Intelligence in War: The Value--And Limitations--Of What the Military Can Learn About the Enemy (56 page)

3. A. Marder,
From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow,
vol. III, p. 42.

4. Ibid., pp. 134ff.

5. Ibid., p. 40.

6. Halpern, pp. 36–37; but see A. Lambert,
The Rules of the Game,
London, 1996, p. 49, who doubts the circumstances; the incident was certainly referred to by those in the know as “the miraculous draught of fishes,” Halpern, p. 37.

7. S. Singh,
The Code Book,
London, 1999, pp. 46–51.

8. R. E. Weber,
Masked Dispatches: Cryptograms and Cryptology in American History, 1775–1900,
National Security Agency, 1993, pp. 43–44.

9. Maffeo,
Most Secret and Confidential,
Annapolis, MD, 2001, p. 83.

10. Singh, p. 120

11. S. Budiansky,
Battle of Wits,
New York, 2000, pp. 70–71.

12. R. Kippenhahn,
Code Breaking,
Woodstock, NY, 2000, pp. 28–29.

13. Singh, p. 136.

14. Ibid., pp. 134, 136.

15. Quoted in W. Kozaczuk,
Enigma,
London, 1984, p. 270.

16. Ibid., p. 277.

17. Ibid., p. 284.

18. Ibid., note 2, pp. 22–23.

19. Ibid., p. 304.

20. G. Welchman,
The Hut Six Story,
London, 1982, p. 63.

21. Ibid., p. 71.

22. R. Lewin,
Ultra Goes to War
, London, 1988, p. 47.

23. Budiansky, p. 48.

24. Welchman, pp. 76–77.

25. See Andrew Hodges,
Alan Turing: The Enigma,
London, 1992, particularly pp. 96–99 and, for Bletchley, chapter 4.

26. Welchman, p. 168.

27. F. H. Hinsley et al.,
British Intelligence in the Second World War,
London, Appendix 4, vol. II, pp. 658ff.

28. Welchman, p. 98.

29. Hinsley et al., p. 657.

30. C. MacDonald,
The Lost Battle: Crete 1941,
London, 1993, pp. 11–12.

31. H. Trevor-Roper (ed.),
Hitler’s War Directives,
London, 1965, pp. 68–9.

32. A. Beevor,
Crete: The Battle and the Resistance,
London, 1991, p. 76.

33. Ibid., p. 72.

34. I. Stewart,
The Struggle for Crete,
Oxford, 1966, p. 58.

35. Beevor, p. 349.

36. Ibid., p. 351–52.

37. Paul Freyberg,
Bernard Freyberg VC,
London, 1991.

38. Bennett,
Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy, 1941–45,
London, 1989, pp. 57–58.

39. Beevor, pp. 346–48.

40. Ibid., p. 105.

41. Ibid., p. 112.

42. Ibid., p. 107.

43. Quoted in ibid., p. 107.

44. MacDonald, p. 216.

45. Ibid., p. 196.

46. Stewart, pp. 317–18, 374–75.

47. MacDonald, p. 203.

48. Ibid., p. 212.

49. Bennett, p. 20.

50. Ibid., p. 19.

51. Ibid., p. 20.

CHAPTER SIX: MIDWAY: THE COMPLETE
INTELLIGENCE VICTORY?

1. H. Strachan,
The First World War,
Oxford, 2001, vol. I, p. 458.

2. R. Spector,
Eagle Against the Sun,
London, 1985, p. 42.

3. Ibid., pp. 46–47.

4. H. P. Willmott,
Empires in the Balance,
London, 1982, p. 71.

5. S. Budiansky,
Battle of Wits,
New York, 2000, p. 120.

6. Ibid., p. 32ff.

7.
Pearl Harbor Revisited
.
United States Navy Communications Intelligence, 1924–41,
Naval Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard, 2001, p. 17.

8. R. Lewin,
The American Magic,
New York, 1982, p. 42.

9.
Pearl Harbor Revisited,
Appendix A, “Messages Intercepted Between 6 September and 4 December, 1941,” pp. 53–65.

10. Spector, pp. 153–55.

11. H. Shorreck,
A Priceless Advantage,
Naval Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard, 2001, p. 9.

12. Ibid., p. 11.

13. Ibid., p. 5.

14. Ibid., p. 6.

15. Ibid., p. 8.

16. Ibid., p. 9.

17. Ibid., p. 10.

18. Spector, p. 166.

19. Shorreck, p. 10.

20. Ibid., p. 12.

21. A. Marder,
Old Friends, New Enemies: The Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy,
Oxford, vol. II, 1990, p. 93.

