A World at Arms (186 page)

98
A good source is the file of the German embassy in Madrid, “Seekrieg und seine Auswirkungen auf Spanien,” two vols., in AA. For information on a secret fund available to the Germans inside Spain for use in these activities, see Weinberg,
Foreign Policy
1937–39, pp. 151–52 .

99
Charles B. Burdick, “‘Moro’: The Resupply of German Submarines in Spain, 1939–1942 ,”
CEH
3 (1970), 256–84;
ADAP,
D, 8, Nos. 284, 604, 616; KTB SId A, 3, 4 Nov.
1939, BA/MA, RM 7/5, f. 17–18, and 19 Jan. 1940, RM 7/8, f. 153; AA, Botschaft

100
Klaus Wittmann,
Schwedens Wirtschaftsbeziehungen zum Dritten Reich
1933–1945 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1978), pp. 241–43.

101
See n 80, above.

102
The Swedes were so enthusiastic about trade with Germany that their trade agreement with the Third Reich of December “22, 1939, violated the one they had signed with England on December 7. See Wittmann,
Schwedens Wirtscha Jtsbeziehungen,
pp.I6o-72; Lutzhöft,
Deutsche Militärpolitik,
p.68.

103
Lutzhöft, pp. 32–34.

104
Wittmann, p. 396, appropriately stresses these points. See also KTB Skl A, 17, 2 Jan. 1941, BA/MA, RM 7/20, f. 23–24. An apologia for Swedish policy, based mainly on the Swedish Foreign Ministry archives, may be found in William M. Carlgren,
Swedish Foreign Policy during the Second World War
, trans. Arthur Spencer (New York: St. Martin’s, 1977).

105
Norman Rich, who is generally very cautious in his assessment of Hitler’s long-term aims, concludes (
Hitler’s War Aims,
2: 401) that the Austrian model would probably have served for Sweden.

106
Note
ADAP,
D, 8, Nos. 165,297,298,304.

107
Sweden also supplied steel ball-bearings and some other important materials, but iron ore was the key element.

108
Weinberg,
Foreign Policy
1937–39, pp. 242, 591.

109
On Turkey at this time, see Lothar Krecker,
Deutschland und die Türkei im Zweiten Weltkrieg
(Frankfurt/M: Klostermann, 1964); Zehra Önder,
Die türkische Aussenpolitik im Zweiten Weltkrieg
(Munich: Oldenbourg, 1976).

110
Hoptner,
Yugoslavia in Crisis,
pp. 167–72, remains the best English language account but is now superseded by chapt. 4 of Alfredo Breccia,
Jugoslavia
1939–1941:
Diplomazia della Neutralita
(Rome: Giuffrè, 1978), which is based on extensive work in the Italian and Yugoslav archives in addition to British, US., and German documents. See also Elizabeth Barker,
British Policy in SouthEast Europe in the Second World War
(London: Macmillan, 1976), PP. 13–19.

111
When discussing the problem of the Polish government leaders who had fled to Romania with the Japanese Minister on September 22, 1939, Romanian Foreign Minister Grigore Gafencu predicted a war between Germany and the Soviet Union in the future (Oshima to Tokyo No. 1058 of 24 Sept. 1939, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 001825–28).

112
The account in Andreas Hillgruber,
Hitler, König Carol und Marschall Antonescu
(Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1954), pp. 80ff, must now be modified in light of Philippe Marguerat,
Le llle Reich et Ie pétrole roumain, 1938–1940
(Leyden: Sijthoff, 1977), chap. 5. See also the documents in PRO, AIR 19/12.

113
Weinberg,
Foreign Policy,
1937–39, pp. 174–76; Gerhard Krebs,
Japans Deutschlandpolitik
1935–1941, 2 vols. (Hamburg: MOAG, 1984), 1: 117–47; John P. Fox,
Germany and the Far Eastern Crisis 1931–1938
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), chap. 9.

114
On this, see Hsi-sheng Ch’i,
Nationalist China at War
1937–45 (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1982), pp. 118–21.

115
Chiang himself appears to have thought on occasion of German mediation in the war with Japan. The Germans, however, were not interested in trying once more, at least not until after Japan had moved southward and committed herself against Britain, because otherwise a Sino-Japanese settlement could easily pave the way for a settlement between Japan and the Western Powers. See
ADAP,
D, 8, Nos. 32, 201, 217.

116
John H. Boyle,
China and Japan at War
1937–1945:
The Politics of Collaboration
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1972), deals with only aspects of the broader problem.

