Double Cross in Cairo (25 page)
Read Double Cross in Cairo Online
Authors: Nigel West
The great Allied undertaking of 1943 was
HUSKY
, the invasion of Sicily for which a cover-plan,
BARCLAY
, was devised to keep the Germans persuaded of a continuing threat in the eastern Mediterranean, and specifically to provide evidence that the 12th Army was in Cairo, preparing for a move to Syria, and then the Balkans. The 12th Army, of course, was one of Clarke’s inventions, and was alleged to comprise of twelve divisions, but in fact it was only ever five real divisions, with a further three, greatly inflated, divisions. Thus the 12th Army became one of ‘A’ Force’s mainstays, and was accepted by the enemy. In February and March 1944, when three of its real divisions were sent to Italy, they were replaced by notional divisions, and by April the 12th Army consisted of just two divisions and three brigades but, according to the official historian Sir Michael Howard, ‘none of them in any condition to take to the field’.
As well as the entirely fictitious reports generated by
CHEESE
, the plan was supported by some genuine troop deployments. The plan worked, to the extent that the German reinforced the Balkans with an additional ten divisions, and when the landings happened in Sicily there were only two German divisions there, which were taken entirely by surprise.
In a review of
CHEESE’S
contribution to
BARCLAY
, dated 25 March 1944, ‘A’ Force reported to SIME’s Major Robertson that
1.
CHEESE
transmissions over the three months of
BARCLAY
on 50 out of 92 days, i.e. more often than every other day.
2. During a typical ‘negative’ month (September 1943) he transmitted on 15 days.
3. The average number of words per message was 59. September 1942.
4. During the present period (
ZEPPELIN
) he has transmitted 14 times in 51 days with an average of 74 words (NB: Not a fair comparison in view of the ‘technical amelioration’ period but his average is only once every three days lately).
An analysis completed by ‘A’ Force immediately following
HUSKY
concluded that prior to
BARCLAY
the German forces amounted to six divisions in Yugoslavia, with one in Greece and one in Crete. By June reinforcements changed these figures to nine divisions in Greece, and seven in Yugoslavia:
It seems fair, therefore, to claim a net ten divisions as having been added to the German Balkan Armies during the period of the operation of the
BARCLAY
plan. The garrison in Southern France has been increased simultaneously by two to three German divisions while two more had been sent to occupy Sardinia and Corsica.
Throughout 1943 ‘A’ Force undertook studies to determine the degree of their campaign’s success, and it emerged that one reason for the enemy’s greater reliance on double agents, and perhaps in part an
explanation for
CHEESE’S
recovery in the eyes of the Abwehr, was the domination of the skies exercised by the RAF. Total air superiority meant that the Luftwaffe was unable to fly aerial reconnaissance missions, which heightened Rommel’s reliance on other sources of intelligence, the principal two being the interception and analysis of signals, and the networks of Abwehr agents. Thus, ironically, the Afrika Korps became increasingly dependent upon human sources that were under British control, because the Luftwaffe was incapable of completing flights over enemy lines. Indeed, as Allied wireless communications’ security improved, prompted by clear proof in
ULTRA
summaries of poor radio procedures, the Germans came to place heavy reliance on the Abwehr.
During the summer of 1943
CHEESE’S
traffic reached a remarkable volume. Ten of his messages repeated items he had spotted in the newspapers:
Walter Kirk has been appointed ambassador to the Greek government; General Sikorski is in Cairo; The news of Churchill’s arrival was false; The Belgian GOC Order of the Day; General Sikorski inspects Polish troops; King George VI was in North Africa; The Greek King returns from the Lebanon; The Yugoslav government is moving to Cairo at the end of August.
Fifteen of
CHEESE’S
messages originated from what were termed ‘casual sources’ which included a Greek corporal from the 3rd Corps in Syria who was staying in Cairo. A ‘journalist I know’ said that at a press conference General Montgomery had announced that the 8th Army would carry the campaign to the end. A telegraph officer had mentioned aircraft in Cyrenaica; His interpreter talked of troop movements on the Derna-Tobruk road, also aircraft and ships in Tobruk, and a convoy with ‘GO’ on a green circle. Two Greek sergeants in a café were heard to say that Greek troops were to be transferred from
Syria from 18 May, and that they were convinced that Greece was the next target.
A sailor on leave said there were ‘more than fifty ships in Alexandria’; ‘An English soldier I know’ announced there would be ‘night manoeuvers till 1 July’; a sergeant in the Warwickshire Yeomanry said the regiment was conducting landing exercises at Kabrit. ‘A doctor I know’ was credited with noting that the Arab Medical Congress had been postponed until 1 August, and that the Syrian frontier would be closed on 14 July.
