Tom Barry (30 page)

Fifty years later as he looked back on those days he was convinced that if the British government had felt that they could out-fight the IRA, then they would have further increased their strength in Ireland as they had in past history.

‘I am one of those who believe' that the Volunteers were never ‘fully stretched from 1919–1921. Had the British succeeded in bringing in another 70,000 troops, the real test of the people and of the IRA could have begun.'
[17]
Barry and different IRA men entered ‘Bandon which was a garrison town between 40 and 50 times al-together, we tried to bring them out, especially over the last three to four months, but they didn't come out.'
[18]

He never doubted that the column could continue harassing during the summer months and would survive the British summer offensive. Neither did he under-rate the potential of the immensely increased forces with which they were threatened and which would undoubtedly push against them if the negotiations did not succeed. Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson was prepared to pour ‘every available man' into Ireland.
[19]
Montgomery believed ‘that Lloyd George was really right in what he did; if we had gone on we could probably have squashed the rebellion as a temporary measure, but it would have broken out again like an ulcer the moment we had removed the troops; I think the rebels would have refused battle, and hidden away their arms, etc., until we had gone'.
[20]

If the British government came to recognise the IRA, which was a startling upheaval of British policy, it was, according to Barry, ‘due only to the British recognition that they had not defeated and could not reasonably hope to defeat in the measurable future, the armed forces of the Irish nation.'
[21]

In the daily papers Tom Barry and the officers read of Lloyd George's invitation to President de Valera and such colleagues as he might select to come to London to explore the possibility of a settlement. Negotiations regarding a Truce had begun. During this process Lloyd George requested information about Lord Bandon. On Tuesday 6 July, Mick Collins, Diarmuid Hegarty and Gearóid O'Sullivan sent for the Cumann na mBan director of organisation, Leslie Price. They ‘instructed' her to visit Tom Barry in West Cork to obtain ‘full details of the health and condition of the Earl of Bandon … a very highly placed member of the British House of Lords'. De Valera was ‘to discuss terms of the Truce with Lord Midleton' on Friday 8 July. ‘Midleton had stated that he would not discuss terms until he knew that Bandon was safe and sound. Midleton and Bandon were cousins.'

Leslie left Dublin on the first train on Wednesday morning 7 July; she had to be back by mid-day Friday. Having arrived at the train station in Cork she set out on a borrowed bicycle for Dunmanway. Having cycled thirty miles, she met Paddy Walsh at Coppeen. He drove her in a pony trap to Caheragh and then to Skibbereen. Here they got a fresh pony and drove to Schull, only to be told that Tom Barry and the men had gone to Kealkil, outside Bantry. At Kealkil they were told Tom was back in Caheragh where they had left. It was after midnight on Thursday night when Leslie located Tom in a field, asleep in a bunker. She got ‘a withering look' from him. ‘Tell Dublin headquarters to come down and see how my men are!' Then he softened: ‘Lord Bandon is getting better dinners than the boys!' He had been with him the night before, and ‘had seen the old man playing cards with his guards and urging them not to talk or laugh too loudly in case the British forces would come and attack them'. Tom assured her that he was being properly treated, and in a whisper expressed the hope that his plan would be fruitful. Having obtained the information and assurances, Leslie, with a change of ponies again, set out for Cork to catch the first train. She was back to meet De Valera in Dublin by 11.30 a.m. Friday. ‘Exhausted! I slept for twelve hours', she wrote.
[22]

According to Percival, in kidnapping Lord Bandon, the IRA's ‘object [was] to conclude a Truce'. Percival wrote that ‘a well-known lady, who had become an ardent Sinn Féiner, came down to Castle Bernard and said to Lady Bandon, “I have been sent down by our people to warn you that, unless the government conclude a Truce, Lord Bandon will be killed.” The reply [Lady Bandon's] was “If that is all you have to say, you had better go home.” It would have been impossible to carry out any operations', Percival wrote, ‘without having a reasonably good intelligence service'.
[23]
Barry would smile had he known of Percival's intelligence service on this occasion!