22. J. Winton,
Ultra in the Pacific,
London, 1993, p. 58.

23. W. Lord,
Midway: The Incredible Victory,
Ware, 2000, p. 119.

24. H. Bicheno,
Midway,
London, 2001, p. 149.

CHAPTER SEVEN: INTELLIGENCE, ONE FACTOR AMONG MANY: THE BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC

1. F. H. Hinsley and A. Stripp,
Codebreakers,
Oxford, 1993, p. 11.

2. Ibid., p. 12.

3. W. S. Churchill,
The Second World War,
London, 1949, p. 529.

4. P. Padfield,
Dönitz,
London, 1964, p. 101ff.

5. Ministry of Defence,
The U-Boat War in the Atlantic,
London, vol. I, 1989, p. 1.

6. Ibid., pp. 3–4.

7. J. Terraine,
Business in Great Waters,
London, 1983, p. 142.

8. Ibid., pp. 618–19.

9.
Jane’s Fighting Ships,
London, 1940, p. 60ff.

10. Terraine, pp. 54, 119.

11. Padfield, p. 201.

12. Terraine, pp. 266–8.

13 . Hinsley et al.,
British Intelligence in the Second World War,
London, 1981 and later, Vol. 1, p. 336, Vol. 2, p. 179.

14. Ibid., Vol. 2, Appendix 4, parts 3 and 6.

15. Ibid., Vol. 2, Appendix 9, p. 681.

16. Ibid., Vol. 2, Appendix 19, pp. 751–52.

17. C. Blair,
Hitler’s U-Boat War,
vol. 1,
The Hunters,
New York 1939–42, 1996, pp. 727–32, 695.

18. D. Kahn,
Seizing the Enigma,
London, 1991, pp. 211–12.

19. Ibid., chapter 16, passim.

20. Hinsley et al., vol. 3, appendix 8.

21. Kahn, chapter 20.

22. Blair, vol. 1, p. 424, vol. 2,
The Hunted. 1942–45,
p. 712.

23. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 421.

24. Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 743–44.

25. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 418.

26. Terraine, p. 629.

27. Blair, vol. 1, pp. 741–45.

28. Ibid., p. 247.

29. Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 791–92; J. Terraine, pp. 314–15.

30. Blair, vol. 2, pp. 519–20.

31. Terraine, p. 619.

32. Ministry of Defence, pp. 109-18; Blair, vol. 2, Appendix 2.

33. Kahn, pp. 211–13.

34. Hinsley et al., vol. 2, Appendix 19.

35. Blair, vol. 2, Appendix 18.

36. Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 710–11.

CHAPTER EIGHT: HUMAN INTELLIGENCE AND SECRET WEAPONS

1. D. Irving,
The Mare’s Nest,
London, 1964, pp. 13–14.

2. F. Hinsley et al.,
British Intelligence in the Second World War,
London, 1981 and later, vol. 1, appendix 5.

3. M. Smith,
Foley,
London, 1999.

4. Irving, p. 34.

5. P. Wegener,
The Peenemünde Wind Tunnels,
New Haven, 1996.

6. Ibid., p. 27.

7. Irving, p. 35.

8. Ibid., p. 38.

9. Ibid., p. 43.

10. Wegener, p. 10.

11. Ibid., pp. 34–40.

12. B. Collier,
The Defence of the United Kingdom,
London, 1957, pp. 353–55.

13. Irving, pp. 140–41.

14. T. Wilson,
Churchill and the Prof,
London, 1988, pp. 2–4.

15. Irving, title page.

16. Ibid., pp. 45–47, 53.

17. Hinsley et al., vol. 3, part 1, p. 369.

18. Ibid., p. 385.

19. Ibid., part 1, p. 390.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Hinsley et al., vol. 1, p. 57, n. 277.

23. Hinsley et al., vol. 3, part 1, p. 389.

24. Ibid., p. 379.

25. Ibid., p. 391–92.

26. Ibid., p. 402.

27. Ibid., p. 412.

28. Ibid., p. 428.

29. B. Collier,
The Battle of the V-Weapons,
London, 1964, pp. 45–46.

30. Collier,
Defence of the United Kingdom,
Appendices XLV, L.

31. Hinsley et al., vol. 3, part 1, p. 446.

32. F. H. Gibbs-Smith,
The Aeroplane,
London, 1960, chapter 14.

33. N. Longmate,
Hitler’s Rockets,
London, 1985, p. 187.

34. Hinsley et al., Vol. 4, p. 184.

35. M. Howard,
British Intelligence in the Second World War,
vol. 5, 1990, pp. 18–20, 231–41. It has to be said that Garbo was a genuine anti-totalitarian and strongly pro-British.

36. Ibid., vol. 5, p. 12.

37. Ibid., pp. 177–79.

38. Ibid., p. 183.

39. Hinsley et al., vol. 3, part 1, p. 360.

40. Private information, Professor D. C. Watt.