacked them during their march. These were given the option of remaining prisoners and slaves or, if they were willing to fight in single combat with one another, the victor would gain his freedom, arms, armour, and a horse. As for the vanquished, death at least would spare him from his present sufferings. With one accord, all the Gallic prisoners voted for combat. After these gladiatorial fights were over, and the dead had been dragged away and the prisoners who had not been lucky enough to be selected by lot to take part had been led off in their chains, there was scarcely any need for words. There, said Hannibal, was the true picture of his men’s situation: if they fought well and triumphed, Rome and all the riches of this country were theirs; if they died in battle they were spared further suffering; but if they fought and lost, then nothing but the misery of slavery awaited them.

The first meeting between the Romans and Carthaginians hardly deserves to be termed a battle: it was more of a cavalry skirmish in which, and not for the last time in the war, the superiority of Hannibal’s cavalry over the Roman was soon established. The Romans at this time still rode without bridles (as had the Greek cavalry before them). So did Hannibal’s light brigade, the Numidians, but it is noteworthy that Polybius points out that on this occasion Hannibal put ‘all his bridled and heavier cavalry in front of the army’. This was the Spanish heavy brigade, and no doubt he was remembering his experience when the Numidians had been worsted by the Romans during their previous encounter near the Rhône. Scipio, advancing to meet his enemy, had bridged the Ticinus, a tributary of the Po. He had got his troops across and was marching northwards while Hannibal was coming down to meet him. The flat land in that area was ideal for cavalry, even though the hard weather of northern Italy in winter must have made the going unpleasant for both armies—in particular the Iberian and North African foot soldiers, who could scarcely have recovered from the hardships in the Alps.

As the armies neared one another and encamped, both generals took command of their cavalry and set out to reconnoiter. Clearly the heavy winter rains had not yet turned those plains into their customary fields of mud, for both Polybius and Livy comment on the fact that each side had advance warning of the other’s approach by the thick clouds of dust kicked up by the horses, Hannibal, putting his heavy cavalry in the centre, led them to the attack himself, while distributing the Numidians on his wings to outflank the enemy if possible. Scipio, for his part, advanced with his light horse in the centre and kept his heavier Roman and Gallic cavalry in the rear. Meeting head on, the light-armed Roman horse were compelled to withdraw, after an ineffectual discharge of their javelins, before the weight of the Carthaginian centre. Many riders on both sides either were unhorsed or dismounted deliberately, so that the clash now became almost as much an infantry as a cavalry engagement. While confusion reigned in the centre, the Numidians on both of Hannibal’s wings rode round and outflanked the Romans. The latter turned in flight and, to add to the confusion, the consul, Publius Cornelius Scipio, was severely wounded. (Tradition has it that he was only saved from capture by the action of his son, later to become known as the famous Scipio Africanus—ultimate victor over Hannibal—who led a charge into the mêlée around his father and brought him safe from the field.) The Romans now withdrew at speed and in good order, but the wounded consul, having noted the superiority of the enemy cavalry and being concerned for the safety of his army, ordered a total withdrawal to the line of the Po. The action was inconclusive enough, but it had given both sides a chance to assess their enemy. Furthermore, the wounding of Scipio had disheartened the Romans, as well as depriving them of his leadership in the battle that was later to follow.

While Scipio crossed the Po and assembled his men at Placentia on the east of the river Trebia, which at this point flows into the Po from its birthplace in the Apennines, Hannibal followed hard on his heels. He reached the place where the Romans had bridged the Ticinus and captured 600 men from the force that had been set to guard it. He then marched up the Po for two days until he found a place where it was comparatively easy to cross. Here, Polybius tells us, ‘he halted and constructing a bridge of boats, ordered Hasdrubal, his senior commander, to see to the passage of the army while he himself, crossing at once, gave a hearing to the envoys who had arrived from the districts around.’ His capture of the headquarters of the Taurini, followed by this early success against the Romans, had confirmed the Gauls in their promised allegiance to the Carthaginian and they came flocking in from the countryside around.

Some days later, having marched down the south bank of the Po and drawn up his army in full view of the Roman camp—daring them to come out and engage him—Hannibal’s self-assurance again paid dividends. Some two thousand Gallic auxiliaries, together with two hundred horsemen, revolted against their Roman masters in Placentia and came over to him. At the same time the chieftains of the Boii made their way to the Carthaginian camp and promised all their assistance in the forthcoming war. Despite the heavy losses which he had suffered in his passage of the Alps Hannibal was now able to field an army large enough to meet any that the Romans could—as yet—muster against him. The physical strength and the innate bravery of the Gauls would have to be used in the ensuing conflict to wear down the Romans, while his own hardened and trained professionals would always have to be kept in reserve for the kill. It was upon this general strategy that he based his tactics in the assault on Rome.
 