In more general reporting from ‘Greek circles’,
CHEESE
reported that they had been astonished by the landings in Sicily and anticipated the approaching invasion of Greece or the islands. Some Greek officers said the RAF Regiment was leaving, and that no attack on Greece would take place without the Straits of Otranto. They also referred to aerodromes at Lecce. A New Zealand sergeant was described as a member of the 2nd New Zealand Division, and part of the 12th Army. He said that a unit leaving Cairo was part of the 16 Corps. Another acquaintance, a Greek sergeant pilot, mentioned that he had seen landing craft along the coast of Cyrenaica. The Chief Clerk of the Greek legation talked of landing exercises, morale among the Greek troops, anticipating operations in the autumn.
Between October and December 1943
CHEESE
sent six messages based on own observations, which reported
Polish airmen but no troops here; An increase of South African troops here. Few Greek soldiers but many sailors in Alexandria. Still many South Africans in Cairo; Trucks with a fig-leaf sign; Trucks with a sign of a blue band on yellow with white felucca imposed; Large number of paratroops in Cairo; Cars bearing ‘GO’ sign; More cars in Cairo bearing 12th Army sign.
Although not having claimed to have seen them personally,
CHEESE
also stated that ‘many Poles arrived recently near Cairo, wearing sign of green fir tree on red and white’.
CHEESE
also relied on newspaper articles for eight messages:
Ten Italian warships arrived in Alexandria; The King of Greece is now in Syria; An advertisement for radio mechanics; The arrival of the King of Yugoslavia and government in Egypt; Photos of Indian troops in Italy; General Smuts in Cairo visiting troops of the 6th South African Armoured Division; The occupation of Cos; The Americans built Payne Field aerodrome; Indian troops of the Jodphur Sardar Regiment now in Italy.
Three of
CHEESE’S
messages reflected rumours that were alleged to be in current circulation:
The war in Italy will be shortened by a landing near Bologna; There will be no invasion of Greece this year; The Indian division which sailed from Port Said has gone to Italy.
CHEESE
also sent two messages based on information he had received from a source described as his ‘ESR friend’: ‘An Indian division recently left Port Said, probably for Italy; Goods trains guarded by airborne troops went towards Palestine.’
Another of his sources was a corporal in the 6th South African Armoured Division who was credited with messages mentioning that ‘his camp was on the other side of the Pyramids; he belongs to the Durban Regiment; he thinks that the 1st South African Division has returned to the Cape.’
A New Zealand sergeant asserted that his unit was part of 16 Corps which was soon to leave Cairo. His unit in the 2nd Division left Cairo for Byrg el Arab.
The net effect of this deluge of detailed information was to
demonstrate the wide range of
CHEESE’S
informants, and the detailed nature of their reports. These were the building-bricks of the Allied Middle East order-of-battle under construction by Fremde Heere West, and they were really nothing more than a plausible fiction. What the Allied deception planners did not yet suspect was
CHEESE’S
growing primacy within the Abwehr. In a relative vacuum of sources, and under pressure from OKW, the enemy’s apparatus was coming to not just believe in the
CHEESE
organisation, but to rely on it when making critical strategic decisions.
T
he great event of 1944 was D-Day, to which
CHEESE
made a significant contribution. Having pioneered the concept of strategic deception, ‘A’ Force, which had by now grown to a staff of forty-one officers and seventy-six NCOs, was asked to develop
FORTITUDE
, the cover-plan for the invasion. Accordingly, in December 1943, Clarke’s deputy, Noel Wild, was posted to Norfolk House in St James’s Square to head ‘Ops B’, the SHAEF deception cell.
The deception scheme for the largest amphibious landing ever contemplated in military history was suitably comprehensive, supported by a Whitehall bureaucracy that, dictated by the need for secrecy, was top-level, highly influential but compact in size. Soon after the War Cabinet and the Chiefs of Staff had approved the creation of a London Controlling Section (LCS) to coordinate all deception plans, a sub-committee, codenamed
TWIST
, was established as an interdepartmental coordination agency with a membership of ten, drawn from MI5 (T. A. Robertson, Anthony Blunt and J. C. Masterman) and SIS (Frank Foley and Martin Lloyd) with representatives from the LCS (Ronald Wingate and Harold Petavel), the Foreign Office (Sir
Reginald Hoare), the Naval Intelligence Division (Ewen Montagu) and Lionel Hale from Economic Intelligence. At the end of February 1943
TWIST
supervised what amounted to a full dress-rehearsal for D-Day by drafting a blueprint to protect
HUSKY
, the planned invasion of Sicily with ‘an invasion of the Balkans. This version the Germans also took to be highly credible; they assumed that a base was being built on Cyprus for the invasion of Crete and Rhodes and then of the Balkan Peninsula.’
