The Dictionary of Human Geography (206 page)

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Authors: Michael Watts

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town
A general name for an urban place but, like both a city and a village, with no generally accepted criteria on which to distin guish such a settlement. Such definitional problems constrain both historical analyses (e.g. urban origins) and planning for urban futures. rj (NEW PARAGRAPH)
townscape
The observable units of urban form that can be mapped and classified. Early work in urban geography focused on morphoLogy the patterns of Land use and built form (such as street layouts and building heights), and the processes underpinning their evolution with little reference to their visual appearance in the Landscape. A rigor ous approach was developed by M.R.G. Conzen (1907 2000: see Conzen, 1969), who identified three main townscape elem ents: the town plan (within which the other two were largely constrained), the land use units and the built form. His pioneer work has been developed into studies of not only the patterns of urban morphology but also of the agents who shape and re shape it, including pioneer studies by Whitehand, Larkham and others in the University of Birmingham?s Urban Morphology Research Group: the (NEW PARAGRAPH) International Seminar on Urban Form launched the journal Urban Morphology in 1997. rj (NEW PARAGRAPH) Suggested reading (NEW PARAGRAPH) Whitehand (1992). See also http://faculty. washington.edu/krumme/VIP/Tiebout.html (NEW PARAGRAPH)
trade
Under normal capitalist conditions, the transportation and exchange of commod ities for money. As such, trade provides a vital link between production and consumption in capitalist commodity chains. It is through trade that commodities reach their markets, and it is only when commodities are sold into markets that the value produced by the ex ploitation of workers is abstracted out and represented in the exchange values or prices generated by market trading (Harvey, 1999 [1982]). For these reasons, trade derives both its immense significance and considerable con temporary contentiousness from the ways in which it is interwoven with the wider polit ical economic organization of capitalism. (NEW PARAGRAPH) When it occurs across national borders, trade serves to create international economic ties. As a result, international trade statistics provide some of the best data available about the actual economic interdependencies under pinning gLobaLization. Trade data showing global increases in international trade outstrip ping growth in overall global GDP provide a useful indication of the degree to which con temporary forms of capitalist development are characterized by increasingly cross border flows (Dicken, 2003). Roughly 40 per cent of international trade is actually intra corporate trade that is, border crossing trade that nevertheless remains within the internal com modity chains of a particular TNC (Gabel and Bruner, 2003) revealing the corporate control of these flows within the networks of global corporations (see transnational corporations (tncs)). Meanwhile, maps of import export data (see figure) exhibit the uneven economic integration and triadic geographical structure of these economic flows, in which over 80 per cent of trade takes place between Europe, North America and Asia. Yet while trade data can help us better map global capitalism?s uneven deveLopment, the contentious debates over today?s terms of trade also need to be understood in relation to the profoundly pol iticized discourses surrounding the asym metries and inequities of trade mediated interdependencies. (NEW PARAGRAPH) Many free market fundamentalists insist that trade is always good without ever pausing to consider such basic questions as: The trade of what? For whom? And under what context ual conditions? The transatlantic slave trade that turned Africans into commodities, for example, can hardly be held up as an unmiti gated good (see Wolf, 1982). And the recent for profit trade in blood plasma from Haiti to the USA and Europe reveals how despite historic victories over sLavery, its legacies still provide a vampiric verso of economists? unending odes to free trade in the present (Farmer, 2006). But even putting such odious examples aside, studies of the political and economic geographies in which trade takes place make universal claims about the good ness of trade seem absurd (Sheppard and Barnes, 1990; Merrett, 1996; Porter and Sheppard, 1998; Gilbert, 2005). One of the major weaknesses of mainstream macroeco nomics is that it continually abstracts from these geographies, mirroring but ignoring the ways in which capitalist trading relations affix prices to commodities that crystallize out their abstract value (but see Fireside and Miller, (NEW PARAGRAPH) . All the focus is on the economic bene fits never on the social, political and envir onmental ills that commodity production and trade so often entails. (NEW PARAGRAPH) Going back to David Ricardo?s nineteenth century account of comparative advantage which abstracted from the political economic imperatives that were driving British manufac turers to seek new foreign markets for their prod ucts abstractions such as ?opportunity costs? have continually led economists to obscure the uneven international and personal power relations in which trade takes place. Yet notwith standing endless economic modeLLing demon strating the supposed efficiencies of trade, and notwithstanding the repeated emphasis on the gains from trade in economics textbooks, the geographical context of trade still matters and often reveals the losses from trade. This has become especially clear in contemporary debates over free trade and fair trade. (NEW PARAGRAPH) When the novelist Margaret Atwood joined other Canadians in contesting