Find, Fix, Finish (22 page)
Authors: Aki Peritz,Eric Rosenbach
Zawahiri’s advice to tone down the carnage went unheeded. Later that year, AQI committed a major strategic error that ended up alienating a large swath of the Arab public. On November 9, Zarqawi sent four suicide attackers to the Radisson SAS, the Grand Hyatt, and the Days Inn hotels in Amman, killing approximately sixty people, including many Jordanians attending a wedding reception in the ballroom at the Radisson.
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The fathers of both the bride and groom were killed, along with numerous women and children. The wedding ballroom victims also included Moustapha Akkad, the producer of the popular Jamie Lee Curtis horror vehicle
Halloween,
along with his daughter. Zarqawi proudly claimed credit for the attack, stating Jordan was “a backyard garden to the enemies of religion, Jews and crusaders . . . a filthy pasture to the apostate traitors.”
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The fathers of both the bride and groom were killed, along with numerous women and children. The wedding ballroom victims also included Moustapha Akkad, the producer of the popular Jamie Lee Curtis horror vehicle
Halloween,
along with his daughter. Zarqawi proudly claimed credit for the attack, stating Jordan was “a backyard garden to the enemies of religion, Jews and crusaders . . . a filthy pasture to the apostate traitors.”
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The visceral negative reaction to the attack surprised even the hardened AQI leader. Jordanians from all walks of life reacted immediately; sources reported that upward of 200,000 people demonstrated in Amman against the bombings, many displaying the names of their tribes in order to prove that they came from all over the kingdom.
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Jordanian TV continuously reported news of the attack, especially after the GID apprehended one of the suicide bombers, middle-aged female Iraqi national Sajida al-Rishawi, who failed to detonate her suicide vest. Jordanian authorities then taped her showing off her (defused) suicide vest, which made for a riveting television broadcast on the evening news.
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Jordanian TV continuously reported news of the attack, especially after the GID apprehended one of the suicide bombers, middle-aged female Iraqi national Sajida al-Rishawi, who failed to detonate her suicide vest. Jordanian authorities then taped her showing off her (defused) suicide vest, which made for a riveting television broadcast on the evening news.
Zarqawi released a lengthy audio statement in his own voice on November 18, explaining that AQI was targeting US, Jordanian, and Israeli security services: “Know that we selected these hotels only after we learned—after scoping them out for over two months and collecting information from reliable sources inside the hotels [themselves]—that they have come to [serve] as headquarters for the Jewish, American, and Iraqi intelligence apparatuses.... Regarding the Radisson hotel—most of the people of the Israeli embassy stay there, as well as Israeli tourists, and this is also true for the Days Inn Hotel. As for Hyatt Amman, it is a den [of evil] for the Zionist, American, and Iraqi intelligence [services].”
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As for the attack on the wedding party, Zarqawi tried to backpedal, suggesting they were not the intended target, despite the fact that the suicide bomber had obliterated the banquet hall:
The brothers who carried out the martyrdom operation meant to target the halls which served as meeting places for intelligence officers of several infidel Crusader countries and countries allied with them. The people [at the wedding feast] were killed because part of the ceiling collapsed from the intensity of the blast, and it is no secret that this was not intended; it was an unintended accident, which had not been taken into account.
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However, the public relations damage had been done. Jordanian officials reported a surge in tip-offs about Zarqawi’s whereabouts.
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Members of Zarqawi’s own tribe, including his brother and first cousin, denounced him in the newspapers: “We sever links with him until doomsday.”
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Even the Muslim Brotherhood, while making clear its continued support for those fighting against the US-led coalition in Iraq, called the terrorist attacks within Jordan completely unacceptable.
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After Jordan’s so-called 11/9, Zarqawi’s capture became a goal shared by both the government and the general Jordanian population.
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Members of Zarqawi’s own tribe, including his brother and first cousin, denounced him in the newspapers: “We sever links with him until doomsday.”
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Even the Muslim Brotherhood, while making clear its continued support for those fighting against the US-led coalition in Iraq, called the terrorist attacks within Jordan completely unacceptable.
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After Jordan’s so-called 11/9, Zarqawi’s capture became a goal shared by both the government and the general Jordanian population.