The threat to Crete and Rhodes, as a prelude to a supposed offensive in the Balkans, was the foundation of the deception strategy which, in the following months, would become more elaborate.
Around November 1943, British troops, notably the 50th and 51st Divisions, began to move from the Mediterranean to Britain. In order to disguise the true objectives of this move, the
TWIST
Committee proposed spreading rumours that this transfer was taking place so that battle-hardened troops could pass on their battle experience to younger soldiers at home.
In January 1944 a plan relating to the eastern Mediterranean was drafted by the LCS, which was approved by the
TWIST
Committee in February and the accompanying memorandum noted that
since major cross-Channel landings will not be possible before the end of the summer, the Allies’ main military efforts in the spring of 1944 will be directed against the Balkans. The following operations will be carried out:
(a) An attack by British and American troops on the Dalmatian coast
(b) An attack by British troops on Greece
(c) Landing operations by the Russians on the Bulgarian-Romanian coast
Turkey will be invited to join the Allies; this will increase available operational resources, including airfields, to be used to seize the Aegean islands as a precondition to an invasion of Greece. Pressure on the German satellites to break away from Germany will be intensified.
The Anglo-American operations in Italy will continue. Landing operations will be carried out in the northwest and northeast. If these are successful, the 15th Army Group will move east through Istria to support operations in the Balkans.
Simultaneously, the LCS memorandum cited a recent newspaper article published in London about a genuine event, the appointment of General Wilson which had been interpreted to reinforce the overall strategy.
On 2 January of this year, the well-known journalist [James] Garvin wrote in the
Sunday Express
that the appointment of Wilson to the post of Commander in Chief, Mediterranean, dispelled the last remaining doubts that a front was going to be opened in the Balkans in the air, at sea and on land. This event was bound to have a decisive influence on Turkish policy [he wrote]. Moreover, ‘when the Western powers make contact with the Soviet armies via the Balkans, the last hour of Hitlerism has come’.
One part of the
OVERLORD
cover-plan was
ZEPPELIN
which was required to keep a threat from the Mediterranean alive until at least D+25.
2
ZEPPELIN
comprised of
TURPITUDE
, which concentrated on the Balkans, and anticipated a future Allied offensive in the Adriatic, and
VENDETTA
, which was designed to pin down the ten German divisions in the South of France and encourage them not to move north to reinforce the Normandy defences. This latter task was
undertaken by the imaginary 12th Army and the authentic US 7th Army from Algiers, but the Balkan ruse fell largely to
CHEESE
who described the preparations for operations in Greece, and detailed the training in amphibious landings being given to Greek troops in Egypt. This aspect of the deception kept twenty German divisions tied up in the Balkans, troops that otherwise might have been available for a counter-attack in Normandy.
In January 1944 the DSO in Damascus, Douglas Roberts, provided SIME’s Captain McElwee with some very unwelcome news.
Joseph Weiser, an Austrian Jew, and a member of a gang of money counterfeiters and passport traffickers, who was interned in June 1942 at Mieh Mieh, told the Field Security sergeant attached to the camp last May … that a certain Renato Levi who was supposed to have worked for the British in Genoa, received a number of forged passes from a person called Silbermann. Levi paid a very large sum for these passes, and he had had this money changed by Heim and Silbermann. Weiser was of the opinion that these passes were from a South American state, probably Cuba.
Further enquiries by SIME revealed that the counterfeiters were mainly Jewish refugees who had set up a business in Milan before the war to sell forged visas and travel documents of all kinds. When Italy joined the war the gang moved to Turkey where in 1941 Weiser had betrayed his confederates to the police in Istanbul. As a result Alfred Heim had been sentenced to three years’ imprisonment for forgery. His 32-year-old mistress, Elfrieda Berger, whom he had allegedly lived off, then went to live with another member of the gang, Anton Raab, who moved to Palestine, and she finally made her way to Berlin. Another conspirator, Robert Silbermann, was a friend of Heim’s and had lived at the Hotel Modern in Milan. According to Weiser’s testimony in June 1942, Silbermann travelled on a forged
Norwegian passport and had moved to Sofia with Lotte, described as his German Ayrian wife.