the Canada USA Free Trade Agreement, she pointed to the discursive power of free trade by under lining how it hinges on the positive association of the word ?free?, ?as in free gift, free lunch, free world and free speech? (Atwood, 1993, p. 93). Against this, Atwood argued that free trade in fact represented the systematic straitjacketing of Canada?s democratic autonomy and policy setting freedom. Many other critics in Canada repeated the argument that free trade threa tened everything from public health services to national development initiatives to food safety to cultural creativity. Subsequent pro tests from Seattle to Singapore have made simi lar arguments against the worLd trade organisation, underlining the many areas of social, political and environmental policy making that are straitjacketed by trade laws (Peet, 2003; Wallach and Woodall, 2004). At the heart of these criticisms is a concern with the ways in which free trade agreements create systems of rule or state effects that, while grant ing TNCs quasi constitutional rights, simul taneously undermine any sort of democratic rights for the subject populations who want to question and reform the new rules (Gill, 2003; El Fisgon, 2004; Sparke, Brown, Corva et al., (NEW PARAGRAPH) . Based on these concerns and critiques, diverse transnational groupings from the worLd sociaL forum to the Intercontinental Caravan are converging to deliberate and de lineate diverse alternatives, including diverse forms of fair trade (Featherstone, 2003; Rou tledge, 2003; Sparke, Brown, Corva et al., 2005; Routledge, Nativel and Cumbers, (NEW PARAGRAPH) . Meanwhile, new work by feminist eco (NEW PARAGRAPH) nomic geographers points hopefully (and des pite its capitalist government funding) towards non capitalist, extra capitalist and, most ideal istically, post capitalist forms of trade that is ?free? from poverty, patriarchy and corpor ate control (Gibson Graham, 2006c: see also feminist geographies). ms (NEW PARAGRAPH)
tragedy of the commons
A short hand for the popular assumption that collective re source management as opposed to private or state control of resources will inevitably fail. The ?tragedy of the commons? was first elaborated by Hardin (1968) as an extended metaphor for thinking about the need for so cial and institutional solutions to population growth. Hardin sought to highlight how de cisions that are rational at the level of the indi vidual (about family size) can yield outcomes that are far from optimal for society (what he called the ?population problem?). His aim was to ?exorcise the spirit ofAdam Smith? in demo graphy that the pursuit of individual gain would promote the public interest and to make the case for restrictions on ?the freedom to breed?. To make his point, Hardin asked readers to ?picture a pasture open to all? upon which herdsmen could stock as many cattle as they saw fit. Each herder, he argued, would further his or her self interest by adding ani mals to the pasture, yet if all herders pursued this strategy, the collective result would be overgrazing: thus would ?freedom in the com mons bring ruin to all?. (NEW PARAGRAPH) Hardin?s model has travelled widely within academic and policy circles over the past four (NEW PARAGRAPH) decades and is frequently invoked as a guide to renewable resource management (see Wade, 1987). Although he was not the first to draw attention to ?the dilemma of collective resources? (Gordon, 1954), Hardin ?codified into a social economic theory? the ?conven tional wisdom . . . that private gains might hold social and ecological costs? (Robbins, (NEW PARAGRAPH) . Thus has the tragedy of the commons acquired the status of resource management parable, and has provided intellectual support both to calls for resource privatization and to demands for increased state control. (NEW PARAGRAPH) Since the first publication of Hardin?s argu ment, however, a substantial body of work by both natural and social scientists has docu mented the remarkable diversity of contem porary property management arrangements around the world (Berkes, 1989). This work demonstrates that successful collective man agement regimes cannot accurately be charac terized as ?exceptions? or pre modern relics: collective resource management regimes are widespread, are not restricted to developing countries, and can be resilient in the face of economic and environmental change. This work has shown that Hardin?s error was to move too quickly from an initial observation (NEW PARAGRAPH) about the significant tensions between pri vate and collective interests to his conclusion that collective management must fail. In prac tice, ?the commons? are not the open access, free for all regimes that he made them out to be; rather, what distinguishes common property from open access regimes are the customs, rule systems and enforcement mech anisms that condition individual access to and use of the resource. Furthermore, Hardin?s conclusion can only be sustained if one assumes that resource users cannot communi cate with each other, share information on the condition of the resource, or coordinate their behaviour. (NEW PARAGRAPH) The past few years have seen renewed theoretical interest in the adaptive capacities, negotiated rule systems and indigenous envir onmental knowLedges that often characterize common property management regimes. Given the failure of many ?top down? deveL opment and conservation initiatives, these attributes are increasingly seen as valuable components of sustainabLe deveLopment and adaptive management in the face of environmental change. gb (NEW PARAGRAPH) Suggested reading (NEW PARAGRAPH) Feeny, Berkes, McCay and Acheson (1990); Ostrom (1999). (NEW PARAGRAPH)
transaction costs