Despite—or perhaps because of—Zarqawi’s notoriety, everybody wanted to claim credit for his death or capture. This resulted in a continuous stream of false claims from the Iraqi government that he had been killed, muddying the public’s perception whether he was in fact alive or dead. In one such example, Iraqi foreign minister Hoshyar Zebari announced in late November 2005 that Zarqawi was killed in a coalition assault and subsequent firefight in Mosul.
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Zebari’s claim was apparently based on intelligence that the terrorist meeting might include Zarqawi,
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a tip stemming from what a senior Iraqi military leader called a “credible source.”
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There was no confirmation that Zarqawi was even in the area.
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Zebari’s claim was apparently based on intelligence that the terrorist meeting might include Zarqawi,
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a tip stemming from what a senior Iraqi military leader called a “credible source.”
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There was no confirmation that Zarqawi was even in the area.
The operation in Mosul also showed that US forces were often obliged to work jointly with Iraqi forces in the Zarqawi hunt. The fact that an Iraqi minister announced Zarqawi’s possible death––apparently without coordinating with US officials––and that he was familiar with the source suggested that this operation stemmed from an Iraqi informant. Further, the combined Iraqi police, conventional and Special Operations forces used in the assault may have contributed to the messy and extended gun battle that followed: a six-hour firefight during which four Iraqi policemen and two US special operations officers were killed.
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All the insurgents fought to the death. From an intelligence point of view, the raid was only a limited success since it yielded no surviving insurgents for interrogation and cost the lives of several team members. And Zarqawi was gone.
STUMBLING TOWARD CIVIL WAR: 200687
All the insurgents fought to the death. From an intelligence point of view, the raid was only a limited success since it yielded no surviving insurgents for interrogation and cost the lives of several team members. And Zarqawi was gone.
Beyond the hunt for Zarqawi, the overall US position in Iraq was becoming increasingly tenuous as a full-blown Sunni insurgency exploded all over the country. While the exact number of insurgents was debated (some believe it would exceed 200,000 people), what was clear was that attacks were on the rise.
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During the winter of 2005–2006, US and allied forces reported 500 attacks per week; by summer 2006, it was up to 800.
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One Army transportation battalion was hit 170 times out of 400 convoys between 2005 and 2006.
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By midyear, the country’s morgues were overflowing. For example, almost 2,000 bodies showed up in Baghdad’s central morgue in July 2006, with some 90 percent of the deceased brought in due to a violent death.
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During the winter of 2005–2006, US and allied forces reported 500 attacks per week; by summer 2006, it was up to 800.
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One Army transportation battalion was hit 170 times out of 400 convoys between 2005 and 2006.
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By midyear, the country’s morgues were overflowing. For example, almost 2,000 bodies showed up in Baghdad’s central morgue in July 2006, with some 90 percent of the deceased brought in due to a violent death.
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AQI’s February 23 bombing of the al-Aksari Golden Dome shrine in Samarra revealed the depths of the sectarian conflict. A US serviceman stationed in Samarra recalled, “All eyes turned [toward] the explosion. You see this plume of smoke going up, and the plume of smoke was right next to the mosque.... You’re thinking, What the heck happened there? . . . It was kind of a cloudy day, overcast. Now there’s this huge plume of smoke, a monstrous cloud, and it’s kind of yellowish and black.”
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The attack on the shrine—one of the holiest pieces of real estate in Shia Iraq—was a bridge too far for many Shia Iraqis, who unleashed a furious response. Shia death squads greatly stepped up their murderous activities against terrified Sunni civilians, slaughtering hundreds if not thousands of Sunnis all over the country during the subsequent weeks. Baghdad’s ethnic cleavages deepened quickly into Sunni and Shia enclaves hidden behind concertina wire and concrete blast walls. Suicide bombings in marketplaces became commonplace occurrences, tortured corpses littered the street, and the country lurched toward all-out civil war. Zarqawi’s tactics had all but succeeded.
In 2006, AQI launched an online political front, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), placing an Iraqi with a rather bland name, Abu Umar al-Baghdadi, as its titular head. US and Iraqi forces could not figure out whether Abu Umar was a real person with actual responsibilities, a Iraqi puppet controlled by Zarqawi, an amalgam of individuals in the AQI/ISI hierarchy, or just a figment of someone’s imagination. His death in April 2010 at the hands of Iraqi forces indicated he was a real person named Hamid Daoud Muhammad Khalil al-Zawi, but it remained doubtful whether he had meaningful power within the organization during his lifetime.