Other members of the gang were identified as Martin Sands and Jacob Weiss, who were interned with Weiser at Mieh Mieh, and four others: Joseph Buchegger, Eugen Kienast, Arno Gutentag and Rudolf Bodner. Their significance was that this was the same group that had been involved with Fulvio Melcher, Levi’s radio operator, who had been arrested with them in 1940. SIME’s fear was that perhaps inadvertently the gang had implicated Levi and led the Abwehr to conclude that their supposed star agent had been compromised by his previous relationship with the British in Genoa.
The first news from Levi himself consisted of a letter dated 10 February 1944 which was addressed to the British Passport Office in Istanbul, and eventually relayed to SIME in Cairo. Headed as having come from ‘care of Captain Cooley, 7th Division Headquarters’, Levi described his harrowing experience.
As I have not been able to communicate with you since I last left Istanbul on 4 June 1941 for Italy on my return from Egypt, I feel it is my duty, now that it is possible for me to do so, to let you know the cause of my silence up to date.
You have only to look up my file to know that I went to Egypt and was returning to Italy. There is no need for me to let you have any further as to what had been arranged in Cairo with Captain Jones of the Intelligence Department Headquarters. My reports which you will find in my file contain any information you may require. At your embassy I was generally interviewed by [XXXXXXX] at the Passport Register Office.
I arrived in Italy without any difficulty on 12 June 1941 after having travelled through Burgas, Sofia, Belgrade, Vienna, Munich and the Brenner Pass on to Venice. I have nothing of importance to report in reference to my voyage to Italy, except that on my arrival in Vienna, I was handed a message to go on to Munich and report at Marien Theresien Strasse No. 4. Here I was
interviewed by Major Travaglio to whom I handed my report as arranged with Captain Jones and [XXXXXXXXXXXX].
On 14 June 1941, [the] date of my arrival in Rome, I immediately got in touch with Colonel Helfferich, Chief of the German Wehrmacht Nachrichtendienst for Italy, who had his headquarters at the Ministry of War in Via XX Settembre. After having given Colonel Helfferich detailed information in reference to my trip to Egypt, he highly congratulated me for the successful work I had been able to carry out. On his request I also handed him a written statement similar to the one I gave to Major Travaglio in Munich. Colonel Helfferich there informed me that they had not yet been able to connect Rome and Naples with Cairo, although according to my report, which had been sent ahead through the German embassy in Istanbul, they should have been able to do so since the 26 May 1941, which was the date fixed by Cairo headquarters. He told me that he was very pleased I was back, so that I could immediately try to get in touch with Cairo through Istanbul, find out what had happened in order to obtain contact as early as possible. He further instructed me that should I not succeed I was to return again to Egypt to make sure the thing would be set going.
Unfortunately each trial remained unsuccessful for another two or three weeks when connection was finally obtained following instructions received by wire from Cairo via Istanbul in reply to my second telegram. I was then requested to report immediately to Colonel Helfferich. He gave me a wonderful reception. He told me of being extremely pleased that such an important and dangerous mission had been successfully carried out. I was asked whether I was prepared to undertake another trip to Egypt, as it was most urgent now that news could be got through, that someone should go once again in order to bring the necessary funds to the men I had engaged and organise a chain of new agents in different parts of Palestine and Egypt for the supply of any valuable information which was badly needed by the German HQ, otherwise the work done by me would become practically useless. To reply, I pretended that I had no desire to undertake a second
trip as it carried too great a risk and I could easily be suspected if I was seen again in Egypt. I told him I rather preferred if he could send someone else. I would be very pleased if he could oblige me by giving me a different mission. He pointed out that unfortunately I was the person he knew capable to go through such an important task successfully and insisted on me going back once more successfully with the promise that on my return I would be highly compensated. I finally accepted, pretending I was a great deal displeased. He wanted me to leave in 48 hours, but I insisted on fifteen days’ leave before going back in order to see my family and settle certain private business matters which badly needed my personal attention. I was finally granted fifteen days’ leave, while the date of departure from Italy was fixed for 5 August 1941.
Before taking leave from Colonel Helfferich, I was handed the necessary instructions which included a long list of information required by them, a new cipher code, timetable and a large sum of money in American and English currency which would have been wanted for the purpose. I was also given a few names of persons living in Haifa, Cairo and Alexandria with whom I should have got in touch, as valuable help could have been obtained from them. One person particularly was recommended to me, for he should have put me in touch with a high Egyptian Government official.
After this interview I left for Genoa to meet my family.