The justices were released when the peace talks made it obvious that a Truce was imminent. However, Lord Bandon was held, being moved periodically to different houses to avoid a British swoop.

Lord Bandon's deputy lieutenant, R. Bence Jones of Clonakilty escaped being kidnapped – as he was absent from home, meeting General Strickland. Some days later Bill Daly and other captured IRA men were informed that their death sentence would be postponed.
[24]

Could the IRA have carried on if there had been no Truce? ‘No participant can speak with accuracy on the overall position of the IRA throughout Ireland on that date ... My own views are based only on the intimate knowledge of one area, a general association with several others and what fellow officers told me afterwards of their brigades.

‘The IRA in July 1921 were stronger in number – in spite of several thousands arrested – than they were in July 1920. In addition there were ten times more experienced, tough fighters.'
[25]

Tom Barry had always maintained, according to Denis O'Callaghan, that ‘one Volunteer was worth 100 paid soldiers, and this certainly has been proved. He also proved that the IRA could destroy the British civilian intelligence machinery.' A drop in the number of IRA casualties occurred as spying and informing became dangerous. ‘Our army was a war army. It was made up of all types, all kinds, all classes. I can say without any fear of contradiction with 100 of these West Cork men, half armed with neither rations, supplies, telephone equipment, or any kind of decent accommodation, if I was offered 1,000 of the British army of that period in Ireland, with all the advantages, with all their barracks to retire into, by choice, I'd take the 100 of West Cork men, especially men who believed in what they were doing.'
[26]

Barry admitted that in a defensive action against British artillery, planes, armoured-cars and fire-power, the IRA would not have stood a chance. However, in the event of a troop build-up, he said, ‘Every wanted man in his area would be gathered into a flying column which would be through the blockade lines before the enemy had got set to commence their sweeps. Once outside the perimeter, the commander would have a choice of moving into a lightly held area or watching for a chance to harass the British from their rear.'
[27]

The harassment could be continued for years, but by then the cost in lives and energy would have been great. However, according to Barry the cost would not have been on the Irish side alone and with hindsight he asked, ‘Would the losses have been any greater than they were for the Irish who suffered two years of a bitter Civil War?' He was convinced that if the leaders had foreseen the consequences of the Truce, none of them would have agreed to it, certainly not on the British terms of negotiations.

At the time though, Barry was acutely aware of what a further build-up of British troops in his area during the summer of 1921 could mean. Michael Collins was in constant touch with the brigade leaders in all areas and also with outside sources regarding the securing of arms and ammunition, and so had a complete picture of the over-all situation. Florrie O'Donoghue, IO, says that ‘for 9 months every day practically before the end of Tan War, Collins and I had communication'. There was ‘closer contacts between brigades for communication was [part] of intelligence'. O'Donoghue had ‘a distinct view that closer co-operation between places in the south was necessary'. He had found many holes in the British intelligence system and their use of ‘Loyalists' informers. ‘The British really thought they could organise an intelligence system. They had not learned their difficulties or they certainly did not know their own inherent weakness'.
[28]

Though national resistance against British rule and administration was general, ‘GHQ was in no position to control the fighting in the different brigade areas ... Each unit fought its own battles, won its own victories or stood up to its own defeats'. Consequently, ‘the British High Command quite logically concentrated on wiping out the fighting men of the active districts'.
[29]

The invitation by the British prime minister to the Irish leaders to attend a conference and to list the terms of the Truce were the best indication to Barry as to the success of guerrilla warfare. ‘The only language they [the British] listened to or could understand was that of the rifle, the revolver, the bomb and the crackling of the flames which cost them so dearly in blood and treasure.'
[30]

‘The general election of 1918 had given the people an opportunity, under an election that was held under the British authority at the time, to declare their wish about the men of 1916, and the declaration of the Republic. The people opted for a Republic,' Barry said. ‘But the British had no respect for the people at the polls even though they boasted about democracy.' Professor John A. Murphy spoke of ‘Barry and his West Cork column's contribution' which ‘helped bring about a state of affairs where the British were anxious to make a truce. In 1919 and 1920 all the British wanted was to give a very limited form of Home Rule. If, in the summer of 1921 they were anxious to offer Dominion status, there was an enormous difference.'