117
I am not aware of any recent study of this route and its utilization. There are descriptions of the route in Owen Lattimore, “China’s Turkestan-Siberia Supply Road,”
Pacific Affairs
13 (1940),393–412; Aitchen K. Wu,
China and the Soviet Union
(New York: John Day, 1950), pp. 259–60. There is a little information in Andrew D.W. Forbes,
Warlords and
Muslims in Chinese Central Asia: A Political History of Republican Sinkiang,
1911–1949
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1986), p. 146; John W. Garver,
Chinese-Soviet
Relations,
1937–1945:
The Diplomacy of Chinese Nationalism
(New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1988), pp. 39, 107–8; Allen S. Whiting (ed.),
General Sheng Shih-ts’ai, Sinkiang:
Pawn or Patriot?
(E. Lansing, Mich.: Michigan State Univ. Press, 1958), pp. 49, 61–62. In spite of its title, the 1981 New York University PhD dissertation of Arthur C. Hasiotis, Jr., “A Study of Soviet Political, Economic and Military Involvement in Sinkiang from 1928 to 1949,” does not discuss the Soviet supply route.

118
James W. Morley, (ed.),
The Fateful Choice: Japan’s Advance into Southeast Asia, 1939–1941
(New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1980), pp. 32–41.

119
On Wang Ching-wei, see Gerald E. Bunker,
The Peace Conspiracy: Wang Ching-wei and
the China War
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1972). The defection of two key aides of Wang, who released documents on his negotiations with the Japanese on January 2I, 1940, which showed him as subservient to extreme Japanese demands, effectively discredited Wang. See Boyle,
China and Japan at War,
pp. 278–80, 293–337.

120
The fullest account is Coox,
Nomonhan.

121
Morley,
Deterrent Diplomacy,
pp. 174–76.

122
ADAP,
D, 8, No. 93. The new Japanese ambassador, Kurusu Saburo, who temporarily replaced the extremely pro-German Oshima Hiroshi, did not make himself popular in Berlin by urging that Germany not attack in the West, but attain her aims in Europe by peaceful means and then mediate the war in East Asia; all this on the basis of the assumption that Germany could not defeat Britain because of American power (ibid., No. 590). Anyone this clear-sighted was certain to be ignored in the Third Reich.

123
On German efforts in this direction, see Morley,
Fateful Choice,
pp. 20–22; Morley,
Deterrent Diplomacy,
pp. 197–98;
ADAP,
D, 8, Nos. I I, 29, 75, 77, 79, 140, 549.

124
ADAP,
D, 8, Nos. 40, 132, 292, 448.

125
Stephen E. Pelz,
Race to Pearl Harbor
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1974).

126
Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto (eds.),
Pearl Harbor as History
(New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1973), pp. 242–43. There is an excellent account of the whole project in Malcolm Muir, Jr., “Rearming in a Vacuum: United States Naval Construction and the Japanese Capital Ship Threat, 1936–1945,”
Journal of Military History
54, NO.4 (1990), 473–85.

127
Note the material in Morley,
Fateful Choice,
pp. 241–43.

128
Krebs,
Japans Deutschlandpolitik,
1: 337–78.

129
Borg and Okamoto,
Pearl Harbor,
p. 43.

130
Michael Schaller,
The U.S. Crusade in China,
1938–1945 (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1979), pp. 25–29, 32–33.

131
Morley,
Deterrent Diplomacy,
pp. 192–93, 195; Borg and Okamoto,
Pearl Harbor,
pp. 14446. Eugen Ott, the German ambassador to Japan, predicted the likelihood of failure in Japan’s negotiations with Britain and the U.S. and success in the negotiations with Russia as early as Oct. 16, 1939
(ADAP,
D, 8, No. 264).

132
Note the 2–4 year estimate in Berlin to Hsinking No. 178 of 15 Sept. 1939, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 1708.

133
Japanese Ambassador to Poland from Bukarest to Tokyo No. 84 of 24 Sept. 1939, ibid., SRDJ 1818–20.

134
See Berlin to Tokyo No. 220 of 11 Oct. 1939, ibid., SRDJ 1957–58; Ott (Tokyo) to Berlin No. 303 of 4 Apr. 1940, AA, Ha Pol, Clodius, “Japan,” Bd. 3. German complaints about Japan in
ADAP,
D, 8, No. 421; Emil Helfferich, 1932–1946
Tatsachen, Ein Beitrag
zur Wahrheitsfindung
Oever, Oldenbourg: C.L. Mettcker, 1968), chap. 7.

