Fundamentalism in Comparative Perspective (26 page)

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Authors: Lawrence Kaplan

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Page 104
It should be emphasized, however, that even where the movement is quite successful, as is the case in Egypt, a Muslim "counter-society" (to borrow P. Nettle's term) as foreshadowed by tactics (4) and (5) is still an ideal rather than a reality. For one thing, some of the more important ventures in this directionsuch as Sheikh Hafiz Salamah's Abbasiyah complex in northern Cairoencountered substantial financial and management difficulties. And for another, one should not underestimate the capacity of the beleaguered state to heap one obstacle after another upon the road of such ventures, e.g., through the shrewd use of licensing and zoning regulations and by putting counterpressures on recalcitrant judges. Which brings us once again to the finding noted above: that the continued expansion of civil society's sphere by the Islamic resurgence depends to a large extent on what the state will doin the present context, what the state might do to contain the resurgence either by repressive means and "divide and rule" tactics (particularly effective vis-à-vis the decentralized Sunni resurgence) or by providing better social services. The irony once again, as with the expansion of the public sector, is that some of the "active defense" tactics employed by the statei.e., a greater role for parliament, a measure of political pluralism and broader freedom of expressionmight serve to buttress the Islamic resurgence, with its goal of creating an alternate and autonomous society. Eventually, such an alternate society, secure in its cultural hegemony, may even serve as a basis for the seizure of power, exactly in line with the Gramsci scenario. But even disregarding such an eventuality (which for the moment, one should admit, looks farfetched), the mere fact that the state has recourse to the tactics outlined here contributes to the redrawing of the boundaries in favor of civil society.
4
Perhaps the most interesting paradox in a story replete with ironies and paradoxes relates to the future aspirations of the Islamic resurgence, as they can be extrapolated from various scenarios produced under the movement (and cross-checked against the postrevolutionary developments in Iran). As one reads such writings one
 
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perceives instantly that Islamic radicals aspire to establish a "contemporary state" (
hukuma 'asriyya
), one in tune with the twentieth century with regard to means and modalities, though not in values. The writings do hold as a sort of mythical reference to the seventh-century state of Muhammad and the early caliphs (all four orthodox caliphs, for the Sunnis, or 'Ali only for the Shiites). But this applies to broad moral principles and does not imply a return to a medieval form and method of government. Unlike the seventh-century state (or, for that matter, almost all premodern Muslim states), this is to be a strong and actively interventionist state, not one confined to foreign affairs, defense policy, and certain areas of commerce. The medieval Muslim watchdog statewhich left civil society largely to its own devicesis gone forever. Technological changes, especially in transportation and communication, enabled the modern state in the Middle East to intervene in areas hitherto left to voluntary forms of association (and greatly influenced by men of religion). The upshot of it all, say the radicals, is that Islam was pushed to the sidelines in education, family mores, leisure, economic initiative, and so on. To counter this trend of de-Islamization, the radicals propose to take the modern state and use its own tools to Islamize society; there is no sense in dismantling this state or outlawing the technology it utilizes. Technology cannot be written off by juristic flat; it can only be regulated. A case in point is television, which is subject to tight state control in order to shape hearts and minds. Likewise, whatever their economic predilections, the radicals are agreed on one point: there is no going back to the hands-off policy of the pre-nineteenth-century Middle Eastern states (or, for that matter, of the Prophet's state). This much is clear even from the debates between pragmatists and ideologues within the present Iranian political elite. The former wish to extend the private sector, but they remain dedicated to state control of key sectors (oil, military industry, heavy industry, etc.) and to a measure of state intervention in order to achieve redistribution of income and wealth.
The adaptation of past molds to present realities is to be made through the use of
ijtihad
(innovation in matters of jurisprudence) which all radicals endorse, provided it is kept in the hands of the "virtuous" (i.e., the radicals themselves) and not conferred upon just
 
