They do not permit the people to be ill spoken of in comedy, so that they may not have a bad reputation; but if anyone wants to attack private persons, they bid him do so, knowing perfectly well that the person so treated in comedy does not, for the most part, come from the populace and mass of people but is a person of either wealth, high birth, or influence. Some few poor and plebeian types are indeed abused in comedy but only if they have been meddling in others’ affairs and trying to rise above their class, so that the people feel no vexation at seeing such persons abused in comedy.
[19]
It is
my
opinion that the people at Athens know which citizens are good and which bad, but that in spite of this knowledge they cultivate those who are complaisant and useful to themselves, even if bad; and they tend to hate the good. For they do not think that the good are naturally virtuous for the people’s benefit, but for their hurt. On the other hand, some persons are not by nature democratic although they are truly on the people’s side.
[20]
I pardon the people themselves for their democracy. One must forgive everyone for looking after his own interests. But whoever is not a man of the people and yet prefers to live in a democratic city rather than in an oligarchic one has readied himself to do wrong and has realized that it is easier for an evil man to escape notice in a democratic city than in an oligarchic.
As for the constitution of the Athenians I do not praise its form; but since they have decided to have a democracy, I think they have preserved the democracy well by the means which I have indicated.
I notice also that objections are raised against the Athenians because it is sometimes not possible for a person, though he sit about for a year, to negotiate with the council or the assembly. This happens at Athens for no other reason than that owing to the quantity of business they are not able to deal with all persons before sending them away.
[2]
For how could they do this? First of all they have to hold more festivals than any other Greek city (and when these are going on it is even less possible for any of the city’s affairs to be transacted), next they have to preside over private and public trials and investigations into the conduct of magistrates to a degree beyond that of all other men, and the council has to consider many issues involving war, revenues, law-making, local problems as they occur, also many issues on behalf of the allies, receipt of tribute, the care of dockyards and shrines. Is there accordingly any cause for surprise if with so much business they are unable to negotiate with all persons?
[3]
But some say, “If you go to the council or assembly with money, you will transact your business.” I should agree with these people that many things are accomplished at Athens for money and still more would be accomplished if still more gave money. This, however, I know well, that the city has not the wherewithal to deal with everyone who asks, not even if you give them any amount of gold and silver.
[4]
They have also to adjudicate cases when a man does not repair his ship or builds something on public property, and in addition to settle disputes every year for chorus leaders at the Dionysia, Thargelia, Panathenaea, Promethia, and Hephaestia.
Four hundred trierarchs are appointed every year, and disputes have to be settled for any of these who wish. Moreover, magistrates have to be approved and their disputes settled, orphans approved and prisoners’ guards appointed. And these things happen every year.
[5]
Now and again they have to deal with cases of desertion and other unexpected misdeeds, whether it be an irregular act of wantonness or an act of impiety.
There are still many items which I altogether pass over. The most important have been mentioned except for the assessments of tribute. These generally occur every four years.
[6]
Well then, ought one to think that all these cases should not be dealt with? Let someone say what should not be dealt with there. If, on the other hand, one must agree that it is all necessary, the adjudicating has to go on throughout the year, since not even now when they do adjudicate throughout the year can they stop all the wrongdoers because there are so many.
[7]
All right, yet someone will say that they ought to judge cases, but that fewer people should do the judging. Unless they have only a few courts, there will necessarily be few jurors in each court, so that it will be easier to adapt oneself to a few jurors and to bribe them, and easier to judge much less justly.
[8]
Further, one must consider that the Athenians have to hold festivals during which the courts are closed. They hold twice as many festivals as others do, but I am counting only those which have equivalents in the state holding the smallest number. Under such circumstances, therefore, I deny that it is possible for affairs at Athens to be otherwise than as they now are, except insofar as it is possible to take away a bit here and add a bit there; a substantial change is impossible without removing some part of the democracy.
[9]
It is possible to discover many ways to improve the constitution; however, it is not easy to discover a means whereby the democracy may continue to exist but sufficient at the same time to provide a better polity, except — as I have just said — by adding or subtracting a little.
[10]
Also in the following point the Athenians seem to me to act ill-advisedly: in cities embroiled in civil strife they take the side of the lower class. This they do deliberately; for if they preferred the upper class, they would prefer those who are contrary-minded to themselves. In no city is the superior element well disposed to the populace, but in each city it is the worst part which is well disposed to the populace. For like is well disposed to like. Accordingly the Athenians prefer those sympathetic to themselves.
[11]
Whenever they have undertaken to prefer the upper class, it has not turned out well for them; within a short time the people in Boeotia were enslaved; similarly when they preferred the Milesian upper class, within a short time that class had revolted and cut down the people; similarly when they preferred the Spartans to the Messenians, within a short time the Spartans had overthrown the Messenians and were making war on the Athenians.
[12]
Someone might interject that no one has been unjustly disfranchised at Athens. I say that there are some who have been unjustly disfranchised but very few indeed. To attack the democracy at Athens not a few are required.
