Descent Into Chaos (75 page)

1
ABC television, Australia, documentary on Pakistan, interview by Mark Corcoran, February 2000.

2
Pervez Musharraf,
In the Line of Fire: A Memoir,
New York Simon & Schuster, 2006.

3
Ayeda Naqvi, “Hum dekhein gay,” interview with Musharraf,
The Friday Times,
Lahore, Pakistan, December 12, 1999.

4
Ron Moreau and Zahid Hussain, “Pakistan’s striving son,”
Newsweek,
January 22, 2002.

5
My notes from Musharraf’s first press conference, Islamabad, November 1, 1999.

6
George Polk, “Power Breakfast with Musharraf,”
The Financial Times,
January 25, 2006.

7
After 9/11, I had the opportunity to meet many European prime ministers and foreign ministers, who all said they liked Musharraf at a personal level but had great qualms about his ability to deliver on policies and his inability to listen. “He should talk less and listen more,” one foreign minister said.

8
Interview with Maulana Fazlur Rehman, Khushab, September 3, 2000.

9
Interview with Amir ul-Azim, Lahore, July 13, 2000.

10
Jeffrey Goldberg, “Inside Jihad,”
The New York Times Magazine,
June 25, 2000.

11
Pervez Musharraf, speech to the nation, October 17, 1999. The aims and objectives of the military regime were to: (1) rebuild national confidence and morale; (2) strengthen the federation, remove interprovincial disharmony, and restore national cohesion; (3) revive the economy and restore investor confidence; (4) ensure law and order and dispense speedy justice; (5) carry out the depoliticization of state institutions; (6) devolve power to the grass-roots level; (7) and ensure swift and across-the-board accountability of all corrupt people.

12
With a foreign debt of $32 billion, Pakistan was spending 90 percent of its revenue servicing interest repayments on its foreign debt and military expenditure. There was little left over for the social sector. Pakistan’s traditional growth rate of 6.0 percent in earlier decades had come down to under 4.0 percent in the 1990s. With a population growth rate at 2.8 percent a year, real growth was just over 1.0 percent—barely sufficient to provide jobs for a population of 160 million people. One third of the country’s industry was shut down and exports were collapsing.

13
I attended several hearings of the case in Karachi. Sharif’s statement, personal record, Karachi, March 12, 2000.

14
There was a constant reshuffling of judges hearing the case, and Sharif’s lawyer Iqbal Raad was shot dead in Karachi in March 2002 by unidentified gunmen. Sharif’s wife, Kulsoom, was charged with treason after making provocative speeches against the army. “His lawyer was assassinated, judges were changed, reports of witness tampering arose repeatedly, the bench complained about the indirect influence of intelligence agents who packed the courtroom, and basic rights protection were missing,” said Paula New-berg, an American legal expert.

15
Ahmed Rashid, “Nearing High Noon,”
Far Eastern Economic Review,
January 27, 2000.

16
Inderfurth said, “Pakistan’s support to the Taliban, who harbor and protect Osama bin Laden, is of concern to us. We hope that Pakistan will take steps against such extremist groups, which carry out acts of violence inside Pakistan as well as in the region, including the Harkat ul-Ansar and Hizb ul-Mujahedin.” Transcript of press conference by Inderfurth, U.S. embassy, Islamabad, January 21, 2000.

17
Interview with Ambassador William Milam, Washington, D.C., November 19, 2005.

18
Independent commission investigating the September 11 attacks, public hearings, testimony of National Security Advisor Samuel Berger, Washington, D.C., March 24, 2004.

19
Bill Clinton, speech issued by U.S. embassy, Islamabad, March 25, 2004.

20
Ahmed Rashid and Nayan Chanda, “Deadly Games in South Asia,”
Far Eastern Economic Review,
April 6, 2000.

21
Voice of America transcript,
www.fas.org/news
/pakistan/2000 /000502=pak1 .htm.

22
Quoted in Ahmed Rashid, “Pakistan’s Pashtun Policy in Afghanistan,”
The Nation,
July 13, 2000. Musharraf made the comment on May 25 in a press conference in Islamabad.

23
Interview with Maj.-Gen. Ghulam Ahmad, May 15, 2000.

24
On May 17, 2000, Musharraf went back on his promise to reform the blasphemy law, which allowed anyone to bring blasphemy charges against another person without proof. The law carried the death sentence. Musharraf’s promised reform was relatively mild—merely a procedural change—but General Aziz advised Musharraf to back down because it would annoy the fundamentalists.