By July 1921 the Government of Ireland Act of December 1920 imposed a six county border. The May 1921 six county elections led to a parliament for the area in June. Professor John A. Murphy put it into a framework: ‘The War of Independence took place within the mandate' of the 1918 victory within ‘the Dáil which spoke for Nationalist Ireland. The physical struggle was, as it were, mandated by that parliament … Crossbarry, Kilmichael and so on must be fitted into the pattern.'
[31]

Now a time had arrived when the fighting could stop. The British parliament was ready to negotiate. Since he became column commander shortly after joining the IRA Tom Barry had had moments of great hope and of great glory, moments of joy, of sorrow, of hate, of aggression, of deep sadness and a hundred thousand other moments as he tried to steer his men towards success. During all this time he doesn't appear to have entertained any thoughts of despair – for him the sun would eventually come out and shine. And the spirit of the people in spite of their sorrow had a buoyancy which could not be quelled.

As an example of why he thought British aggression had failed, he told of a touching memory when one day in February he left the column to visit the parents of Lieut Patrick Crowley of Kilbrittain after he had been killed by the Essex Regiment.

With another officer Tom came out through the woods. Mrs Crowley, a frail, ageing woman dressed in black, was sitting on a stool in the yard gazing at the ruins of their burned-out-home. Her husband, a grey-bearded, thin man, was moving some rubble to strengthen a hen house which alone escaped the orgy of destruction. Towards the end of their days, their son Paddy was killed the previous week; Denis lay badly hurt in a British jail after a merciless beating by his captors; Con was also in prison under the name of Paddy Murphy with a shadow of death hanging over him should his identity be discovered. The fourth remaining son Mick had been seriously wounded early in the struggle, and his chance of survival was not great. Their two daughters, in Cumann na mBan, Ciss and Bridie were away on IRA business and would not be back until late that night. ‘The sorrows and sufferings of this ageing couple must have weighed heavily upon them, but there was no sign of weakness or complaining as they listened to our words of sympathy at the death of their son. British money could not buy them, nor could British guile and duplicity wean from them their support of the Irish Republican army. People with spirit like this were as truly soldiers of the resistance movement as any Volunteer of the flying column.'

Tom had a high regard for his men and though there were dissensions in other brigade areas he was ‘happy to record that in the West Cork Brigade no such bickerings or dissensions ever existed. The brigade staff set an example of good comradeship that could not be surpassed. We were a happy family, bound together by close ties.' All that mattered to them was ‘the pursuit of the movement for freedom.'
[32]

Peter Hart wrote that men in Tom Barry's Column'contained only those who were loyal to him personally, who went anti-Treaty “to a man”, stuck with him afterwards … and who agreed with his version of history.' He cites Barry's comment regarding Paddy O'Brien's Kilmichael ambush account in the Deasy book. Hart wrote that men ‘who were not part of this group, like Paddy O'Brien, were not part of the column, according to Barry himself'.
[33]
Other accounts show that Barry, O'Brien and flying column men, were at the period under review, comrades in arms, ‘fighting for the one objective'. (Later, men such as Seán Hales, John L. O'Sullivan, some Kilmichael and other flying column men became pro-Treaty).
[34]

Flor Begley, told Ernie O'Malley that ‘Tom Barry was a hard man, very strict but very good to his column men, and they loved him. “Did you have a good billet?” he would say to them next day, “and how were you fed?” And if they had not been, he would do his best for them.'
[35]

‘It has to be remembered,' Comdt Christy O'Sullivan told Irish army officers, that Tom Barry trained several different columns over a period. The men were changed from time to time, but the commander was never changed which shows that the brigade had the utmost confidence in him.' Comdt O'Sullivan met many men who had ‘participated in engagements' under ‘General Tom Barry' and ‘one thing all agree, is the sheer confidence which they had in their column commander at all times, even in the worst of positions.' Whenever he was absent ‘there was always a feeling of tension and uncertainty', when he was present they were ‘relaxed and confident'.
[36]