135
John W.M. Chapman (ed.),
The Price of Admiralty: The War Diary of the German Naval
Attache in Japan, 1939–1943
, Vol. 1 (Lewes, Sussex: Univ. of Sussex Printing Unit, 1982), passim;
ADAP,
D, 8, No. 646;9, No. 50; Ott (Tokyo) to Berlin No. 204 of 8 Mar. 1940, AA, St.S., “Japan,” Bd. 2, fr. 398404–5; AA, Ha Pol, Clodius, “Japan,” Bd. 3, passim.

136
Morley,
Fateful Choice,
pp. 23–24; Krebs,
Japans Deutschlandpolitik,
1: 368–69.

137
On the period of the Yonai government Gan.-July 1940), see Krebs, 1: 379–437.

138
Donald Smythe,
Pershing, General of the Annies
(Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana Univ. Press, 1986), chaps. 5–26, provides a good picture of the American role.

139
The author has placed this issue in a broader perspective in Jurgen Rohwer and Eberhard Jäckel (eds.),
Kriegswende Dezember
1941 (Koblenz: Bernard & Graefe, 1984), pp. 73–74.

140
This is the burden of Robert A. Divine’s
Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism in America during World War II
(New York: Atheneum, 1967).

141
These issues are discussed in William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason,
The World Crisis and American Foreign Policy
, 2 vols. (New York: Harper, 1952–53); Robert A. Divine,
The Reluctant Belligerent
, 2d ed (New York: Wiley, 1979); Wayne S. Cole,
Roosevelt and the Isolationists
, 1932–45 (Lincoln, Neb.: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1983); Robert Dallek,
Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy
, 1932–1945 (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1979).

142
Haight,
American Aid to France.

143
There is a good study of Bullitt by Beatrice Farnsworth,
William
C.
Bullitt and the Soviet Union
(Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1967), and his brother prepared an edition of his correspondence, Orville H. Bullitt (ed.),
For the President, Personal and Secret
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972). (Henceforth cited as
Bullitt Papers.)
There is no scholarly study of Strauss, the first American ambassador to Paris in twenty years who spoke French. A friendly account is Reginald W. Kauffman,
Jesse Isidor Strauss
(New York: private print, 1973). Neither Bullitt nor Strauss is included among those covered in the fine collection of Kenneth P. Jones,
U.S. Diplomats in Europe,
1919–1941, repro ed. (Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-Clio, 1983).

144
Langer and Gleason,
World Crisis,
1: 222; Dallek,
Roosevelt and Foreign Policy,
p. 201.

145
For an account of this struggle which is very strongly biased in favor of the isolationists, see Cole,
Roosevelt and the Isolationists.

146
Elliott Roosevelt (ed.),
F.D.R.: His Personal Letters
1928–1945, 2 vols. (New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1950), 2: 934. (Henceforth cited as
FDR Letters.)

147
The final vote in the Senate was 55 to 24; in the House of Representatives, 243 to 172. In both houses, the vote was mainly along partisan lines.

148
ADAP,
D, 8, 22,54, 56, 85, 88, 129, 220, 301.

149
Gerhard Wagner (ed.),
Lägevorträge des Oberbefehlshabers der Kriegsmarine vor Hitler 1939–1945
(Munich: Lehmanns, 1972), p. 27.

150
it should be noted that Roosevelt’s own experience as second man in the Navy Department had sensitized him to the problem of shipping which would become so crucial. See the memorandum by D.J. Callahan for Roosevelt of 11 Dec. 1939, FDRL, PSF Great Britain, Kennedy, Box 53.

151
Gerhard L. Weinberg,
World in the Balance
(Hanover, N.H.: Univ. Press of New England, 1981), pp. 53–74. On the pre-war development of German-American relations, see Weinberg,
Foreign Policy,
1933–36, chap. 6, and 1937–39, pp. 249–55.

152
Jochen Thies,
Architekt der Weltherrschaft: Die “Endziele” Hitlers
(Dusseldorf: Droste, 1976), chap. 3.

153
Friedrich von Boetticher, “Soldat am Rande der Politik,” BA/MA, N 323/56, P.209.

154
Gerhard L. Weinberg (ed.),
Hitlers Zweites Buch
(Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1961), pp. 138ff.

155
Borg and Okamoto,
Pearl Harbor,
pp. 176–77.

156
See
FDR Letters,
p. 920.

157
The preceding
USS North Carolina
was to have been completed in the 1920S but was
scrapped in 1923 under the terms of the Washington Naval Treaty. Here is one of the many examples of the extent to which German propaganda about the failure of the victors of World War I to disarm was unrelated to the truth. There is some irony in the fact that the scrapped
North Carolina
was to have been essentially the size of the
Bismarck;
the one subsequently built was smaller. A short account in John R. Corbett,
Ships by the Name of North Carolina
(Wilmington, N.C.: Corbett, 1961).