On the 2 August 1941, quite unexpectedly, six persons attached to the Italian CS (Contro Espionaggio) came to see me at my house. I was told they had received instructions to search my house, which was immediately carried out without giving me any explanation. A few private papers of no importance, besides the documents handed to me in Rome, were seized, including the funds which had been given to me by Colonel Helfferich. I was then requested to accompany them to a waiting car with which I was brought straight to the gaol, Mnrassi, in Genoa.
The same night I was accompanied handcuffed by two Carabinieri to the railway station, put on the train to Rome where I arrived the following
day after a journey of eighteen hours and was brought immediately to the prison Regna Caoli. I would like to point out that during the whole trip, not even for a minute was I ever relieved of my handcuffs.
A few days later started my first interrogatory and [I] was finally charged. The charge brought against me was that I had cooperated with the British Intelligence Service in Belgrade (Yugoslavia) and in Cairo. No mention was made then or at any other time interrogations about Istanbul.
The first question put to me was ‘why the radio receiving and transmitting set erected by me in Cairo was at the moment working under the control of the British authorities?’ My reply was that I was greatly surprised and stated that I had never had any connections with the British Intelligence Service, but only with the British embassy in Belgrade and Istanbul for purely personal reasons with reference to my British passport to obtain the necessary visas in order to be able to reach Palestine and Egypt. I further stated that if his statement referring to the radio transmitting set was true, either the man I had engaged had not been acting secretly enough and had been arrested, or they themselves, for a lack of funds, must have sold the show to the British authorities for the purpose of making money. As no questions were put to me by any of my interrogators referring to my activities in France from December 1939 to June 1940 while I was working under instructions by the Deuxième Bureau by order of Major Knowles of the British embassy in Paris, I stuck firmly to the story arranged in Cairo and acknowledged in Istanbul by Captain Whittal. I supported my defence by stating that should I have had any connection with the British Intelligence Service I would not have insisted with Colonel Helfferich on being granted fifteen days’ leave, but would have without delay left Italy in 48 hours as had been requested by him.
I was not permitted any lawyer for my defence although my family had already appointed one.
The judge who had my case in hand told me that probably I would be tried by the Tribunale Speziale (Special Court). This to my great relief did
not happen and, after a great many interrogations made over a period of several months, he did not think there was sufficient evidence available for me to be brought before the special court. However, instead of being released, the judge on 17 October decided to sentence me to five years to be served as a political prisoner on the island of Tremiti (Adriatic Sea) and provided at the same for the confiscation of $3,801 and £100 found in my private safe which belonged to me.
Owing to ill-health (due to the hardships I was forced to bear on the island) I was permitted on 11 May 1943 to enter the Civil Riuniti Hospital at Foggia, for treatment. On 19 August 1943, due to heavy air bombardments which made it unsafe to stay any longer in Foggia, I was transferred to the military hospital at San Severo. On 21 August the medical officer in charge instructed the Carabinieri Police of the town to take charge of me, saying that he could not keep me any longer owing to shortage of beds, so that the Carabinieri Police, not knowing what to do with me, being unable to send me back to the Island, brought me to the prison of San Severo, when they ordered that I should be kept to await the pleasure of the Questura at Foggia.
On 17 October 1943, a few weeks after the occupation of San Severo by the British troops, by the AMGOT CAO officer Captain Cooley who the following day engaged me to act as his interpreter and clerk. I gladly accepted the position offered to me, which up to date I am holding.
This is all I have to say regarding my activity since I left Istanbul on 4 June 1941 and I would be pleased if you will let me know whether you require my services any longer.
I wish to point out that on my release from gaol in San Severo, I was finable to produce my British Passport or other documents to prove my identity as a British subject. I would be much obliged if you would confirm same to the AMGOT authorities for whom I am now working and further clarify my personal position with them regarding my future duties.
I wish to state that taking into consideration my past activity it would give me great pleasure if you would arrange to have me transferred to the
Intelligence Section, even if I am to be officially attached to the British Army. Please note that I can speak and write correctly in German, French and Italian.
Before closing I would like to state that, since my arrest on 2 August 1941 up to the date of my release on 17 October 1943, apart from personal suffering which I [was] forced to bear in gaol and on the island as a political prisoner, I have concurred a large financial loss in the way of sums of money in foreign currency confiscated as previously mentioned, and other large sums paid out by my family for the defence of any trial, and for my personal expenses while on the island and in hospital. No allowance was ever made to me by the Italian Government as generally was the custom with the other political prisoners. Consideration should also be taken that, for the above period, I had no means to earn any money with which to provide my family, who, fortunately could be provided for by my bankers in Genoa from my personal account. I await your further instructions.
