Chanakya's New Manifesto: To Resolve the Crisis Within India (16 page)

2.52  Another suggestion made by some electoral reform activists is to implement the Right to Recall. This aims to give voters, subsequent to an election, the right to recall the winning candidate should his or her conduct deserve such a response. If a sufficient percentage of the voters express their dissatisfaction with their representative, s/he would have to step down and fresh elections would be held. Although, generally speaking, voters should be empowered as much as possible, such a measure could be problematic. First, the measures enumerated earlier to keep tainted people out of the democratic process, automatically reduces the need for recall. Secondly, the measure introduces a degree of instability in the system, where a winning candidate will always be on his or her guard against being recalled, which might lead him or her to choose the safe option every time it comes to taking a decision. Thirdly, in large constituencies we could potentially have the task of mobilizing and supervising innumerable Right to Recall petitions which may put too much strain on the system. Finally, this measure could be partially abused by defeated candidates to engineer a call for fresh elections. In a situation where majorities in state assemblies and Parliament are wafer-thin, political parties are very likely to initiate Right to Recall petitions with the sole motive of coming to power through unfair means. Voters do need to be empowered to monitor the working of their representatives. They need to be able to pressure them to fulfil their promises. Voters must not remain passive bystanders in the interregnum between elections. However, this goal is better served by mobilizing and educating voters about their rights. An aware and vigilant electorate, with the right avenues to continuously express its opinion, is a crucial aspect of democracy. Citizens groups, NGOs and other public service organizations must work to ensure this. This would be a better option than formalizing the Right to Recall in our electoral system.

2.53  One way of empowering the voter is to give him or her the information and the opportunity to make a more informed choice about who is best qualified to represent him or her. At the moment there is little space for voters to interrogate candidates, or to hear them calmly debate issues, or to evaluate, through reasoned discussion, what parties have to offer in response to constituency-specific needs. In many other democratic systems, opposing candidates meet to debate issues in institutionally organized public forums. Some democracies have the system of primaries which enables voters to actively participate in a pre-election exercise which familiarizes them with candidates and the issues of the day. None of this happens in our elections.

2.54  As has been proposed earlier, all candidates will need to be announced six months in advance of the polls which should go some way towards enabling voters to get to know their potential representatives. To further facilitate the empowering process, local administrative authorities, under the supervision of the EC, must provide public platforms for debates between candidates, and try and ensure maximum media coverage for such events. Candidates would also be required to appear before local bodies such as panchayats or zila parishads, or citizen’s groupings, to answer questions and defend their credentials. A mature democracy must provide more opportunities for relevant political interaction between a candidate and a voter, and between candidates themselves, prior to the casting of the vote itself.

2.55  The proliferation of non-serious candidates over the years has become a genuine problem. The EC and the Law Commission have suggested that the right way to counter this is to increase the security deposit of candidates. Further, the EC should be given the power to decide on security deposits before each election so that repeated amendments to the RP Act are not necessary.

2.56  The Law Commission has recommended that independent candidates should be debarred from contesting elections to the Lok Sabha. However, it is difficult to endorse this proposal. The democratic process must give space to those who wish to contribute in the political sphere without affiliating themselves to one party or the other. Standing as an independent is a legitimate way to express a lack of confidence with all political parties; it is also one way for candidates excluded for partisan reasons by the various political parties to test their popularity with the electorate.

2.57  The EC has recommended that ‘advertisements of the achievements of governments, either central or state, in any manner, should be prohibited for a period of six months prior to the date of expiry of the term of the house, and in case of premature dissolution, from the date of dissolution of the house.’
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This should be implemented immediately. The EC has advocated that an exception to this rule could be made for advertisements seeking to disseminate information on poverty alleviation and health-related schemes. However, it would be a mistake to do this as the avenue of spending government resources to project the achievements of the government in power prior to elections has been much misused. There must be a blanket ban effective six months before elections. In any case, there are enough avenues outside government-sponsored advertisements to disseminate information.

2.58  The EC’s recommendation that a person be debarred from contesting from more than one constituency is an excellent one. If a candidate wins from both constituencies s/he has to vacate one, and elections have to be held in this constituency again. This involves additional expenditure and human resources. But the more important reason is that it is party bosses who usually resort to double constituencies as a form of insurance against losing in one. Only they can afford the expenditure of fighting two elections. This provision is, therefore, inherently unfair and restricts the democratic rights of others less privileged.

2.59  The EC is one of the few institutions in the country which has a proven track record of competence and probity. Its role in sincerely endeavouring to conduct free and fair elections has been acknowledged along bipartisan lines. Within the framework of legality and democratic rights, democratic reform in India needs a stronger and more effective EC with wider powers of surveillance, monitoring and deterrence.

2.60  An important step in strengthening the EC is to extend to all the three election commissioners the same level of constitutional protection that is available to the CEC. Clause (5) of Article 324 of the Constitution specifies that the CEC cannot be removed from office except in like manner and on like grounds as a judge of the Supreme Court. This protection must extend to all election commissioners.

2.61  To preserve the effectiveness and independence of the EC it must be insulated from interference by the executive. It is essential, therefore, that the EC also has autonomy over the functioning of its secretariat as well as the secretariats of the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha, and the registries of the Supreme Court and high courts.