25
In April several leading clerics, including Maulana Fazlur Rehman, said that ministers such as Javed Jabbar were dangerous for Pakistan. Such comments were repeated by other clerics through the summer, and Musharraf failed to support his ministers. The governor of Sindh province, Azim Daudpota, resigned on May 24, citing differences with the corps commander of Karachi, Lt.-Gen. Muzaffar Usmani, whom he blamed for dominating decision making in the province. Mohammed Shafiq, the governor of the North-West Frontier Province, resigned on August 13. Derek Cyprian, the minister for minorities affairs, resigned on August 16. In October, Shafqat Jamote, the minister for food and agriculture, resigned, as did Shafqat Mehmood, a key minister in Punjab province.

26
Pakistan television, Musharraf’s speech to the nation, December 20, 2000.

27
Ahmed Rashid, “The General’s New Power Play,”
Far Eastern Economic Review,
May 3, 2001.

28
Ahmed Rashid, “Musharraf Appoints Deputy,”
The Daily Telegraph,
May 3, 2001. See also “Politicians Played Useless Innings: CE,”
The News,
Lahore, Pakistan, April 30, 2001.

29
“CE Rules Out Army Role in Future Set Up,”
The Nation,
May 17, 2001.

30
Musharraf said, “I personally think with all sincerity and honesty that I have a role to play in this nation. I have a job to do here and therefore I cannot and will not let the nation down.” Ahmed Rashid, “Coup Chief Makes Himself President,”
The Daily Telegraph,
June 21, 2001. Ihtashamul Haq, “Takeover in National Interest,”
Dawn,
June 20, 2001.

31
Editorial,
Dawn,
June 21, 2001.

32
Shaheen was replaced by Lt.-Gen. Ehsan ul-Haq, the former head of military intelligence, who after 9/11 became head of the ISI and a key Musharraf adviser and ally.

33
Interview with Musharraf’s adviser, who asked to remain unnamed, as he still holds a key post, Lahore, November 30, 2004.

34
On March 1, 2001, the British issued a list banning twenty-one terrorist groups, including al Qaeda and Pakistan’s Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, Harkat ul-Mujahedin, and Jaish-e-Mohammed.

35
Private correspondence between Lakhdar Brahimi and the author, July 8, 1999.

36
William Maley,
Fundamentalism Reborn?: Afghanistan and the Taliban,
London: Hurst and Co., 1998.

37
Vendrell headed UNSMA, or the UN Special Mission to Afghanistan, while UNOCHA, or the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, was the economic and aid arm of the UN and run separately.

38
In track two, each country was represented by three officials. Pakistan sent three retired generals, the United States three former State Department officials, including Karl Inderfurth, the former assistant secretary of state for South Asia. Russia sent Yuli Vorontsov, the former ambassador to the UN who had played a key role negotiating the Geneva Accords in 1998; while Iran’s team was headed by its former ambassador to the UN, Saeed Rajai Khorassani.

39
Interview with Francesc Vendrell, Islamabad, March 1, 2006.

40
Some of the points from the concept paper were: “Neither the Taliban nor the NA can bring peace and stability and are thus not the solution for Afghanistan. At the same time, neither can be wished away. At present, neither is in a position to achieve a military victory, nor would they be allowed to by others. The Taliban as currently constituted are highly unlikely to be capable of real reform.” Concept paper, United Nations, 2001.

41
Barnett Rubin, Ahmed Rashid, William Maley, Olivier Roy, and Ashraf Ghani, “Afghanistan: Reconstruction and Peacemaking in a Regional Framework,” paper originally prepared for the Swiss government but widely circulated among European governments, spring 2001.

42
“The Situation in Afghanistan,” Report of the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative to Afghanistan to the UN Security Council, New York, August 17, 2001. “The Security Council might wish to consider adopting a comprehensive approach to the settlement of Afghanistan, in its political, military, humanitarian, and human rights dimensions, setting forth the basic requirements for a settlement of the conflict and the principles on which it should be based, together with a coherent strategy to resolve the conflict . . . no military solution to the Afghan conflict is possible, desirable or indeed acceptable, that the pursuance of the conflict is futile since territorial gains achieved on the battlefield do not constitute the basis for the legitimization of power and that a piecemeal, as distinct from a step-by-step approach is unlikely to succeed.”

43
Bill Clinton,
My Life,
New York: Knopf, 2004. The others were the Middle East, North Korea, and Iraq.

44
Scott Shane, “2001 Memo to Rice Warned of al Qaeda and Offered Plan,”
The New York Times,
February 11, 2005. In 1998, Richard Clarke was elevated to become the national coordinator for counterterrorism with cabinet rank and a seat on the Principals Committee—an unusual position for a bureaucrat.

