The President's Call: Executive Leadership From FDR to George Bush (34 page)

BOOK: The President's Call: Executive Leadership From FDR to George Bush
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ings for judicial appointments. Headed by a Democrat and with a Democratic majority, the committee confirmed 99 percent of those who appeared before it; that is, 209 Republican candidates of a Republican president for lifelong jobs, hardly evidence of Senate independence or obduracy.
The Spoils System at Work in Political Appointments: The Stockbrokerage Dealing Jobs
The president has appointing authority for some 3,925 civilian positions. These include the Schedule C, SES, PAS, and PA positions; the latter two are most crucial to presidential control of the executive branch. Patronage pressures are inevitable and particularly strong on new administrations; they come from various sources. One source is the Congress whose members have constituents, staff members, or policy advocates they want placed in the executive branch. Sometimes it is a loyal representative or senator, herself or himself recently defeated, retired, or simply desiring a change.
A more pressing source of patronage pressure is the successful campaign itself. Campaign workers expect a "fair share" of the spoils of victory. Presidents Nixon, Carter, Reagan, and Bush were all attacked for not appointing enough workers and party faithful.
In the Reagan administration Lyn Nofziger represented those campaign workers who wanted jobs in the administration and felt that the White House was placing too many "retreads" from the Nixon and Ford administrations. According to Nofziger, "We have told members of the Cabinet we expected them to help us place people who are competent. . . . As far as I'm concerned, anyone who supported Reagan is competent." (Pfiffner 1987a, 67)
George Bush faced patronage pressure from within and without. Because his administration was a "friendly takeover" and seen by many, including at times Bush himself, as simply an extension of the Reagan presidency, a Republican third term, those Reagan appointees in place who had supported Bush expected to stay in office, at least somewhere in the new administrationthey were in no hurry to leave. And, because there had not been a party turnover there was no rush to move them out, as there would have been otherwise.
Despite administration statements that turnover of some 80 to 90 percent was expected, the Bush people were not initially noticeably suc-
 
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cessful in eradicating every trace of Reagan. By the summer of the first year, approximately 35 percent of the subcabinet appointees were Reagan holdovers, though not necessarily holding the same position (Pfiffner 1990, 68). However, a year later only 22 percent remained (Aberbach 1991, 239).
Another important source of patronage pressure is the other appointees themselves. Robert Mosbacher, secretary of commerce, for example, publicly complained that not enough fund raisers were getting jobs in the administration, even though as many as 50 percent of them did. There was also a "must list" of fifty major donors who wanted jobs for themselves or their relatives; more than a dozen significant donors were appointed to major ambassadorial posts early in the administration (Pfiffner 1990, 68).
Conservative think tanks and the Far Right continued their importuning of the White Housethe Heritage Foundation sent over a ten-foot stack of 2,500 resumes. The flood of resumes to the White House from all sources eventually numbered 70,000 (45,000 after duplicates were culled). As one administration official said, choosing among them was like "trying to take a sip from a fire hydrant" (ibid., 68). The sheer numbers are enough to stagger any personnel office, let alone one not firmly established and well positioned within an administration.
Models of Political Appointments: Political Pay-Offs, Shadow Governments, and Counter-Staffing
In their study of noncareer SES executives in the Reagan administration, Ban and Ingraham discuss three models for political appointments and the relationships with careerists to which they lend themselves. Their analysis applies in large measure to PAS executives as well. One is the political payoff model, in which the appointment is made to please or appease a constituency group, party power base, large donor, or individual crucial to the success of the presidential campaign. Appointees occupying these positions are "particularly hard to control, since they are likely to define their role in terms of representing the interests to whom they owe their position, and to have strong ties to the 'iron triangle' [an agency, congressional oversight committee, and special interest groups] in their field." If they share similar values and priorities with their career staff their relationship is likely to be very good (Ban and Ingraham 1990, 109-10).
The shadow government model involves what Heclo terms "political careerists," who may be congressional staff members, academics, career
 
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civil servants, and those employed in think tanks or consulting firms who are tapped for temporary government service (this model dominates only at the Department of Defense). They are "people who build their careers around problems of public policy and do so outside the confines of the formal civil service personnel system." As professionals, they are more likely to treat careerists as knowledgeable colleagues and to know most effectively how to employ their expertise (ibid., 110).
The third version, the counter-staffing model, is employed when an appointee is put into an agency who is opposed to its direction or mission or who is
deeply committed to the administration's ideology or policies. Their mission is to "turn things around." Such appointees may have considerable prior substantive experience, often challenging the previous policies in the field (e.g., James Watt). More often, however, they lack substantive experience and this is seen as a strength, rather than a weakness, since they will be less likely to have strong ties to the existing interests in the area. . . . These appointees are least likely to have had prior public-sector experience. (Ibid., 110)
As might be expected, these appointees are most likely to be suspicious of careerists' motives and capabilities and to assume them to be in the enemy camp and opposed to the kind of radical change the PASs demand, particularly if the White House has just changed parties.
Ban and Ingraham conclude that the majority of the Reagan noncareer SES executives they interviewed
conformed closely to the counter-staffing model . . ., particularly at OPM and HUD. Most had neither prior substantive experience relevant to their current positions nor prior governmental experience. Their personal motivation for taking a political appointment was usually a strong commitment to the president's policies and programs. . . . Several also saw a political appointment as a smart career move; as one put it, "I didn't have executive experience and wanted it." Interestingly, almost all of those fitting the counter-staffing model actively sought political appointment. (Ibid., 111)
There is a close correlation between the entry patterns of the noncareer SES executives and the PASs. The latter are also perceived as being "highly committed to the Reagan ideology and as having less previous governmental experience than appointees of earlier administrations, and
 

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