XI

BATTLE AT THE TREBIA

Ill from his wound and disturbed by the defection of the Gauls, Scipio was determined not to be drawn into battle against the Carthaginian until he had been joined by his fellow consul, Sempronius. The latter, having put his legionaries under oath to make their way to Ariminum at their best speed (an astounding march from the heel of Italy to Ariminum on the north-east coast in some forty days), was now in a position to take his two legions across to Placentia. Scipio, however, rather than stay at the garrison-town, decided, according to Polybius, ‘to break up his camp and march towards the river Trebia’. He hoped that in the hills surrounding the river he would find a more secure position in which to encamp and hold the Carthaginians until he was reinforced.

Hannibal could hardly fail to notice this troop movement and, as soon as Scipio began to withdraw, sent out his Numidians to harass the Romans on their march. This was the moment when Scipio might indeed have been brought to battle and utterly destroyed. The Numidians, however, unable to resist the temptation to plunder and loot, turned aside from the pursuit and, having ransacked the remains of the Roman camp, set fire to it. Although some of his rearguard were killed or captured, Scipio was able to establish himself in a strongly fortified camp along the small hills above the river. Hannibal was not to be drawn after him. When battle came, he wanted it on his own terms, and he had no intention of taking his troops across the Trebia to be met on the far side by an already entrenched Roman army. At about this time a piece of good fortune came his way: the neighbouring township of Clastidium, used as a store depot by the Romans, was betrayed by its commandant (for a large bribe, says Livy), and its granary served the Carthaginians well as the cold winter of northern Italy set in. Rain, sleet, icy winds and the flat land around growing steadily more muddy—these were the conditions which both sides faced as the year drew to a close.
 

Sempronius now moved across from Ariminum and joined Scipio. Although his army had marched from Sicily and had then traversed almost the length of Italy—as fine a proof as there could be of Roman endurance and discipline—it was still comparatively fresh. Unlike Scipio’s troops, who had been mauled during the Gallic uprising, and who had now experienced the first blows of the Carthaginians, Sempronius and his men, geared as they had been for the attack on Carthage, were eager to make contact with the enemy. This was especially true of Sempronius himself, an ambitious man and one who was particularly eager to give battle before his consular term expired. The fact that Scipio seems to have been almost completely disabled by his wound meant that, in practice, the command fell into the hands of Sempronius, although the weakness in the system—the divided command—undoubtedly affected the whole Roman reaction to Hannibal’s presence in the area. Scipio was in favour of delay, of waiting through the winter, holding Hannibal at bay, but not committing themselves to a major engagement until the better weather in the new year—by which time they would also have been reinforced from Rome. Sempronius judged that with their two consular armies united, and with the forces of their Latin and Gallic allies, they had more than enough men to engage the Carthaginian forces without much risk. The weather was worse for the enemy than it was for them—accustomed as they were to such winters—and even though Hannibal’s troops had been reinforced by Gauls, they were hardly likely to be in good condition so soon after their descent from the Alps.

At this juncture, immediately before the battle of the Trebia, the consular forces numbered about 16,000 Romans, together with 20,000 allies and 4,000 horse. The army under Hannibal was smaller—consisting of 20,000 infantry composed of Africans, Spaniards and Celts, while his cavalry, including Celtic allies, amounted to some 10,000. Hannibal, therefore, was superior in cavalry but inferior in infantry, and the majority of his men were unlikely to be in the best physical condition. It is almost certain that each side had a fairly accurate estimation of its enemy’s strength, for the Gauls who were passing between the lines—some pro-Roman and others pro-Carthaginian—must have carried their assessments to the officers of the opposing armies. Nonetheless, it is likely that Hannibal’s information system was better since more Gauls were inclined towards the Carthaginians. He had also, from the early days when he was still planning the campaign, maintained a very efficient espionage system in Italy. It is unlikely that he did not know of the differences between the two consuls, and that he had not taken stock of the fact that Sempronius was in effective command-particularly when the armies were committed to battle-as Scipio would be unable to take the field. It was upon the known ambition and desire for a quick victory on the part of Sempronius that he had to base his overall strategy.