[13]
As this is so, there is no need to consider whether any persons have been justly disfranchised, only whether unjustly. Now how would anyone think that many people were unjustly disfranchised at Athens, where the people are the ones who hold the offices? It is from failing to be a just magistrate or failing to say or do what is right that people are disfranchised at Athens. In view of these considerations one must not think that there is any danger at Athens from the disfranchised.
Ancient ruins at Scillus, where Xenophon spent his exile years
More ruins at Scillus
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CONTENTS
MEMORABILIA - Ἀπομνημονεύματα Σωκράτους
SYMPOSIUM - Συμπόσιον φιλοσόφων
ON HORSEMANSHIP - Περὶ ἱππικῆς
THE CAVALRY GENERAL - Ἱππαρχικός
HUNTING WITH DOGS - Κυνηγετικός
WAYS AND MEANS - Πόροι ἢ περὶ προσόδων
CONSTITUTION OF SPARTA - Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτεία
CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS – Αθηναίων πολιτεία
ANABASIS -
Κ
ύ
ρου
ἀ
ν
ά
βασις
CONTENTS
Βιβλ
ί
ον
α
ʹ
[1.1.1]
Δαρείου καὶ Παρυσάτιδος γίγνονται παῖδες δύο, πρεσβύτερος μὲν Ἀρταξέρξης, νεώτερος δὲ Κῦρος· ἐπεὶ δὲ ἠσθένει Δαρεῖος καὶ ὑπώπτευε τελευτὴν τοῦ βίου, ἐβούλετο τὼ παῖδε ἀμφοτέρω παρεῖναι.
[1.1.2]
ὁ μὲν οὖν πρεσβύτερος παρὼν ἐτύγχανε· Κῦρον δὲ μεταπέμπεται ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἧς αὐτὸν σατράπην ἐποίησε, καὶ στρατηγὸν δὲ αὐτὸν ἀπέδειξε πάντων ὅσοι ἐς Καστωλοῦ πεδίον ἁθροίζονται. ἀναβαίνει οὖν ὁ Κῦρος λαβὼν Τισσαφέρνην ὡς φίλον, καὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἔχων ὁπλίτας ἀνέβη τριακοσίους, ἄρχοντα δὲ αὐτῶν Ξενίαν Παρράσιον.
[1.1.3]
ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐτελεύτησε Δαρεῖος καὶ κατέστη εἰς τὴν βασιλείαν Ἀρταξέρξης, Τισσαφέρνης διαβάλλει τὸν Κῦρον πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφὸν ὡς ἐπιβουλεύοι αὐτῶι. ὁ δὲ πείθεται καὶ συλλαμβάνει Κῦρον ὡς ἀποκτενῶν· ἡ δὲ μήτηρ ἐξαιτησαμένη αὐτὸν ἀποπέμπει πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχήν.
[1.1.4]
ὁ δ᾽ ὡς ἀπῆλθε κινδυνεύσας καὶ ἀτιμασθείς, βουλεύεται ὅπως μήποτε ἔτι ἔσται ἐπὶ τῶι ἀδελφῶι, ἀλλά, ἢν δύνηται, βασιλεύσει ἀντ᾽ ἐκείνου. Παρύσατις μὲν δὴ ἡ μήτηρ ὑπῆρχε τῶι Κύρωι, φιλοῦσα αὐτὸν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸν βασιλεύοντα Ἀρταξέρξην.
[1.1.5]
ὅστις δ᾽ ἀφικνεῖτο τῶν παρὰ βασιλέως πρὸς αὐτὸν πάντας οὕτω διατιθεὶς ἀπεπέμπετο ὥστε αὐτῶι μᾶλλον φίλους εἶναι ἢ βασιλεῖ. καὶ τῶν παρ᾽ ἑαυτῶι δὲ βαρβάρων ἐπεμελεῖτο ὡς πολεμεῖν τε ἱκανοὶ εἴησαν καὶ εὐνοϊκῶς ἔχοιεν αὐτῶι.
[1.1.6]
τὴν δὲ Ἑλληνικὴν δύναμιν ἥθροιζεν ὡς μάλιστα ἐδύνατο ἐπικρυπτόμενος, ὅπως ὅτι ἀπαρασκευότατον λάβοι βασιλέα. ὧδε οὖν ἐποιεῖτο τὴν συλλογήν. ὁπόσας εἶχε φυλακὰς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι παρήγγειλε τοῖς φρουράρχοις ἑκάστοις λαμβάνειν ἄνδρας Πελοποννησίους ὅτι πλείστους καὶ βελτίστους, ὡς ἐπιβουλεύοντος Τισσαφέρνους ταῖς πόλεσι. καὶ γὰρ ἦσαν αἱ Ἰωνικαὶ πόλεις Τισσαφέρνους τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἐκ βασιλέως δεδομέναι, τότε δὲ ἀφειστήκεσαν πρὸς Κῦρον πᾶσαι πλὴν Μιλήτου·
[1.1.7]
ἐν Μιλήτωι δὲ Τισσαφέρνης προαισθόμενος τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα βουλευομένους ἀποστῆναι πρὸς Κῦρον, τοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν ἀπέκτεινε τοὺς δ᾽ ἐξέβαλεν. ὁ δὲ Κῦρος ὑπολαβὼν τοὺς φεύγοντας συλλέξας στράτευμα ἐπολιόρκει Μίλητον καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν καὶ ἐπειρᾶτο κατάγειν τοὺς ἐκπεπτωκότας. καὶ αὕτη αὖ ἄλλη πρόφασις ἦν αὐτῶι τοῦ ἁθροίζειν στράτευμα.