2.62  For the same reason, the EC’s budget must be treated as ‘charged’ on the Consolidated Fund of India.

2.63  But all these provisions can only become truly effective if the president of India works proactively to protect the effectiveness and independence of the EC. The CEC, and the other members of the EC, are appointed by the president. Unlike other appointments made on the advice of the executive, members of the EC report only to the president. Even a routine matter like leave or a visit abroad, has to be, in their case, sanctioned by the president. The EC as an institution, therefore, derives its strength from the constitutional protection provided to it by the president of India.

2.64  Unfortunately, in recent times the office of the president of India has been reticent in fulfilling its constitutional role. During the assembly elections in U.P. in 2012, the CEC was left with little option but to write to the president seeking intervention in a matter where two cabinet ministers wilfully and repeatedly flouted the instructions of the EC. The president, instead of acting decisively, merely passed on the letter of the CEC to the PM. The letter of the CEC, a constitutional functionary reporting solely to the president, was not even acknowledged. Given the fact that the two erring ministers belonged to the PM’s party, it was not surprising that he did very little about the matter.

2.65  It needs to be reiterated that Article 42—which was last amended during the Emergency and later, only partially, restored—needs to be reviewed. The role of an elected head of state in preserving the sanctity and intent of the Constitution, especially with regard to the working of independent bodies like the EC, cannot be merely ceremonial, even in a parliamentary democracy where real executive power is vested in the PM. This is even more relevant today, when the functioning of our democracy is witness to the kind of change which the founders of our Constitution did not contemplate.

2.66  No reform of our democratic polity can be complete without taking up the pivotal issue of inner party democracy. Only when parties have regular, free and fair elections that give members the freedom of constructive discussion and debate, can the system be entitled to call itself a mature democratic polity. The rampant spread of dynastic politics and the culture of an unapproachable, omniscient and ubiquitous high command, fosters a milieu of sycophancy and enforced conformity which is antithetical to the spirit of democracy.

2.67  All political parties must, therefore, make public their schedule of internal elections, both at the state and national levels. Past experience, however, shows that even when elections are ‘duly’ held, they are stage-managed affairs, manipulated by the party high command to enable a chosen one to be elected ‘unanimously’. On other occasions, in keeping with the sycophantic culture that has evolved, decisions on critical issues or on the choice of leadership at different levels of the party are passively surrendered to the party chief, who often holds that office because s/he belongs to a political dynasty. Both these practices are condemnable.

2.68  The initiative to rectify this state of affairs cannot be left to political parties. It is therefore recommended that all party elections be conducted in a structured and fair manner by the EC. The EC has the requisite expertise to provide this service. Its role would not be intrusive but purely supervisory in ensuring that due process is followed, and that candidates are given a fair chance without a decision being imposed on them by an individual, a coterie or cabal at the helm. Moreover, the EC has indicated that it is willing to take on this responsibility.

2.69  Some parties can be expected to oppose this proposal on the grounds that the EC does not have the mandate to hold inner party elections and that if it did so, it would constitute undue interference in their internal affairs. Opposition is likely to be the greatest from parties that practice inner party democracy the least. However, in the larger interest of healthy democratic practices in the country, this decision should be pushed through. The broad mandate of the EC is to administer major electoral processes in India. Political parties, which claim to represent the electorate, are a vital part of these processes. They are public bodies whose conduct as per democratic tenets is pivotal to the credibility of the system itself. The EC has the power to register such parties. If there are disputes between splinter groups of registered parties, it can, as part of its quasi-judicial powers, settle them. As part of these powers, the EC is entitled to ensure that those seeking registration have the requisite democratic credentials. If, for instance, a party which says that it does not believe in inner party democracy, and holds dynastic succession to be the only form of succession, applies for registration, the EC could question whether such a party has the credentials to be registered in a democracy. The Supreme Court has held that when enacted laws are silent on electoral issues the EC has residuary powers under the Constitution to act in an appropriate manner. Most importantly, the EC already has the mandate to ask political parties to hold organizational elections at periodic intervals. Given this, the EC should take it upon itself to conduct inner party elections, and all parties must welcome this role in order to raise the credibility of their organizations and for the overall benefit to democracy in the country as a whole.

2.70  This being said, there is the question of whether the introduction of inner party democracy might not lead to organizational meltdown. Often, a strong leader and a limit to the expression of dissent appear to be the only ways to enforce discipline within our major political parties. What we need to find is the balance which allows inner party democracy to coexist with inner party discipline, so that after an opportunity is provided for dissent and debate, all members abide by the final decision of the party leadership. We need to create a leadership strong enough to contain internal dissension, but not so strong, or overtaken by its strength, that it becomes an undemocratic force.

2.71  Whatever the dangers of avoidable indiscipline and the misuse of intra party democratic freedoms to pursue self-serving agendas, inner party democracy is a must, as it encourages people to think, and prevents, or at least reduces, the possibility of personality cults. It brings debate out into the open. It renders irrelevant the hypocrisy of party workers saying one thing to the leader and another behind his back. It is congruent with freedom of choice and the dignity of the individual. It is an antidote to the mind-numbing sycophancy that has become the norm.

2.72  However, with a view to maintaining party cohesion and discipline, once a decision has been taken by a party after free dissent and debate, the party leadership must have the powers to move against those who disobey the party’s directive or work against its interests. For this purpose, the instrumentality of the ‘whip’ issued by parties in Parliament must be retained, although there is a school of thought that believes that this stifles the right of the MPs to express their individual opinions. However, while the right to express a dissenting opinion must exist within party forums, it should not be allowed in the house where party solidarity is a must.