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Starting in March 2006, the US got closer to Zarqawi thanks to efforts made in large part by the US military’s elite counterterrorism units from the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). These elite counterterrorism units were so secretive that recent operating titles have included Task Force (TF) 626, TF 121, TF 77, TF 145, and TF 16—numbers picked mostly at random.
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These elite groups became the most lethal (and costly) light infantry units in the history of warfare.
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These elite groups became the most lethal (and costly) light infantry units in the history of warfare.
An
Army Times
investigation from May 2006 provided specific details about the composition of the various TFs, reporting a hodgepodge of military and civilian personnel, including members of Delta Force, Navy SEAL Team 6, Air Force 24th Special Tactics Squadron, CIA officers, FBI agents, and civilian interrogators, among others.
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Integrating these mixed components, the TFs were intended as a unique means of gathering and acting upon intelligence. Interrogators worked to extract information from detainees, immediately relaying any intelligence produced to the Special Forces members of the unit, who could then act on its basis. Unlike other military groups, JSOC units were authorized to work from raw intelligence and did not need to wait for authorization for follow-on strikes based on the acquired information.
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This meant that JSOC could raid geographical units without consulting higher-ranking officials, a circumvention of the chain of command that enabled Special Forces to act on intelligence gathered by interrogators earlier that day.
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Members of JSOC describe this fusion of intelligence and operations as “the unblinking eye.”
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Army Times
investigation from May 2006 provided specific details about the composition of the various TFs, reporting a hodgepodge of military and civilian personnel, including members of Delta Force, Navy SEAL Team 6, Air Force 24th Special Tactics Squadron, CIA officers, FBI agents, and civilian interrogators, among others.
95
Integrating these mixed components, the TFs were intended as a unique means of gathering and acting upon intelligence. Interrogators worked to extract information from detainees, immediately relaying any intelligence produced to the Special Forces members of the unit, who could then act on its basis. Unlike other military groups, JSOC units were authorized to work from raw intelligence and did not need to wait for authorization for follow-on strikes based on the acquired information.
96
This meant that JSOC could raid geographical units without consulting higher-ranking officials, a circumvention of the chain of command that enabled Special Forces to act on intelligence gathered by interrogators earlier that day.
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Members of JSOC describe this fusion of intelligence and operations as “the unblinking eye.”
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The JSOC commander, General Stanley McChrystal, was known to favor risk taking and held subordinates responsible for lack of results.
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He demanded incremental fine-tuning of operational procedures. In an early 2006 internal memo, he wrote that “although initial structures and TTPs [tactics, techniques, and procedures] have evolved tremendously from where they were even two years ago, we are still operating with manning and operating processes that need to be improved . . . we will do everything to increase the effectiveness even in small ways.”
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An early 2010 profile of McChrystal characterized him as being so enthusiastic about JSOC and his ability to perfect his deadly arts that he had increased counterterrorism operations “to an industrial scale, with 10 nightly raids . . . 300 a month, that [he] . . . regularly joined.”
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He demanded incremental fine-tuning of operational procedures. In an early 2006 internal memo, he wrote that “although initial structures and TTPs [tactics, techniques, and procedures] have evolved tremendously from where they were even two years ago, we are still operating with manning and operating processes that need to be improved . . . we will do everything to increase the effectiveness even in small ways.”
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An early 2010 profile of McChrystal characterized him as being so enthusiastic about JSOC and his ability to perfect his deadly arts that he had increased counterterrorism operations “to an industrial scale, with 10 nightly raids . . . 300 a month, that [he] . . . regularly joined.”
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On April 16, 2006, JSOC raided a terrorist safe house in Yusifiyah and killed five Zarqawi associates.
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Nine days later, JSOC killed twelve more AQI members in a shootout in another Yusifiyah safe house. Both raids sprang from the skillful interrogation of a Sunni insurgent in February, who revealed the existence of the residences.
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Through the raids, a new group of midlevel AQI operatives was captured for interrogation and revealed that Zarqawi had been hiding just a few blocks away.