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any Muslim learned in the law (as Islamic modernists would have it). The primacy of Muslim law (the shari'a)which is crucial to the Islamic revolutionary mythcan thus be preserved while allowing the state to be contemporary and powerful.
In this state's agenda, matters pertaining to education, communication, and entertainment are going to loom large. This is where, according to radicals' diagnosis, "westoxication" had its most deleterious and rapid impact; hence, to counter it is the most urgent task. The state's nearly complete monopoly in these domains will give the revolutionaries the means to that end. A purge of the present media and the school system by the future Islamic state is thus a vital necessity. (In fact, these are the areas into which the Iranian regime moved first and in the swiftest manner.) The outlawing of "anti-Islamic" scientific theories by the state is to be expected, a measure not perceived to contradict the "contemporary state." The radicals are content to use technological applications of science, and do not care for the basic research most of them are predicated upon (particularly in fields like molecular biology, astrophysics, and geology, which inch too close for comfort to the essential verities of religion). They resign themselves to backwardness in science, hoping for an up-to-date transfer of technology from abroad. They are even ready to accept a certain lag if the transfer does not operate as smoothly as hoped; and, needless to say, they refuse technology that may create thorny ethical problems (e.g., genetic engineering). This underlying attitude toward the preeminence of the ''satanic'' West in the realm of technology is best exemplified in arms procurement and in medicine. It is emblematic that when gravely ill, the major proponent of Sunni radicalism, the Pakistani Mawlana Mawdoodi, went to the United States for treatment (where he was eventually to die). What holds for technology in the service of brainwashing or in defense against external enemies, also holds for surveillance and mass control techniques. It is likewise clear that in an Islamic state, the "westoxicated" will not be allowed the free use of tape cassettes and other reactive, feedback media technology which the fundamentalists now use to solidify their presence in civil society.
Which brings us to an even more crucial irony. However much they critique the "nondemocratic practices" of the present regimes,
 
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it is evident from their tracts that the Muslim radicals flatly reject democracy as being predicated on manmade laws, and thus contradicting the law system set by Allah, i.e., the shari'a. The attempts by modernists to show that Islam may be compatible with democracy are treated with cold disdainas typical of the apologetic mode that accepts Western criteria and endeavors to make Islam conform to them. The reason is obvious: conformity with contemporary civilization in the domain of values is unacceptable a priori. The liquidation of basic democratic liberties in the name of the shari'a follows necessarily. And that entails a restriction of civil society's sphere (even compared with the present situation), particularly with regard to formal institutions.
Although some form of parliamentary representation may endure, it will take a back seat to revolutionary institutions. This is made amply clear in the "draft constitution" that the Islamic Republic of Lebanon prepared under Hizbolla aegis in 1985: in the absence of the Hidden Imam, the source of all authority is the Virtuous Jurist who will appoint the chairman of the Lebanese Governance of the Jurist Commission, a local ayatollah. The commission, made up of representatives of all religious communities, will be the ultimate locus of all legislative, judicial, and executive powers. Among others, it will oversee the election by universal suffrage of the president of the republic and of the Islamic Consultative (
shura
) Council, and will have the power to dissolve the council. Significantly, the word "democracy" does not appear in the draft. Sunni scenarios, while much less detailed, carry the same message.
The fundamentalists' greatest services to civil society are, consequently, rendered in opposition. But either in opposition or eventually in power, they never envision the dismantling or gross enfeeblement of the state. The logic is crystal clear: one has to keep intact the essentials of state-centralized authority in order to transform it into an instrument for the implementation of Islamic law.
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Fadlallah, M. H.
The Meaning of Force in Islam
[Arabic]. Beirut, 1979.
 
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Friedman, M., and E. Sivan.
Religious Radicalism and Politics in the Middle East
. Albany, 1990.
Ghanushi, R.
Collected Articles
[Arabic]. Paris, 1984.
Guenana, N.
The Jihad: An Islamic Alternative in Egypt
. Cairo Papers in Social Sciences/ A.U.C. September 1986.
Kepel, G.
The Prophet and the Pharoah
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Mayer, T.
Islamic Resurgence in Israel and in the Administered Territories
[Arabic]. Nazareth, 1986.
Manufi, K.
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[Arabic]. Beirut, 1980.
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[Arabic]. January 1972.
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[Arabic]. Cairo, 1971.
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