45
George Tenet,
At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA,
London: HarperPress, 2007.

46
Rocca had last dealt with Afghanistan in the early 1990s, when she had helped run a covert $70 million program to buy back Stinger missiles from the former Afghan Mujahedin.

47
Bush went on to say, “The continued presence of Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda organization is a direct threat to the United States and its interests that must be addressed. I believe al Qaeda also threatens Pakistan’s long-term interests.” Independent commission investigating the September 11 attacks, public hearings, testimony of Secretary of State Colin Powell, Washington, D.C., March 23, 2004.

48
Interview with Abdul Sattar, Islamabad, September 20, 2004.

49
Independent commission investigating the September 11 attacks, public hearings, testimony of National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Washington, D.C., April 8, 2004.

50
“Interview with Richard Armitage,”
The Nation,
June 18, 2001. The interview, which was lifted from an unnamed Indian newspaper, was conducted by Indian journalist Malini Parthasarathy.

51
“Pakistan Not Sponsoring Terrorism Says US,”
Dawn,
August 18, 2001.

52
Independent commission investigating the September 11 attacks, public hearings, testimony of National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Washington, D.C., April 8, 2004.

53
Steve Coll,
Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001,
New York: Penguin Press, 2004.

54
The 9 /11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States,
New York: W. W. Norton, 2004.

55
Coll,
Ghost Wars.

56
The deputies developed formal policy papers, which they discussed in three subsequent meetings in June and July. Independent commission investigating the September 11 attacks, staff text of events, Washington, D.C., March 2004.

57
I talked to several State Department and National Security Council officials about the April 30 meeting when I visited Washington, D.C., in July 2001. I met with Zalmay Khalilzad, the National Security Council director for Afghanistan and South Asia, on July 5, 2001.

58
Interview with Khalilzad, July 5, 2001.

59
“Musharraf Condemns UN Sanctions,”
Dawn,
August 20, 2001, report from Moscow on Musharraf’s interview to Russian newspaper
Kommersant.

60
The 9 /11 Commission Report.
See also Bob Woodward,
Bush at War,
New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002.

1
Gen. Tommy Franks, with Malcolm McConnell,
American Soldier,
New York: Regan Books, 2004.

2
See Ron Suskind,
The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America’s Pursuit of Its Enemies Since 9 /11,
New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006.

3
George Tenet,
At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA,
London: HarperPress, 2007.

4
Bob Woodward,
Bush at War,
New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002.

5
One e-mail read, “US citizenship required for SECRET level security clearances, positions are also available for non-US citizens. . . . Positions available for language instructors, interpreters, translators, analysts, human intelligence, area experts, liaison elements, transcription technicians and interceptors. Current or previous security clearance highly desirable.”

6
Gary Schroen,
First In: An Insider’s Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan,
New York: Ballantine Books, 2005. Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, a former lecturer at Kabul University, was jailed after the communist coup in 1978, then released. He fled to Saudi Arabia. When he returned to Peshawar he set up the Ittehad-e-Islami party with Saudi funding. He set up a jihad university and hospital in Peshawar and was a close friend of Osama bin Laden. Sayyaf was the leading Wahhabi warlord in Afghanistan but rejected the Taliban and joined with the NA. After the defeat of the Taliban he remained at his base in Paghman, outside Kabul, from where he terrorized the local population. He was cultivated and funded by the CIA.

7
Franks,
American Soldier.

8
Julian Borger, “Blogger Bares Rumsfeld’s Post 9/11 Orders,”
The Guardian,
February 24, 2006.

9
Richard A. Clarke,
Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror,
New York: Free Press, 2004.

10
Wolfowitz raised the idea of attacking Iraq at the first full cabinet meeting after 9/11, at Camp David. See Woodward,
Bush at War.
Also Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon,
The Next Attack: The Failure of the War on Terror and a Strategy for Getting It Right,
New York: Times Books, 2005.

11
Woodward,
Bush at War.

12
Quoted in Franks,
American Soldier.

13
George Packer,
The Assassins’ Gate: America in Iraq,
New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2005.

14
John Kampfner,
Blair’s Wars,
London: The Free Press, 2003.

15
The United States continued to play a little-noticed role in monitoring the huge Soviet-era nuclear industry in Central Asia, which included active research reactors, uranium mines, and nuclear waste dumps. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also hosted major chemical and biological warfare facilities.

16
Ahmed Rashid,
Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia,
New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2002.