The costs associated with effecting an economic transaction, either through market exchange between two or more legally distinct economic actors, or internally within a single organization (firm or, more generally, ?hierarchy?). (NEW PARAGRAPH) Costs for market mediated transactions might include: (NEW PARAGRAPH) The cost of gathering information concern ing the availability, price and quality of par ticular commodities (goods or services). (NEW PARAGRAPH) The costs associated with identifying potential customers. (NEW PARAGRAPH) The cost of determining the reliability of a supplier or the creditworthiness of a purchaser. (NEW PARAGRAPH) The costs associated with negotiating the terms of an exchange, including price, delivery date and terms of payment (and of setting these out in the form of an agreed contract). (NEW PARAGRAPH) The cost of completing a transaction (mak ing or collecting payment). (NEW PARAGRAPH) Costs will also accompany non market transac tions within a single firm; in other words, the costs of organizing and coordinating complex, multi step production processes in house. (NEW PARAGRAPH) transport costs associated with moving goods between transacting parties have tradi tionally received special attention from eco nomic geography in general and have provided the basis for classical spatial modeLs in Location theory but, as the following dis cussion shows, other forms of transaction cost have recently attracted considerable attention within industriaL geography in particular. (NEW PARAGRAPH) Williamson (1975, 1985) is generally cred ited with developing a comprehensive analysis of transaction costs. He sought ?to achieve a better understanding of the origins and func tions of various market structures stretching from elementary work groups to complex modern corporations? (1975, pp. 1 2). In stead of relying on technological arguments based on concepts such as indivisibilities or non separabilities to explain why two or more functions might be performed within the same firm (?organizational hierarchy?), Williamson focused on ?transactions and the costs that attend completing transactions by one institu tional mode rather than another?. He insisted that it was transactional not technological considerations that are ?typically decisive in determining which mode of organization will obtain in what circumstances and why?. Most goods require a number of semi finished or intermediate inputs for their production. They also require a number of discrete, separate functions to be performed as part of the overall production process. Williamson argued that the extent to which all of these operations are performed within a single vertically integrated firm versus the extent to which some or all of the required inputs are produced by other firms and then acquired through a market transaction depends on which mode of organization most successfully minimizes transaction costs: ?whether a set of transac tions ought to be executed across markets or within a firm depends on the relatively effi ciency of each mode? (p. 8). Generally, the more difficult or expensive the task of coord ination or ?governance? of the production pro cess, Williamson proposed, the greater the likelihood that production will be vertically integrated within a single internal hierarchy. (NEW PARAGRAPH) The geographical significance of transaction costs (other than transportation costs) was first made clear by Scott (1988c), who demon strated both theoretically and empirically that the spatial clustering of firms often serves to reduce the cost of transactions between them (see cluster; industrial district). Under such conditions, firms will find it cheaper and easier to acquire the requisite information con cerning potential suppliers and buyers nearby. Moreover, because such firms may be managed by individuals who have come into contact with one another repeatedly over extended periods of time, they may have built up a high degree of familiarity and trust between them that serves to facilitate the sharing of information and the successful achievement of non routine transactions (Harrison, 1992; Nootebloom, (NEW PARAGRAPH) what Storper (1997b) called ?untraded interdependencies?. When such circumstances prevail, Scott argued, one should expect to find a much more fully articulated social division of labour, in which individual firms specialize in the production of a relatively small number of goods and/or services and trade actively with one another. Such arrangements are likely to be specially useful in industries for which mar ket tastes are changing rapidly, and in which product life cycles are short. Since input requirements for such goods will also change rapidly, spatial concentration will reduce the transaction costs associated with producers finding and assessing the performance charac teristics of potential new suppliers. Similarly, when the product is complex or highly custom ized, it is advantageous for producers and users to interact frequently and easily. Possibilities for achieving this are enhanced when the producer and user are close to one another, thereby reducing the cost of such a complex transaction (Lundvall, 1988). (NEW PARAGRAPH) Hence, as Storper (1997, pp. 34 5) ob served, this kind of analysis demonstrates ?that geography figures in transaction costs in general, and hence influences the boundar ies of the firm and production system?. He also concluded that ?the geography of transaction costs helps explain aggLomeration and spa tial divisions of labour?. However, the transac tion cost approach has been criticized for its rather reductionist analysis of industrial or ganization for its ?exclusive focus on the transaction rather than the relationship? (Powell, 1990, p. 323) and for its tendency to ignore the influence of the public sector in shaping the institutions (such as markets) that mediate exchange (Harrison, 1997). msg (NEW PARAGRAPH)

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