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Nine days later, JSOC killed twelve more AQI members in a shootout in another Yusifiyah safe house. Both raids sprang from the skillful interrogation of a Sunni insurgent in February, who revealed the existence of the residences.
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Through the raids, a new group of midlevel AQI operatives was captured for interrogation and revealed that Zarqawi had been hiding just a few blocks away.
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Less evident but equally significant was the mounting pressure on Zarqawi as a result of effective US evisceration of his foreign leadership.
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By May, US intelligence officials said they believed Zarqawi was beginning to run short of foreign fighters willing to conduct suicide missions.
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Further, Zarqawi’s micromanaging personality made him increasingly vulnerable to discovery, according to Jordanian intelligence officials.
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By May, US intelligence officials said they believed Zarqawi was beginning to run short of foreign fighters willing to conduct suicide missions.
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Further, Zarqawi’s micromanaging personality made him increasingly vulnerable to discovery, according to Jordanian intelligence officials.
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In late April, Zarqawi released what would be his final video statement. Zarqawi said that events were proceeding badly for the US, while hinting at future attacks outside Iraq. “Allah has given the mujahidin sons [of the nation] the strength to face the cruelest Crusader campaign, invading the lands of the Muslims. They have withstood this invasion for more than three years.... My dear nation, we in Iraq are but a stone’s throw away from the place of the Prophet’s ascension. We are fighting in Iraq, but our eyes are set upon Jerusalem, which will only be restored to us through the guidance of the Koran and the support of the sword.”
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That month, JSOC raided an apartment in Yusifiyah, killing several people, including three suicide bombers.
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Inside the apartment, JSOC found unedited footage of Zarqawi struggling to use an M249 SAW (squad automatic weapon) during the shoot for his last video production. The portly, white sneaker–clad AQI leader did not seem to be the cunning mastermind that some thought. Rather, he looked like a bungler. The US later released this footage, which came to be known as Zarqawi’s blooper reel, to discredit him.
ENDGAME109
Inside the apartment, JSOC found unedited footage of Zarqawi struggling to use an M249 SAW (squad automatic weapon) during the shoot for his last video production. The portly, white sneaker–clad AQI leader did not seem to be the cunning mastermind that some thought. Rather, he looked like a bungler. The US later released this footage, which came to be known as Zarqawi’s blooper reel, to discredit him.
A multiagency effort finally eliminated the AQI leader on June 7, 2006. Acting on information provided by
intelligence several months beforehand, US counterterrorism forces discovered a new name to work with: Shaykh Abd al-Rahman (a.k.a. Abu Amina).
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Abu Amina was supposedly Zarqawi’s spiritual adviser and met with the AQI head on a regular basis to discuss issues of Islamic jurisprudence.
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Abu Amina’s importance in the AQI hierarchy was unclear to the US until 2006, but subsequent painstaking sensitive site exploitation (SSE)—examining captured computer drives and the like—by a sharp-eyed analyst looking at the specific military raid designated “Arcadia 8,” as well as detainee information, indicated that he was probably the best lead to find Zarqawi.
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Furthermore, information from detainee debriefings and other HUMINT indicated Abu Amina’s overall security rituals, including his attempt to shake off potential surveillance (called a surveillance detection route, or SDR) which allowed the US to track him and also build a picture of Zarqawi’s movements.
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intelligence several months beforehand, US counterterrorism forces discovered a new name to work with: Shaykh Abd al-Rahman (a.k.a. Abu Amina).110
Abu Amina was supposedly Zarqawi’s spiritual adviser and met with the AQI head on a regular basis to discuss issues of Islamic jurisprudence.
111
Abu Amina’s importance in the AQI hierarchy was unclear to the US until 2006, but subsequent painstaking sensitive site exploitation (SSE)—examining captured computer drives and the like—by a sharp-eyed analyst looking at the specific military raid designated “Arcadia 8,” as well as detainee information, indicated that he was probably the best lead to find Zarqawi.
112
Furthermore, information from detainee debriefings and other HUMINT indicated Abu Amina’s overall security rituals, including his attempt to shake off potential surveillance (called a surveillance detection route, or SDR) which allowed the US to track him and also build a picture of Zarqawi’s movements.
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