[1.1.8]
πρὸς δὲ βασιλέα πέμπων ἠξίου ἀδελφὸς ὢν αὐτοῦ δοθῆναι οἷ ταύτας τὰς πόλεις μᾶλλον ἢ Τισσαφέρνην ἄρχειν αὐτῶν, καὶ ἡ μήτηρ συνέπραττεν αὐτῶι ταῦτα· ὥστε βασιλεὺς τὴν μὲν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐπιβουλὴν οὐκ ἠισθάνετο, Τισσαφέρνει δ᾽ ἐνόμιζε πολεμοῦντα αὐτὸν ἀμφὶ τὰ στρατεύματα δαπανᾶν· ὥστε οὐδὲν ἤχθετο αὐτῶν πολεμούντων. καὶ γὰρ ὁ Κῦρος ἀπέπεμπε τοὺς γιγνομένους δασμοὺς βασιλεῖ ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ὧν Τισσαφέρνους ἐτύγχανεν ἔχων.
[1.1.9]
ἄλλο δὲ στράτευμα αὐτῶι συνελέγετο ἐν Χερρονήσωι τῆι κατ᾽ ἀντιπέρας Ἀβύδου τόνδε τὸν τρόπον. Κλέαρχος Λακεδαιμόνιος φυγὰς ἦν· τούτωι συγγενόμενος ὁ Κῦρος ἠγάσθη τε αὐτὸν καὶ δίδωσιν αὐτῶι μυρίους δαρεικούς. ὁ δὲ λαβὼν τὸ χρυσίον στράτευμα συνέλεξεν ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν χρημάτων καὶ ἐπολέμει ἐκ Χερρονήσου ὁρμώμενος τοῖς Θραιξὶ τοῖς ὑπὲρ Ἑλλήσποντον οἰκοῦσι καὶ ὠφέλει τοὺς Ἕλληνας· ὥστε καὶ χρήματα συνεβάλλοντο αὐτῶι εἰς τὴν τροφὴν τῶν στρατιωτῶν αἱ Ἑλλησποντιακαὶ πόλεις ἑκοῦσαι. τοῦτο δ᾽ αὖ οὕτω τρεφόμενον ἐλάνθανεν αὐτῶι τὸ στράτευμα.
[1.1.10]
Ἀρίστιππος δὲ ὁ Θετταλὸς ξένος ὢν ἐτύγχανεν αὐτῶι, καὶ πιεζόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν οἴκοι ἀντιστασιωτῶν ἔρχεται πρὸς τὸν Κῦρον καὶ αἰτεῖ αὐτὸν εἰς δισχιλίους ξένους καὶ τριῶν μηνῶν μισθόν, ὡς οὕτως περιγενόμενος ἂν τῶν ἀντιστασιωτῶν. ὁ δὲ Κῦρος δίδωσιν αὐτῶι εἰς τετρακισχιλίους καὶ ἓξ μηνῶν μισθόν, καὶ δεῖται αὐτοῦ μὴ πρόσθεν καταλῦσαι πρὸς τοὺς ἀντιστασιώτας πρὶν ἂν αὐτῶι συμβουλεύσηται. οὕτω δὲ αὖ τὸ ἐν Θετταλίαι ἐλάνθανεν αὐτῶι τρεφόμενον στράτευμα.
[1.1.11]
Πρόξενον δὲ τὸν Βοιώτιον ξένον ὄντα ἐκέλευσε λαβόντα ἄνδρας ὅτι πλείστους παραγενέσθαι, ὡς ἐς Πισίδας βουλόμενος στρατεύεσθαι, ὡς πράγματα παρεχόντων τῶν Πισιδῶν τῆι ἑαυτοῦ χώραι. Σοφαίνετον δὲ τὸν Στυμφάλιον καὶ Σωκράτην τὸν Ἀχαιόν, ξένους ὄντας καὶ τούτους, ἐκέλευσεν ἄνδρας λαβόντας ἐλθεῖν ὅτι πλείστους, ὡς πολεμήσων Τισσαφέρνει σὺν τοῖς φυγάσι τοῖς Μιλησίων. καὶ ἐποίουν οὕτως οὗτοι.