17
Ahmed Rashid, “US Builds Alliances in Central Asia,”
Far Eastern Economic Review,
May 1, 2000.

18
Agence France-Presse, “Uzbekistan Not to Allow Use of Land Bases,” Tashkent, October 5, 2001.

19
Agence France-Presse, “US, Uzbekistan Reach Agreement on Bases,” Washington, D.C., October 12, 2001.

20
The figures come from Alexander Cooley, “Base Politics,”
Foreign Affairs,
Winter 2005. See also Robert Rand,
Tamerlane’s Children: Dispatches from Contemporary Uzbekistan,
Oxford: Oneworld, 2006.

21
In his more lucid moments, Zahir Shah would regale visiting American diplomats with stories of the last U.S. presidential visit to Kabul, on December 9, 1959, when Dwight Eisenhower arrived in Kabul on a daylong visit. The king’s memory was perfect about the past, but details related to recent events were not so forthcoming.

22
In the weeks before the war started, deliberate ISI leaks encouraged the U.S. media to write about Taliban foreign minister Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil as being a leader of the moderates one day, while the next day it would be Jalaluddin Haqqani, one of bin Laden’s closest associates, who had been on the ISI payroll since the early 1980s.

23
Agence France-Presse, “Who Are Moderate Taliban,”
The Nation,
October 19, 2001.

24
Reuters, “Musharraf Keen to End Campaign Soon,”
The Nation,
October 30, 2001.

25
See Franks,
American Soldier.
Phase one: Set conditions and build forces to provide the National Command Authority with credible military options. This involved laying the groundwork for the operation and arranging basing rights. Phase two: Conduct initial combat operations and continue to set conditions for follow-on operations. This involved the bombing campaign and infiltrating in Special Forces units. Phase three: Conduct decisive combat operations in Afghanistan, continue to build coalition and conduct operations across the area of operations. This involved defeating the enemy and bringing in American troops to eliminate pockets of resistance. Phase four: Establish capability of coalition partners to prevent the reemergence of terrorism and provide support for humanitarian assistance projects. This would stretch for a three- to five-year period and would involve limited reconstruction.

26
Ahmed Rashid, “A Path Paved with Pitfalls,”
Far Eastern Economic Review,
October 4, 2001.

27
Ahmed Rashid, “The War Starts Here,”
Far Eastern Economic Review,
September 27, 2001.

28
James Traub,
The Best Intentions: Kofi Annan and the UN in the Era of American World Power,
New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2006.

29
Agence France-Presse, “Powell Weighs Afghan Peacekeeping Option,” Washington, D.C., October 22, 2001.

30
Interview with Lakhdar Brahimi, Paris, April 26, 2006. A year later Powell apologized and said he had been wrong, telling Brahimi that now he had another message for him: “Well done, well done, well done.”

31
Gary Berntsen,
Jawbreaker: The Attack on Bin Laden and al Qaeda,
New York: Crown, 2005.

32
Ahmed Rashid, “Intelligence Team Defied Musharraf to Help Taliban,”
The Daily Telegraph,
October 10, 2001.

33
Indian intelligence had leaked information that Omar Sheik, a Pakistani extremist who was later found guilty of murdering Daniel Pearl, had wired one hundred thousand dollars to Mohammed Atta, the ringleader of the nineteen 9/11 hijackers, at the instigation of General Ahmad. This so-called larger conspiracy was never investigated by the 9/11 Commission, indicating that it was nothing more than an Indian petard. The story first appeared in
The Times
of India in an article by Manok Joshi, “Shocking ISI leak,” October 10, 2001. It was then picked up by the rest of the Indian press.

34
Ashraf Ghani, “The Folly of Quick Action in Afghanistan,”
The Financial Times,
September 27, 2001.

35
Lt.-General Aziz became chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, with the rank of full general. Although his new job was largely ceremonial, as he had no troops to command, he had the job of helping the Americans set up their bases in Pakistan.

36
Ahmed Rashid, “Easy to Start, Hard to Finish,”
Far Eastern Economic Review,
October 18, 2001.

37
The Taliban and al Qaeda had used Chechen heroin smuggling networks, which extended to Russia and Eastern Europe, to expand their control of the drug trade. High-ranking Chechen rebel leaders had sent their families to Afghanistan to escape the Russian crackdown in their homeland. In 2000, as the Taliban attempted to improve relations with China through the intercession of Pakistan, the Taliban moved the Uighur fighters from front lines outside Kabul to the north, to join up with the IMU. The Taliban then denied to the Chinese that they were enlisting Uighur militants.